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ABSTRACT 
Watching the Watchers: Non-State Actor Monitoring of State Compliance with International 
Humanitarian Law 
Brooke Caroline Greene 
 This dissertation examines monitoring of state compliance with international 
humanitarian law (IHL) conducted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).  In 
subjecting this particular monitoring regime to systematic analysis, the dissertation sheds light on 
the more general question of the effects of international law on state behavior.   
 The project first places the de facto monitoring regime that governs IHL in the broader 
context of other monitoring regimes in international politics.  Here the decentralized nature of 
the monitoring regime that governs IHL is highlighted. The central role played by a non-state 
actor - the ICRC - in both the initial codification of the law and its monitoring is partial 
indication of the tepid interest of states in securing compliance with the law.  This chapter 
likewise examines variation in the IHL monitoring regime across time to explain how exogenous 
changes in the nature of war in the post-World War II period led to the obsolescence of the 
institution of the protecting power and its replacement by an ad hoc monitoring system with the 
ICRC at its center.  The informality of this institutional arrangement proved an asset, as it was 
not hamstrung by the same considerations that bedeviled its competitors, the protecting power 
and the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC).   
 The dissertation proceeds to introduce an original dataset and to test via statistical 
analysis a set of hypotheses about the conditions under which states grant access to the ICRC as 
a monitor of IHL compliance.  Though both regime type variables and variables related to the 
military-strategic context prove significant, there is substantial evidence that states make 
strategic use of monitor access, for instance offering partial but incomplete access as a way to 
accrue at minimum cost the benefits of signaling compliance. There is further evidence that, 
while some indicators of military urgency decrease monitor access as realists would predict, 
other such indicators have the opposite effect.  I read this as indication that offering a degree of 
access holds some political value to warring states and thus is an incentive for states to offer 
partial access even absent full commitment to the law.  This intermediate level of access that 
appears so attractive to states is thus a potential moral hazard.    
 The next chapter examines the strategic decisions, not of states, but of the ICRC itself, 
probing in particular the circumstances under which it is most likely to break its confidentiality 
policy and "go public."  Examining the full universe of ICRC press releases from 1995 - 2005, I 
find evidence that the organization is particularly likely to choose a policy of silence in situations 
in which states refuse it access.  This decision may sometimes be problematic.  As in the case of 
the Algerian civil war, the organization may hold its tongue during a civil war in which IHL 
violation is rampant only to happily announce that it has been welcomed back into the state once 
the opposition has been routed.  This chapter also finds evidence for the relevance of a cultural 
variable.  Because ICRC neutrality is particularly suspect in contexts in which a politicized 
strand of Islam is a salient conflict dimension, the ICRC tends toward a general policy of silence 
in such conflicts.  A notable exception, nevertheless consistent with the general logic explicated 
here, is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which the ICRC has been unusually critical of Israel in 
an attempt, I argue, to demonstrate the organization's credibility to Arab and Muslim audiences.  
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 Non-state Actor Monitoring of State Compliance with International Humanitarian Law 
In October of 2003, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued a public 
critique of the U.S. policy of holding Guantánamo Bay detainees indefinitely (Lewis 2003). In 
contrast, in November of 2004, after its confidential report on the treatment of prisoners at 
Guantánamo was leaked to the New York Times, the ICRC issued a statement refusing to validate 
the details of the leak and reiterating its commitment to the confidentiality of the results of its 
monitoring missions (Lewis 2004; ICRC 2004). During roughly the same time period, U.S. 
officials admitted to obstructing ICRC access to certain “ghost detainees” and delaying 
“unannounced” visits from the monitoring organization (Schmitt and Shanker 2004, Jehl and 
Schmitt 2004).  
These incidents surrounding the Guantánamo controversy
1
 offer just a snapshot of the 
contestation that takes place between states and those organizations tasked with monitoring state 
compliance with international humanitarian law, and it is this contestation that the dissertation 
seeks to probe. What explains variation in state decisions to grant access to humanitarian law 
monitoring organizations, particularly when the state expects to violate international 
humanitarian law? Conversely, what factors determine the strategic decisions made by the 
monitoring organizations themselves, such as the ICRC’s decision about when to maintain its 
general policy of discretion and when to “go public” about particular violations?  
                                                          
1 As this example is merely intended to illustrate the types of political dynamics that inhere between governments 
and monitoring organizations, for now we can leave aside the question of whether or not the Guantánamo detainee 
dispute is properly considered a case of international humanitarian law monitoring (given debates about the 





International humanitarian law (IHL) refers to a body of legal restraints on the means that 
may be used in war. Codified in the 1894 Hague Conventions, the 1929 Geneva Conventions, the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, IHL 
outlines guidelines for, among other things, the protection of civilians in wartime, the treatment 
of prisoners of war and the wounded, and the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable 
weapons (Dinstein 2004). In the just war tradition, these are known as jus in bello restrictions.
2
 
The extent to which this body of law exerts a meaningful effect on state behavior is of immense 
practical significance, given the extent of human suffering caused by war in general and the 
particularly insidious aspects of war that IHL attempts to limit in particular.
3
  
In addressing questions related to the monitoring of international humanitarian law, this 
dissertation hopes to contribute to broader theoretical debates on the effects of international law, 
and the law of war in particular, on state behavior. Past research on international institutions and 
international law has featured a debate between rational institutionalists,
4
 who argue that legal or 
institutional arrangements can help overcome certain structural barriers to interstate cooperation, 
and those who cast doubt on the ability of such institutions to exert a significant effect on state 
behavior.
5
 In recent years this debate has centered primarily on the extent of state compliance 
                                                          
2
 One interesting question about the modern law of war is why questions of jus ad bellum have been superseded in 
importance by questions of jus in bello.  
  
3
 This is not to say that the tenets of IHL necessarily prohibit the largest sources of human suffering. A fascinating 
literature  has emerged attempting to explain why some laws (or norms) come to be while other possible contenders 
never assume the status of law (or norm).  
 
4
 For instance Chayes and Chayes 1993, 1994; Keohane 1984; Keohane and Martin 1995; Morrow 2001, 2002, 
2007; Simmons 2000, 2005. 
 
5
 Those scholars I (arguably) classify as critics of international law’s efficacy are themselves a diverse lot. They 
include those who emphasize the endogeneity of institutions to the political context in which they are created 
(Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom 1996; Mearsheimer 1995; von Stein 2005) , those who identify strategic motives for 




with international legal commitments, as well as on the causal indicators of state compliance 
level. This dissertation seeks to move beyond the narrow focus on compliance to consider 
instead the ways in which both states and international monitoring organizations strategically 
respond to the constraints created by law.  
In addition to speaking to the general international law literature, the dissertation will 
likewise contribute to a small but growing literature on the causes and consequences of variation 
in monitoring regimes. Monitoring refers to arrangements that exist for the provision of 
information about states’ level of compliance with international agreements. By reducing 
uncertainty and fear about cheating, monitoring is viewed by functionalists as a standard tool by 
which institutions are able to facilitate cooperation. Monitoring arrangements can vary from 
simple self-reporting to highly delegated systems of inspection and arbitration.
6
  Existing 
research has suggested that variation in the degree of delegation to monitoring regimes can be 
explained by the extent to which state interest aligns with the interests of the victims of 
noncompliance and the availability of these victims as low-cost monitors (Dai 2002). Domestic 
incentives for compliance (Jo 2008) and the preferences of particularly pivotal states (Brown 
2006) have likewise been identified as central causes of variation in monitoring regimes.  
 Extant rationalist work on monitoring, however, generally neglects the law of war and 
fails to explain a notable characteristic of monitoring in the law of war regime: little to no de 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Valentino 2004), and those who emphasize the role of organizational or domestic factors in determining state 
compliance (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Legro 1997; Neumayer 2005).  
6 The International Monetary Fund (IMF), which itself undertakes highly centralized monitoring of member states, 
and Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) , which delegates monitoring responsibilities to the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), both rank high on the monitoring scale, while the human rights regime, relying 







 delegation to monitors accompanied by significant – though varied – de facto cooperation 
with non-state monitors. One working from a rationalist perspective might view the lack of a 
centralized monitoring regime for the law of war as unsurprising, as states may have lacked 
incentive to accept significant sovereignty costs in exchange for the meager informational 
advantages monitoring would bring. Yet, if this is so, state acceptance of de facto monitoring by 
non-governmental institutions like the ICRC and Human Rights Watch becomes a puzzle. This 
dissertation aims to shed light on this disjuncture between law (de jure monitoring arrangements) 
and practice (de facto monitoring) while focusing primarily on the latter. 
 What activities constitute monitoring of international humanitarian law? As will be 
discussed in Chapter Two, precisely what monitoring activities are permitted by which 
organizations is a contentious issue that was the subject of much wrangling among states in the 
course of the formation of IHL. Thus, there is not a straightforward or static answer to that 
question.  However, it is helpful to consider at this stage what range of activities are included 
under the rubric of IHL monitoring.  At one end of the spectrum, one could imagine a highly 
centralized form of oversight in which monitors have real-time access to battle sites and freedom 
to object to specific means or methods of warfare observed in the course of this battle-time 
access.  For the most part, such monitoring was not seriously considered by states or 
international organizations as within the realm of feasible options.  Rather, the tasks that were 
more commonly considered included visits to prisoner of war and civilian detainee camps, post-
battle examinations of territories and witnesses, and contact with military authorities as needed to 
discuss IHL-related concerns.  It was also considered whether each of these activities might 
sometimes take place in the course of an enquiry procedure or investigation about possible IHL 
                                                          
7 Several attempts have been made to create de jure monitoring mechanisms for the law of war regime. These 




violations.  Though each chapter below will clarify what specific monitoring activities are of 
interest for particular questions asked in this dissertation, at a bare minimum "monitoring" 
requires some permission granted by the state for the organization to access military sites and 
personnel that would not normally be accessible by those outside the state apparatus for the 
purpose of obtaining information about the state's compliance with IHL.  
This dissertation examines three related questions.  Chapter Two examines in detail the 
unique de facto monitoring arrangement that exists for the law of war and seeks to place this 
monitoring arrangement in the context of other monitoring arrangements that serve particular 
regimes in the realms of international economy, international security, and human rights.  When 
compared to monitoring regimes like that that exists for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
or Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the monitoring regime that exists for the law of war 
is notably less centralized.  This lack of centralization is an expression of states' less salient 
interest in ensuring mutual compliance given the significant cost of delegating autonomy on this 
dimension.  However, one notable anomaly here is the continued effort states and international 
actors have expended to produce more centralized monitoring mechanisms, like the International 
Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (IHFFC), which have nevertheless remained dead letter, 
much less utilized than the de facto monitoring undertaken largely under the initiative of non-
governmental organizations. This apparent paradox is a reflection of a more profound 
disagreement among academics, states, and policymakers alike about the amenability of 
mankind's most pernicious problems - war, poverty, atrocity - to legalistic solutions.  While 
normative entrepreneurs and a diverse though small set of states have sought to replace the de 
facto IHL monitoring regime with a more centralized - and presumably more effective - 




constituted a daunting challenge to such efforts.   Another way to read the apparent failure of the 
IHFFC is that the majority of states found the proposed alternative less conducive to state 
interest than was the system already in place.  
Given this state of affairs, the next chapter turns its attention to the ways in which states 
adapt strategically to the terrain created by law and by the de facto monitoring regime that 
oversees state behavior in regard to law. By systematically exploring the conditions under which 
states are more or less likely to grant one particular but significant monitor of IHL - the ICRC - 
access, this chapter lays the ground for future work to more fully assess monitors' effectiveness. 
This chapter argues that state access decisions are strategic and are significantly determined by 
variables that live at both the second and third images. Mixed support is found for the realist 
contention that access is granted most in contexts in which it costs the least, particularly in 
contexts in which military-strategic incentives for law of war violation, perhaps always present, 
are relatively low. Though some variables indicative of a more dire military-strategic threat do 
decrease access, others exert the opposite effect.  I argue that this is because signaling 
compliance - even if insincerely - is a source of political or ideological power, a source that 
realism may underestimate. Variables at the second image exert a significant influence as well, 
with general measures of the extent of democracy versus autocracy as well as more nuanced 
classifications of regime type proving significant.  However, when the military-strategic and 
regime type variables interact, it is unerringly in the direction of military-strategic variables 
dampening the positive effects of regime type on access.  This chapter also provides evidence 
that regimes in general and certain types of regimes in particular - namely presidential regimes -  
may employ an intermediate level of access as a way of obtaining some benefits from 




geographic or issue-specific. Overall, this chapter warns observers not to equate access with 
commitment, as access decisions are driven by their own political logic.  
Finally, Chapter 4 turns the tables to consider the strategic incentives faced by 
humanitarian monitors themselves.  This chapter uses case study evidence to evaluate the 
circumstances under which the ICRC is most likely to maintain its policy of confidentiality or 
depart from this policy and instead "go public."  This chapter finds that, as access is the 
overwhelming priority of the organization and its promise of confidentiality a key tool in 
securing such access from states, the organization is unlikely to "go public" about consistent 
refusal of states to grant access. This presents a certain risk to the organization's humanitarian 
efficacy - in cases like the Algerian civil war, discussed in this chapter, the organization may find 
itself staying silent while massive atrocities are committed only to announce, once the opposition 
is effectively routed, that it has now received an invitation from the state. This chapter 
additionally finds evidence for the relevance of a particular cultural variable to ICRC publicity 
decisions.  I argue that, given the U.S.' role in the War on Terror, the neutrality claimed by the 
ICRC is particularly challenged in contexts in which politicized Islam is a salient feature of the 
conflict.  This results in less access from Muslim majority states and, in general, greater 
reluctance on the part of the ICRC to use publicity in such contexts.  However, the difficulty of 
demonstrating its neutrality in such contexts is also part of the explanation for the exceptional 
degree of negative publicity that the ICRC has directed against Israel in its conflict with 
Palestinian separatists.  The other part of the explanation lies in the improbability that Israel, 
given its robust democracy and history of granting access to the organization, would retaliate by 





CHAPTER TWO:  
International Humanitarian Law Monitoring in Context 
 Introduction  
 Since the late 1980s, scholars of international relations have taken increased interest in 
the variation that exists among institutions created by states, as well as the possible consequences 
of this variation.  This chapter surveys variation in monitoring regimes in the international legal 
context, placing the monitoring regime that exists for the law of war in the context of other 
regimes that exist for legal commitments in international political economy and international 
security.  This chapter will first briefly review the political science debate about institutions in 
general before zeroing in on the specific topic of monitoring as an empirical and theoretical 
puzzle with significant substantive consequences.  This chapter then proceeds to investigate 
historical evolution in the de facto and de jure monitoring mechanisms that govern the law of 
war.  The question of institutional change is one that has been given short shrift in the literature 
to date, partly due to the polarized way in which institutions - and particularly international 
institutions - have been considered.
8
 Yet, the historical trajectory of law of war monitoring 
presents an empirical arena from which insights about institutional change and institutional 
obsolescence might be gleaned.  Lessons can be learned from the obsolescence of one 
monitoring institution (the protecting power), the failure of states to ward off this obsolescence 
with institutional innovation, the subsequent failure of a replacement institution (the International 
Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission), and the rise instead of a vibrant de facto monitoring 
system with the ICRC at its center.  Several questions arise from this tale of evolution : what 
factors affect the ability of an institution to weather dramatic exogenous changes? Under what 
                                                          
8
 Martin and Simmons (1998) usefully address this polarization between the institutionalists who are optimistic that 




conditions do informal institutions have advantages over formal institutions? In order to 
enlighten this question, this chapter will make use of the historical record as well as primary 
documents from the International Committee of the Red Cross, particularly the official records of 
the Diplomatic Conferences in 1974, 1975, and 1976, that led to the 1977 Protocols Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949.   
 The primary purpose of this chapter is to place the monitoring regime that exists for IHL 
in broader theoretical and empirical context rather than to advance a causal claim about the 
nature of law of war monitoring.  This exploration will set the stage for the consideration in later 
chapters of the ways in which monitoring unfolds under the extant regime.  In addition, a close 
empirical evaluation of law of war monitoring is fertile ground from which to derive hypotheses 
about institutional evolution more generally.  
 The Great Institutional Debate 
 The end of the Cold War heralded a great deal of optimism about the potential for inter-
state cooperation facilitated by international institutions.  Because this debate is well-known, I 
will summarize it only briefly here.  Liberal institutionalists, drawing on the logic of cooperation 
under anarchy introduced by game theoretic investigations, argued that well-designed institutions 
could help to overcome many of the barriers to interstate cooperation presented by the anarchic 
nature of the international milieu. If inefficient outcomes in interstate relations were the product 
of mistrust and uncertainty about others' intentions, then institutions that helped to reduce 
uncertainty about these intentions and mitigate the negative consequences of being duped by 
another state (among other functions) could dramatically increase the degree of cooperation in 




by the unfortunate byproducts of anarchy, but institutions could play a central role in helping 
states to overcome these barriers to realize mutual benefit (Keohane 1984; Keohane and Martin 
1995; Morrow 2001, 2002; Simmons 2000, 2005). 
 Realists, of course, took issue with each of these claims. They suspected that the 
institutionalists were naively exaggerating the potential for mutual benefit that existed in 
international relations.  As Robert Jervis (1988) has usefully suggested, much of the 
disagreement between realists and institutionalists centers on a disagreement about how much 
unrealized potential for cooperation exists in the world.  For institutionalists, there are many 
cases in which anarchy has tragically thwarted an agreement in which both parties could improve 
their positions.  For realists the assumption is instead that in most cases, or at least most cases 
that matter, there is no way to improve one state's position within harming another's - states are 
already, so to speak, "on the Pareto frontier."  Given this state of affairs, what most matters is not 
any magical innovation of institutional design but the straightforward distribution of power that 
prevails. There may be cases in which powerful states use institutions to their benefit, but in 
these cases it is the power underlying the institution that provides the critical causal impetus 
(Mearsheimer 1995).  
 Constructivists, in turn, criticize the assumptions about which realists and institutionalists 
tend to agree - the state as a unitary rational actor and power as a relatively unproblematic 
construct with an objective character.  Rather than enumerate the rationalist functions institutions 
can potentially solve, constructivists might highlight the role that institutions can play in shaping 
state identities and interests.  A constructivist might, for instance, remind us that an institution is 





 Though these paradigms are useful for clarifying competing assumptions underlying 
scholars' claims, there are real limits to each paradigm's ability to enlighten important 
international political puzzles.  Realists are at a loss to explain why the institutional order created 
during the Cold War remains remarkably undisturbed several decades later. Institutionalists 
struggle to integrate the vicissitudes of state power into their accounts of institutions' origin, 
growth, and consequences.  Constructivists likewise struggle to explain why some norms comes 
to exist while others do not.  In his recent article on state compliance with the law of war, James 
Morrow (2007) includes a useful table (p. 569) in which he compares each of his article's results 
with claims deduced from the field's three competing paradigms.  Unsurprisingly, he doesn't find 
a home run for any of the 3 contenders; rather, each paradigm enlightens some aspects of 
empirical reality and obscures others.  I say unsurprisingly because it seems to be in the nature of 
the paradigms to frame the debate in overly stark terms that are difficult for the complexity of the 
empirical world to vindicate.  Rather than being right or wrong, the paradigms might be better 
considered as a reflection of an individual scholar's personality and the types of question that 
fascinate him or her.  
 Where, then, does this work fall in regard to the warring paradigms? The nature of the 
questions being asked here belies an interest in the means states use to govern their relations that 
has an obvious affinity with institutionalism.  Realist scholars tend not to devote their energy to 
studying the law of war except to debunk it, for instance by showing that typical realist strategic 
variables, rather than law itself, explain patterns of state wartime behavior (Valentino, Huth, and 
Croco 2008). Yet, it is certainly remiss to discount the centrality of power to outcomes in the 
international system, and, indeed, many traditionally realist variables keep popping up in this 




as parts of the strategic terrain that states face, neither discounting them as entirely 
epiphenomenal as some realists do nor lauding them as the solution to perennial problems of 
interstate relations as some institutionalists come close to doing.  In this vein, international 
institutions of different stripes create diverse incentives for states - when these incentives trump 
other, more narrowly strategic incentives and when they do not is an important question for 
investigation, one this dissertation hopes to begin to enlighten.  
 Law as an Institution 
 In the seminal issue of International Organization devoted to institutional design, 
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001) define international institutions as "explicit arrangements, 
negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behavior 
(762)."  Though customary international law may not meet these criteria to the extent that it has 
not been explicitly negotiated,
9
 positive (codified) international laws, such as the body of treaties 
that constitute the law of war, surely do.  To view law in this light, as an international institution, 
draws attention to questions about variation in design that might otherwise be overlooked. That 
is, international law is as appropriate a dependent variable as it is an independent variable.  The 
literature on international institutions thus speaks to international law and vice versa.  
 Monitoring  
 According to institutionalist scholars of IR, international institutions help to serve a 
number of functions that make cooperation among states more likely. For instance, they help to 
reduce uncertainty by codifying certain expectations of mutual behavior and providing 
information about the degree to which states meet these expectations.  Monitoring regimes often 
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play central roles in the fulfillment of these institutionalist functions. Monitoring regimes can be 
thought of as one response to the problem of asymmetrical information and incentives to 
misrepresent (Fearon 1995) in the domain of compliance with international legal commitments. 
Monitoring is separate from enforcement, but effective monitoring is often a necessary 
precondition for enforcement, as violation cannot be effectively punished or reciprocated if it 
goes undetected.   
 Monitoring regimes in international relations vary across a number of dimensions. They 
vary, firstly, in the nature of the entity with primary responsibility for monitoring. As Dai (2002, 
2007) observes, monitoring may be undertaken primarily by states, victims of noncompliance, 
NGOs, and treaty organizations, as well as by combinations of the above.  Additionally, as 
Brown (2008) argues, when monitoring is undertaken by a body other than the state, regimes 
vary in the nature and extent of delegation to the treaty body, as well as in the amount of 
resources available for the conduct of monitoring activities.  Importantly, regimes also vary in 
the use that is made of procured information, to whom and how that information is disclosed, and 
the likely consequences of information about compliance and noncompliance procured via 
monitoring.  As will become clear below, the de jure mechanisms in place for a particular 
monitoring regime may be quite different from the de facto mechanisms actually employed by 
states.  When this occurs, a further explanation of this gap between de jure and de facto practices 
is warranted.    
 This chapter will first briefly describe the nature of IHL monitoring.  Particular attention 
will be paid here to the distance between de jure monitoring mechanisms established by states 




mechanisms in broader context and review and assess the main competing explanations for the 
variation that exists across monitoring regimes in international law.  The final section will 
explore in detail the evolution that occurred across time in the IHL monitoring regime.   
 International Humanitarian Law Monitoring 
 International humanitarian law (IHL) is a body of treaty law governing the means state 
use in warfare.  In the broader domain of the law of war, IHL governs the area of jus in bello 
rather than jus ad bellum, which refers to the legality of engaging in war in the first place.  The 
law and ethics of warfare have made a clear distinction between these two categories in order to 
mitigate the likelihood that arguments about the just cause of the war render mute any attempts 
to prohibit specific acts within war.  Prior to the codification of IHL, restrictions on specific acts 
in war existed as customs tied to the institutions of knighthood and the Church that attempted to 
inspire restraint in the treatment of nobles in the one case and fellow Christians in the other.    
 The first major step in the multilateral codification of IHL came with the 1864 approval 
by sixteen states of the First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field, which, as its name indicates, focused primarily on the treatment 
of injured combatants.  The 1899 Hague Conventions expanded the focus to include treatment of 
prisoners of war and appropriate policies for armistice and capitulation. As one might expect, 
subsequent developments in IHL tended to follow wars of systemic significance, with 1929 
witnessing the codification of the Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War and on the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick and 1949 heralding four 




change to codified IHL came with the 1977 Protocol I Additionals, one of which attempted to 
extend the province of IHL to non-international armed conflicts (Dinstein 2004).    
 Though this broad body of treaty law covers a host of prescribed and proscribed state 
behaviors, Morrow and Jo (2006) have usefully classified the law according to nine issue areas. 
These include aerial bombardment, armistice/ceasefire, chemical and biological weapons, 
treatment of civilians, protection of cultural property, conduct on the high seas, prisoners of war, 
declaration of war, and treatment of the wounded.  
 Before one can understand the design of monitoring institutions for a specific legal area, 
one must first understand the nature of state interest in the codification of that law. At first 
glance, codification of law governing war appears surprising given the extent to which war is 
obviously a time when state security concerns are heightened and, as a result, should be an arena 
in which states are reluctant to surrender their sovereignty.  However, upon further examination 
it becomes clear that war is an arena in which there are many inefficiencies that negatively affect 
state interest; as a result incentives exist to create collective institutions to ameliorate these 
inefficiencies. It is perhaps not surprising that the first area to be codified concerned the 
treatment of the wounded.  This addressed an area in which state security interest might be 
advanced by remedying the situation in which injured soldiers - major tools of the state, after all 
- were left to suffer, spread infection, and die when the resource of the soldier's body might 
instead be better preserved for future use.  Agreeing to constraints on specific means of warfare 
seemed attractive, therefore, to the extent that states would benefit from their enemy's reciprocal 
restraint.  Yet, it is easy to see why monitoring would become relevant here - warring states 




the enemy into unreciprocated compliance.  Furthermore, in the "fog of war" it might be difficult 
to distinguish intentional policies of statecraft from the actions of isolated subordinates.   
 Of course, it might be a mistake to ascribe the wave of codification of IHL that occurred 
particularly in the twentieth century solely to a narrowly conceived view of state interest. 
Constructivists, among others, have drawn attention to the ways in which ideational variables at 
the supranational level can help to shape how states view their interests at a particular point in 
time. Colonization and decolonization, both occurring in waves and responding to normative and 
ideological concerns as well as to specific conceptualizations of state interest, are excellent 
examples of this phenomenon. In this view, the development of IHL must be put into a larger 
ideological context.  This context must include the massive devastation caused by both World 
Wars and particularly the outrage of the World War II victors (at least after the fact) to the 
Holocaust.  One might say that part of the zeitgeist of this era lay in legalization and multilateral 
efforts to reduce features of war that had once been considered inevitable.  
 Monitoring of IHL has been marked by the centrality of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC) as well as by the creation of other monitoring institutions whose 
pragmatic utility has paled in comparison to that of the ICRC.  The ICRC's involvement in IHL 
actually precedes the codification of the 1864 First Geneva Convention. In 1859 Henri Dunant, 
who would become one of the founders of the ICRC, witnessed the suffering of soldiers at the 
Battle of Solferino in the Austro-Sardinian War. He subsequently documented the carnage in a 
book entitled A Memory of Solferino, which he concluded with an impassioned plea for citizens 
to form an organization that would help to prevent and respond to such atrocities of war. It was 
with the urging of Dunant and four other Swiss citizens that the Swiss government convened the 




 After its establishment, the organization carved out a niche for itself as provider of relief 
and protection to soldiers injured by war and quickly developed a reputation for its neutrality.  In 
the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War the ICRC was 
explicitly mentioned as an organization that might consult on the development of the Central 
Information Agency (for POWs) or nominate a neutral party to serve as protecting power in the 
event of a dispute over the application of IHL.  The Committee's role in IHL monitoring 
continued to be acknowledged in subsequent Geneva Conventions.  The main tenor of these 
references to the ICRC was to acknowledge that states might call upon "the services of a neutral 
humanitarian organization, like the ICRC" if the other main institution that existed for this 
purpose, that of the protecting power (see below) proved insufficient. These treaties also 
acknowledged the "special position" of the ICRC as provider of relief and medical treatment near 
the battle field.  Interestingly, these treaties also typically included a statement to the effect that 
the provisions within the treaties were not intended to constitute an obstacle to the humanitarian 
work of the ICRC or a similar organization (Forsythe 2005).  
 It might be easy to overlook how unusual was this explicit naming of the ICRC in 
international treaty law.  This was after all a private organization with close ties to one state, 
although given its history of neutrality, Switzerland was, of course, not the average state.  Yet, it 
must be observed how very different granting such a role to the ICRC is from granting the role to 
a body  - like the IMF or the IAEA- that is ultimately responsive to the states who created the 
relevant law. One way of understanding states' willingness to make such a seemingly 
idiosyncratic choice is by noting how little de jure power the organization was given within the 
positive treaty law.  Most of the references to the organization consisted of permissive statements 




(such as that of the protecting power) were found wanting.  There was, then, little obliging states 
to employ the Committee's services if they did not wish to do so.  
 One of the mysteries of the law of war monitoring regime is that two institutions formally 
established to be monitors - the protecting power and the International Humanitarian Fact-
Finding Commission - fell by the wayside, while the ICRC instead took on a vibrant monitoring 
role.  Indeed, one might argue that, while the protecting power and the IHFFC have fallen short 
of their formally recognized duties, the ICRC has carved a de facto place for itself that even 
exceeds its rights and duties as enumerated in the treaty law, particularly when the issue of non-
international armed conflict is considered.  Before we investigate these mysteries in further 
detail, let us examine the features of the IHL monitoring system in comparison to other 
monitoring systems in international politics.  
 IHL Monitoring in Context 
  In this section, I briefly introduce several of the most significant monitoring regimes in 
international politics and compare these to the regime that governs IHL. The monitoring regimes 
considered here include those that monitor the GATT/WTO trade regime, the IMF monetary 
regime, several regimes (nuclear, chemical, and biological) in the broad domain of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) regulation, and the human rights regime. See Table 2.1 for an 
overview of these monitoring regimes across several dimensions.  
 Nature of the Monitor  
 As Dai emphasizes and will be discussed at greater length below, monitoring regimes 
vary as to whether monitoring activities are primarily undertaken by a treaty body created by 
states, by states themselves, or by non-state actors such as individual victims of noncompliance 




instances of centralization are the IMF Executive Board in the domain of monetary policy and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in regard to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT).  In contrast, less centralized monitoring is undertaken by state use of the dispute 
resolution mechanism in regard to GATT/WTO trade agreements, as well as by the NGOs that 
primarily monitor compliance with human rights agreements.  There is a trade-off worth noting 
here - though more centralized monitoring regimes are typically considered more significant 
constraints on state action, these centralized monitoring mechanisms, as the creation of states, are 
typically accountable to states in significant ways.  As for the decentralized monitoring 
mechanisms, states may avoid one type of sovereignty encroachment but surrender the 
opportunity to engineer monitors in ways consonant with state interest.  The human rights 
monitoring conducted by NGOs is a case in point here.     
 Clearly in this domain the monitoring regime actually utilized for IHL (rather than the 
more or less dead letter IHFFC) falls on the less centralized end of the spectrum, with monitoring 
conducted primarily by an organization that is closer to an NGO than to a treaty body.   This 
means that states retain a level of discretion about the extent of daily access to grant the ICRC 




 Monitoring Quality  
 Regimes vary not only in the nature of the actor that undertakes monitoring but also in 
the quality of the information produced by the monitoring mechanism.  How effective is the 
information collected at identifying instances of non-compliance? GATT/WTO has a centralized 
monitoring mechanism, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) which, its centralization 
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notwithstanding,  "does not effectively reveal noncompliance" (Dai,  441).  The reasons for this 
lie in the character of the surveillance reports themselves as well as in the (limited) capacity of 
the organization to create the reports with the frequency and detail that would render them most 
useful.  In contrast, the decentralized monitoring undertaken by states (and particularly by 
producers in states) employing the GATT/WTO Dispute Resolution Mechanism results in high 
quality information even as there is necessarily an element of triage involved in the selection of 
violations considered serious enough to warrant resort to dispute resolution.  This is indication 
that degree of  centralization itself is not a perfect proxy for the quality of the information 
produced via monitoring.
11
  Indeed, though more data is surely needed on this issue, it appears 
that the decentralized monitoring conducted by NGOs produces high quality information, though 
here the problem may be sorting through the mass quantity of information produced.  Another 
limitation of the information collected by NGOs is that in most cases they are not granted 
privileged access to state arenas relevant to assessing compliance, being often forced instead to 
collect information in the face of significant state resistance to their monitoring activities.
12
        
 How does the ICRC as a monitor of IHL fare in this regard? Here, as with the NGOs 
discussed above, the major limitation to the quality of ICRC monitoring lies in the vagaries of 
state access.  The organization is obviously not able to undertake monitoring absent state consent 
and, even when general consent is granted, the quality of monitoring may suffer due to state 
machinations that limit organization access to particular geographic areas or particular prisoners.  
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Another issue relevant to assessing the quality of information procured via monitoring is the 
level of publicity granted to this information, a topic to which I will now turn.          
 Publicity and Enforcement  
 Because one of the distinguishing features of the IHL monitoring system is the general 
confidentiality policy employed by the ICRC, the publicity granted by other monitoring 
organizations to the products of their monitoring missions is relevant.  One of the problems that 
monitoring organizations aim to solve is the desire of states to protect sensitive information even 
as they wish to signal their general compliance with relevant agreements.
13
  Thus, monitoring 
regimes such as the IAEA may protect particular pieces of information even as they publicly 
release summary reports of interest to other states and international actors attempting to evaluate 
the threat of defection.  Most of the monitoring organizations surveyed here employ, then, some 
degree of publicity.  One (relative) exception is the annual Article IV surveillance conducted by 
the IMF, which is generally private, though some steps have recently been made in the direction 
of greater transparency.  The Fund, with the consent of the relevant state, now frequently issues a 
Public Information Notice (PIN) that summarizes the results of its surveillance.  Yet, the 
requirement of consent and the element of summary make this component of publicity relatively 
modest.  
 An interesting question here is how publicity interacts with the mechanisms by which 
monitoring is able to improve state compliance.  In regard to the IMF, publicity may not be 
critical to improving state monetary policy as the IMF itself possesses significant sources of 
leverage over states, particularly debtor states.  Thus, the monitoring entity is also the entity that 
controls access to goods - usually loans - that states desire, so that publicity is not the primary 
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mechanism by which state behavior is likely to change.  In contrast, for a number of the more 
decentralized regimes, publicity is the primary mechanism by which these regimes might hope to 
exert influence on state behavior.  A case in point here are the NGOs that monitor state 
compliance with human rights' treaty obligations.  Election monitoring, discussed further below, 
operates similarly, with its relative efficacy increased by the weight given to the public 
pronouncements of election monitors by powerful states.  
 Given this state of affairs, the IHL monitoring conducted by the ICRC appears especially 
as an outlier.  Unsurprisingly, it lacks the mechanisms of influence, in the form of concrete and 
compelling material incentives, possessed by the IMF or the WTO.  However, what is more 
surprising is that in the absence of such tools it foregoes the opportunity to employ publicity as a 
matter of course.  On the face of it, this seems a recipe for irrelevance.  Further investigation will 
be needed to determine if this is in fact the case.  
  Explanatory Frameworks 
 The above sections undertook the descriptive work of placing the IHL monitoring regime 
in the context of other monitoring regimes in international relations. In this section, I review 
three significant recent works that attempt to explain the variation that exists across these 
regimes.  I then consider to what extent each explanation enlightens puzzles related to IHL 
monitoring.  Interestingly, each of these works, though differing in the particular explanations 
they offer, adopts a primarily rationalist explanation and utilizes quantitative methods (statistical 
analysis, game theory, and sometimes a combination of the two) to usefully test the effect of 
central rationalist variables such as state interest or information costs. I will attempt to 
demonstrate, however, that an historically-informed, qualitative analysis is useful for 




changes in both the nature of warfare and the international legal regime that governs it.  I will 
articulate both what the dominant, rationalist accounts enlighten as well as what they leave 
unexplored.  
 Upon considering these works, it quickly becomes apparent that the type of monitoring 
system that currently governs IHL is outside the rather narrow categories imagined by these 
scholars.  Thus, one contribution of this chapter is to describe an empirical phenomenon that has 
not previously been given sufficient attention and to explore the theoretical implications of this 
empirical oversight.  
 After reviewing the main argument of these three scholars, Ron Brown, Xinyuan Dai, and 
Hyeran Jo, I will briefly assess the ability of each explanation to enlighten the specific case of 
the law of war by considering 1) how each explanation might enlighten the de facto IHL system 
that exists today and 2) to what extent each explanation can explain the change over time that we 
have observed in monitoring in this area.   
 Ron Brown (2008) has tackled the puzzle of variation across international legal regimes 
with painstaking attention to empirical detail.  Writing decisively from the rationalist 
institutionalist perspective,  Brown uses analogies from cartel theory and principal-agent theory 
to construct a set of hypotheses about state delegation in the domain of Nuclear, Biological, and 
Chemical Weapons (NBCW).  This is a two-tiered theory in which Brown first considers why 
states have incentives to create international agreements and then why they have incentives to 
delegate key aspects of that agreement to an international agency.  In regard to the first task, 
Brown employs cartel theory to conceptualize the interests that states with high NBCW 




"cartel," as well as the collective action problems and distributional conflict that impede the 
formation of such a cartel.  He then uses principal-agent theory to deduce the costs and benefits 
of delegation in the service of the cartel.  He argues that international agencies can perform 
useful functions in bargaining, monitoring, and enforcement of international weapons' 
proliferation agreements.  Most notably, such agencies can reduce search costs - the costs of 
collecting highly technical and detailed information about numerous and disparate search targets 
- as well as sovereignty costs - for instance, the risk of disclosing sensitive information to other 
states that possess incentives for the strategic use of this information.   
 Brown's empirical accomplishments are impressive. He develops a quantitative measure 
of delegation to international agents that takes into account the range of functions the agent 
fulfills, the resources the agent possesses for the fulfillment of these functions, and the formal 
and informal ability of the agent to exert influence over the principal (in this case, the states that 
create the international agency).  He likewise attempts the difficult task of quantifying the annual 
threat level posed by each class of weapon and proceeding to test empirically each of his 
theoretical claims about delegation: claims about threat level, preference distribution, political 
and technical information costs, and enforcement.  He finds partial support for each of his 
claims.  In regard to threat level, he finds that higher threat predicts greater delegation for nuclear 
weapons but not for the biological and chemical weapons regimes.  In the realm of preference 
distribution, he finds that the more similar are states' preferences, the more likely is delegation, 
with the preferences of the most powerful NBCW states mattering more than the preferences of 
other states.  Again, though, this is much more clearly the case for the nuclear regime than for 
the other regimes under investigation.  As for information, he finds some (mixed) support for a 




technical information and diffusion of information targets favors delegation but only to the point 
at which such complexity makes the start-up costs of international monitoring too high.  Finally, 
he employs a case study of North and South Korean nuclear behavior before and after the 
institution of the NPT to argue that international organizations can reduce the costs to individual 
states of enforcing international agreements.
14
  Overall, Brown's argument is that states are more 
likely to delegate meaningfully to monitors when 1) there is a compelling objective to be 
achieved from cooperation; 2)  states' preferences are closer together rather than further apart; 3) 
search costs are high (but not prohibitively high); and 4) sovereignty costs are high.    
 What are the implications of Brown's argument for monitoring of IHL? First, it is 
important to note that the nature of the problem faced by states in regard to law of war violation 
presents a distinct strategic logic from the problems that the regimes Brown considers are 
intended to solve.
15
  He considers a situation in which a cartel of states seeks to prevent the 
proliferation of dangerous materials to states outside the cartel.  In such a case the factor most 
relevant to negotiating a monitoring regime is whether one is inside the cartel or outside.  
However, law of war issue areas like treatment of civilians or prisoners of war are not as clearly 
"cartel" issues.  Though there may be predictable variation in states' capacity to engage 
effectively in anti-civilian strategies or to successfully refrain from such strategies, most states 
are capable of strategies of violation
16
 as well as of restraint.
17
  This was especially true at the 
time of the initial codification of the law of war in 1864, when few low capacity states were 
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party to the major multilateral agreements.  Perhaps, however, the absence of this cartel logic 
might explain why there's less incentive to create centralized monitoring for the law of war in 
general than for regimes governing WMD.  One might say that states are more likely to create 
centralized monitoring when they are primarily attempting to tie others' hands, rather than their 
own.   
 Still, if the cartel logic is not precisely relevant, Brown's insights about sovereignty costs 
and search costs may still well be.  Brown predicts that, other things being equal, higher search 
costs and higher sovereignty costs create incentive for centralized monitoring regimes.  Given 
the absence of such centralization for the law of war in general and the presence of such 
centralization for regimes such as the NPT, the implication is that search costs and sovereignty 
costs are lower for the former than the latter.  
  To what extent do these claims enlighten change over time in the IHL monitoring 
regime? If anything, with the increasing legalization of the law of war and the increasing 
technological sophistication of military armaments, what Brown terms search costs have risen 
over the course of the last half of the twentieth century.  Sovereignty costs, too, have increased, 
particularly as the law of war has - if somewhat gingerly - entered the domain of non-
international armed conflict via Common Article 3 and the Protocol II Additional.  According to 
Brown's logic, these factors should have resulted in increased centralization of monitoring in the 
realm of the law of war.  This has been the case, however, in form only, with the level of 
centralization of de facto monitoring remaining relatively static.  Thus, at best Brown helps us to 
understand the absence of compelling state interest in law of war compliance and the absence of 




regime; his argument does relatively little to enlighten the very real change over time that IHL 
monitoring has undergone.    
  Xinyuan Dai (2007) has likewise offered a useful analytic framework for thinking about 
the monitoring regimes that states establish for the international legal commitments they assume.  
Two variables, she argues, determine the type of monitoring regimes that states will establish.  
The first variable is whether state interest is aligned with the victims of noncompliance, and the 
second is the availability of victims as low-cost monitors.  The first variable insightfully captures 
the reality that states might have varying levels of interest in ensuring compliance with the legal 
obligations they undertake.  That is, it is not equally important to states that all of their 
international legal commitments are upheld.  The second variable assumes that, even if states 
have an interest in assuring compliance, resource constraints create incentives for them to utilize 
low-cost monitors that might be available, such as victims and NGOs.  If other actors are willing 
and able to do the monitoring work for states, then those states have little incentive to establish 
more centralized monitoring regimes, the creation and maintenance of which will inevitably 
impose some costs on the state.   
 What predictions does Dai’s framework make in regard to law of war monitoring 
regimes, and are these predictions borne out in reality? The interest alignment variable is quite 
easy to apply to the law of war case, at least when the focus is on the law of international armed 
conflict,
18
 as is the primary (but not exclusive) focus here.  Because the victims of a state’s law 
of war violations are best viewed as opposing states themselves, these states can be considered, 
in Dai’s language, good agents of themselves. There may be cases in which this assumption is 
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not warranted, but these cases should be rare.  Mistreatment of another state’s soldiers can 
clearly be viewed as a victimization of the state as a whole, as can (generally speaking) such 
actions as targeting civilians/cultural sites.
19
  
 It is less clear how the law of war fares on Dai’s second variable, availability of victims 
as low cost monitors.  Dai employs two indicators to assess the value of this variable: 1) whether 
violation is readily observable to victims and 2) whether victims can identify the source of the 
violation  (pg 51).  In many cases, victims should be able to observe noncompliance – incidences 
of indiscriminate attacks against civilians, poisonous gas attacks, etc. are more likely than not 
readily observable, despite some potential for noise to play a disrupting factor.  Though 
mistreatment of prisoners of war may be observable to the victims, the victims may not be able 
to communicate this to their states.  Furthermore, while states will most likely know the identity 
of the violating state (with possible exceptions in coalition wars), they may not be able to readily 
distinguish between violations that are state policy and violations that are the result of 
subordinates acting contra state orders (Morrow, 2007).  It is, then, somewhat unclear how to 
appropriately classify the law of war on this variable.  As a result, let us consider each possibility 
in turn.  According to Dai's analytic framework, if victims are available as low cost monitors, we 
should see monitoring conducted by victims and states, as is the case with GATT/WTO dispute 
resolution system.  If, on the other, victims are not so available, we should see monitoring 
undertaken by a centralized treaty organization, as is the case with the NPT, which utilizes the 
rather powerful IAEA as monitoring organization.   
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It is worth noting, of course, that neither of these alternatives describe the monitoring 
regime that in fact governs the law of war, as, clearly, the ICRC is not a victim of law of war 
violations. Neither is the organization properly conceived of as a treaty body, though on first 
glance such a view might be tempting. The ICRC is in fact a body with a rather unique legal 
status.  The ICRC is explicitly named in the treaties that codify the international law of armed 
conflict as an actor whose monitoring services might be utilized.  Yet, the organization existed 
prior to the codification of the law, and its locus of control lies external to the unity of state wills 
reflected in this codification.  The ICRC might be thought, then, to be closer to a NGO,  though 
its close ties to the Swiss Federation and, as mentioned above, its explicit mention in the relevant 
international treaties somewhat belie this classification.  Still, NGO is a more accurate 
description of the ICRC than is treaty organization. If we accept this classification, the ICRC 
does not fall into the category predicted by Dai’s analysis but instead falls into the cell predicted 
by a regime that does not reflect alignment between state and victims and in which victims are 
not available as low-cost monitors, the same cell to which Dai assigns human rights monitoring 
organizations.   
 One question that emerges from this discussion is whether Dai’s mistaken prediction for 
the law of war regime is entirely the result of the ICRC’s somewhat idiosyncratic status or 
whether it reflects a more significant failure of her analytic framework.  Of course, a schema 
cannot account for all contingencies, and a great deal of parsimony and explanatory power would 
be lost if one tried to accommodate them.  Yet, even when we allow for the ICRC’s status and 
place it in the category best suited for it, Dai’s framework falls short.  Still, one way in which the 
ICRC monitoring regime is consistent with Dai’s analysis is in the area of cost-effective 




monitoring arrangements, she highlights the resource constraints faced by states that make it 
appealing to delegate monitoring to other actors.  Since, at the time of codification of the law of 
war, another actor was already established who was willing and able to undertake the business of 
monitoring and save states the costly and undesirable task of coordinating upon and establishing 
a centralized treaty regime, it makes sense that states would choose to utilize it. This reality, 
then, is not so damning to her analysis.   
 More problematic is the fact that Dai’s interest alignment variable leads us astray here. 
The monitoring regime that exists for the law of war looks more like a regime that would exist 
for an issue area in which states were not the victims of noncompliance.  What’s interesting is 
that in the post-1945 period the law of war may have increasingly taken on this characteristic 
with the increase in the proportion of wars that are internal rather than interstate.  However, this 
cannot of course explain the origin of structures that were created long before this empirical 
phenomenon manifested.  Another possibility is that, following Dai’s resource constraint logic, 
use was initially made by states of the convenient monitoring organization already existent at the 
time of law of war codification and that this initial decision then came to have quite significant 
consequences for the efficacy of the monitoring that ensued.   
 When we look to Dai's framework to explain the changes over time in IHL monitoring 
arrangements, we find that it offers little help.  This is primarily because the significant changes 
that took place in this monitoring regime don't register as such in Dai's analytic schema.  As 
discussed above, Dai considers 4 sets of monitoring arrangements: monitoring by treaty 
organization, monitoring by victims and states, monitoring by NGOs and states, and monitoring 




these categories, it nevertheless appears that the changes that have occurred have not included a 
movement from one of these four categories to another.  That is, the critical changes do not 
appear to have taken place along the main dimensions that Dai assesses.  The primary change has 
been a shift from monitoring by external state actors selected on an ad hoc basis to monitoring 
via external non-governmental organization.  Though this change indeed represents an increase 
in centralization, it does not represent a sufficient enough increase to "graduate" IHL monitoring 
to another of Dai's categories.  Moreover, there does not appear to have been change on Dai's 
two main variables - alignment of interest between states and victims and availability of victims 
as low-cost monitors - over this time period.  One important exception to this is in the domain of 
non-international armed conflict, the rise of which likely has led to a decrease in interest 
alignment between states and victims.  However, Dai predicts that this variable should produce 
less centralization, not more, making the shift from states selected on an ad hoc basis to a neutral 
third-party organization somewhat surprising.   
    Finally, let us turn to the work of Hyeran Jo (2008), another scholar who has taken 
seriously the task of explaining variation in monitoring regimes established by states.  In contrast 
to Dai’s decision theoretic framework, Jo emphasizes the strategic difficulties posed by states' 
attempts to cooperate under conditions of informational uncertainty.  Using an impressive 
combination of game theoretic modeling and rigorous empirical (statistical) analysis, Jo draws 
attention to the particular roles played by asymmetry and distributional conflict in the selection 
of a monitoring regime for a given international institution.  Jo models the situation in which one 
state possesses private information about the conditions under which its violation occurred.  The 
task of the observing state is to determine whether the violation occurred under normal 




difficult, extenuating conditions – in which case the violation was undeterrable and should be 
excused.  An international monitoring body can help the state distinguish between these two 
conditions and can thus improve the prospects for long-term cooperation between the involved 
states.  However, distributional conflict threatens to thwart the establishment of such a body in 
circumstances in which states face highly asymmetrical compliance environments. An 
asymmetric compliance environment exists when domestic or international factors make 
compliance much more costly for some states than for others.  The straightforward prediction 
here is that, despite opportunities for long-term advantage from the establishment of centralized 
monitoring, states are less likely to successfully establish centralized monitoring bodies when 
compliance asymmetry is high.  
 One example that Jo considers in this regard is that of the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NPT).  In this case, the so-called compliance environment of nuclear weapon states 
(NWS) is quite different from that faced by the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).  Jo expects 
that, at least in the short term, centralized monitoring will tend to act contra the interest of the 
NNWS, even as all states might benefit over time from greater cooperation made possible by 
more centralized monitoring.  One solution to the distributional problem created by such a 
scenario is in the form of side payments, which in this regime NNWS receive in the form of 
assistance with civilian-use nuclear technology.   
 How does Jo’s work enlighten monitoring in regard to the law of war? One interesting 
point she makes is that, while more centralized monitoring arrangements are often in both states’ 
interests in the long-term, distributional conflicts can sometimes prevent the development of 




organization for the law of war might be found by exploring asymmetries extant at the time of 
codification.  It is challenging to consider asymmetries in this area because the law of war itself 
covers a number of different issues areas.  It’s likely, for instance, that states possess different 
“compliance environments” for proper treatment of POWs than for protection of cultural 
property or protection of civilians. However, as noted above, one factor that might create 
asymmetry for law of war compliance across the board is state capacity.  At any given time, 
there is variation in states’ abilities to discipline and control their military forces.  Asymmetry in 
states’ capacity to enforce law of war adherence in their own militaries offers an additional 
possible explanation for the relatively decentralized monitoring of the law of war regime, in 
addition to the resource scarcity variable we previously gleaned from Dai.  Another asymmetry 
apt to be relevant, especially once Protocol II comes into play, concerns the relative likelihood of 
a state falling prey to internal rebellion. However, though this is a plausible explanation for 
states' inability to create a more centralized monitoring system in regard to the law of non-
international armed conflict, it fails to explain why this extended to the realm of international 
armed conflict.  Moreover, it likewise leaves unexplained how and why states would permit the 
ICRC to perform monitoring functions, even in regard to the ever-contentious law of non-
international armed conflict.  Thus, though Jo's argument gives rise to an intriguing hypothesis 
about IHL monitoring, it also leaves a great deal unexplained.    
 It is somewhat curious that, while Jo cites Dai, she does not fully engage the implications 
of each of their theories for the other.  As mentioned above, one key difference between the two 
works is Jo’s game theoretic emphasis in contrast to Dai’s primarily decision-theoretic analysis.  
Additionally, Jo tends to examine variation among agreements within a particular issue area.  For 




why some evidence more centralized monitoring than others. In this respect, their two theories 
may be compatible. One factor that Jo recognizes that Dai somewhat neglects is that all 
monitoring arrangements are not equally efficacious at facilitating compliance.  Dai views, for 
instance, the use of victims as low-cost monitors as a cheap strategy without taking into account 
that states may get what they pay for in terms of monitoring efficacy.  Jo, in contrast, 
acknowledges the tendency of more centralized regimes to reap dividends for all relevant states 
in the long-term even though distributional conflict may thwart this cooperation in the short-
term.  
 Each of these accounts has used a rationalist perspective to explain sources of variation 
across monitoring regimes in international politics.  Each account usefully offers some insight 
into the relatively low centralization that has characterized IHL monitoring.  Brown and Dai 
suggest, albeit in different ways, that states may have been insufficiently motivated to increase 
compliance via delegation, as state interest and compliance were not sufficiently aligned.  Jo, on 
the other hand, while leaving open the possibility of long-term gain from delegation, suggests 
that distributional asymmetries at the time of negotiation may have prevented what could have 
become a mutually beneficial act of delegation.  Though it is always dangerous to evaluate a 
comparative theory in terms of its ability to explain one particular issue area, each of these 
accounts rather uneasily captures the unique monitoring arrangement of the law of war.  More 
importantly, none of these worthy accounts is able to articulate an explanation for the evolution 
of this monitoring regime over time.  This is largely due to some limitations of the rationalist 
perspective and the methodological commitments that derive from it.  The next section considers 




monitoring regime and the lessons that can be gleaned from it about institutional delegation more 
generally.     
 The Limitations of Rationalism 
  With some notable exceptions (Finnemore, 1996, 1999; Carpenter 2003, 2006), the 
increased study of institutions in international relations has been predominantly a rationalist 
enterprise.  This is in contrast with institutional studies in comparative politics, which have taken 
two distinct directions: one rationalist, and the other historical institutionalist.  Whereas 
rationalist studies favor deductive methods and a focus on comparative statics, historical 
institutional studies privilege inductive methods and maintain an eye for the ways in which 
nuances of context shape the institutions that come to exist, as well as the short and long term 
consequences of those institutions (Steinmo, Thelen, & Longstrength, 1992).  Each of the three 
important studies of monitoring institutions discussed above has employed a rationalist 
framework; this chapter takes a distinct perspective, highlighting the contingent historical factors 
that led to a particular monitoring constellation for the law of war.  In this light, this chapter is 
more consistent with an historical institutionalist perspective.  
 A good example of the rationalist propensity to exaggeration of predictability and 
precision of explanation can be found in Brown's work.  From the first chapter, he articulates an 
intriguing puzzle. The IAEA was formed in 1957, and its reach greatly expanded with the 
entrance into effect of the NPT in 1970.  In contrast to the significant delegation that took place 
at a relatively early date in the nuclear context, the Convention on Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention was only concluded in 1972 without delegation to an outside agent; the 




entering effect only at the late date of 1993 but establishing provision for delegation to the 
OPCW.  Brown thus poses a tantalizing puzzle of variation in the timing and nature of 
international NBCW agreements and promises to explain this puzzle.  Yet, despite his careful 
hypothesis testing, at the end of the day these questions remain largely unanswered.  He has 
given the reader a sense of some variables that influence the probability of delegation, but he has 
certainly not explained why an agreement on chemical weapons is made 40 years after a similar 
agreement on nuclear weapons.  While Brown surely cannot be faulted for either his attempt to 
frame compellingly his research question or his inability to explain so neatly the complexity of 
empirical reality, ultimately the unrealistic expectation of predictability he sets up is intimately 
related to the limitations of the rationalist paradigm.  While probabilistic insights about the 
circumstances under which delegation is more or less likely may be the best we can hope for, 
rationalists like Brown often hold out the tantalizing and unfulfilled promise of explaining far 
more than probabilistic patterns.  Accordingly, in the sections that follow, I emphasize the 
contingent coalescence of variables that led to the flourishing of a specific type of IHL 
monitoring regime - a relatively decentralized, ad hoc system with the ICRC at its center.   
   The sections that follow offer an extended case study of institutional evolution in reaction 
to exogenous changes in the nature of war-fighting as well as in the political and legal 
ramifications of existing institutional structures.  The case-study makes use of secondary 
historical material as well as primary source material in the form of the seventeen-volume 
Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva, 1974-1977).  Despite 




little historical work has been done on these activities,
20
 and even less work has examined in 
detail the negotiations on monitoring arrangements.  Thus, this chapter attempts to probe the 
records of this momentous conference with an eye toward enlightening certain puzzling features 
of the monitoring arrangements that ensued.   
 Before proceeding with this literature review, it is important to review the specific type of 
empirical variation under exploration here. The focus here is change over time in the type of 
monitoring, de jure and de facto, that governs a specific issue area, the law of war.  Thus, the 
logic of comparison is change across time, rather than across issue area or case.  On the de facto 
level, the change is primarily from de centralized monitoring conducted by states (in the form of 
the protecting power) to de centralized monitoring conducted primarily by the ICRC.  On the de 
jure level, the changes are more complex, as the de facto ascendancy of the ICRC as monitor is 
only imperfectly reflected in treaty law, and present are (failed) de jure attempts to both resurrect 
the protecting power and create a more centralized monitoring body. 
 Of course, there are limitations to the methodological strategy employed here and 
particularly to the emphasis placed on primary documents related to the negotiation of 
international law.  First, though the Official Records contain a large amount of information and 
are thus highly instructive, the information contained therein is necessarily partial.  Though the 
records are meant to be a thorough recounting of the activities of the Conferences that led to the 
acceptance of the two Protocols Additional, they are by no means exhaustive.  Choices are surely 
made about the level of detail that warrants inclusion, and, absent direct participation, it is 
difficult to make judgments about the extent and direction of any censoring effect.  Further, even 
were the notes comprehensive, the fact remains that delegates attending the Conferences were 
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representing their governments and were thus engaged in political maneuvering.  Thus, the same 
caveats attach to the statements made by governments as always attach to political discourse.  
That is, we can only comment on the arguments made by state representatives; we cannot assume 
that those arguments accurately reflect the motivations of states.  Still, one assumption made by 
this kind of analysis is that, even if state delegates' public comments aren't the whole story, they 
are nevertheless a valuable story, as they reveal something about the values and considerations 
deemed appropriate for quasi-public political discourse.
21
  One might also argue that the 
statements made by delegates at a diplomatic conference are more reliable than statements made, 
for instance, to public audiences, as unsentimental arguments about state interest may be more 
acceptable in the former context than in the latter.     
 In the analysis that follows I argue that, though states were resistant to the encroachments 
of the ICRC on the duties of the protecting power as late as 1949, within ten to twenty years the 
ICRC had superseded the protecting power as de facto monitor for two primary reasons:  first, 
the widening domain of non-international armed conflict served as a bright line beyond which 
the protecting power could not go; second, the increasing political and legal consequences from 
invocation of formal mechanisms such as the protecting power created incentives for state use of 
less formal means to achieve the ends of monitoring.  Though these reasons explain the 
abandonment of the protecting power, its replacement by the ICRC in particular requires further 
explanation.  Here the answer lies in the fact that - for longstanding historical and cultural 
reasons of its own - the ICRC had adopted a set of principles remarkably close to the preferences 
of states.  However, lest one make the conclusion that the organization was little more than a 
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sieve for state interest, it is important to acknowledge that the ICRC was ultimately able to craft 
a de facto role for itself - particularly in the realm of non-international armed conflict - that 
outpaced even the role states formally granted it via treaty law.
22
        
 The Protecting Power 
 The rise and fall of the protecting power as institution is noteworthy for its parallels and 
distinctions to the ICRC's own monitoring trajectory.  One might view this story partly as one of 
institutional competition, with the ICRC eventually prevailing over the protecting power at least 
as concerns humanitarian functions in war.  The first striking similarity between the two 
institutions lies in temporal origin, with both created in the late nineteenth century.  Just as the 
Austro-Sardinian War of 1859 provided Henri Dunant with the inspiration that would eventually 
lead to the formation of the ICRC, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 provided the context 
for the first modern use of the protecting power (Levie, 1961; Peirce, 1980).  Yet, like those of 
IHL itself,
23
 the origins of the institution were more deeply rooted in diplomatic custom, 
specifically in the practice of unofficial diplomatic protection of foreign interests in peacetime.  
During the late nineteenth century, the troubling practice of expelling diplomats in time of war, 
when the belligerent's nationals were plausibly at their most vulnerable, provided a clear 
rationale for an institution such as protecting power.  The protecting power was a neutral state 
designated by one of the belligerent states to safeguard its interests within the opposing state, 
subject, of course, to that state's approval.  In the Franco-Prussian War, for instance, the United 
States, Switzerland, and Russia protected the interests of various Prussian states within France, 
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while England was tasked with protecting the interests of France in the German states (Levie, 
1961).  The roles of the protecting power were multifarious and contentious and included such 
varied activities as stewardship of official property, protection of property of local persons, 
assistance in repatriation of nationals, disbursement of relief payments, and protection of 
prisoners of war and civil internees (Franklin, 1947).  States and organizations concerned were 
sometimes inclined to speak of the political versus humanitarian functions of the protecting 
power.  Political functions concerned, for instance, embassy protection, while humanitarian 
functions centered on prisoners of war and civilian internees.  The humanitarian functions played 
by the protecting power themselves evolved over time, with, according to Peirce, the protecting 
power tending to take little action for humanitarian ends prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904 -1905 (p. 95).   
 Prior to and during World War II, the protecting power was an institution that evolved 
alongside the ICRC, with the latter sometimes assuming roles parallel to those of the former.  For 
instance, the 1929 Geneva Convention explicitly outlined a role for both the ICRC and the 
protecting power in the active protection of POWs, though, to be fair, the duties of the protecting 
power were much more numerous than were those of the ICRC or the "relief societies" 
mentioned therein (Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929).   
This didn't mean, however, that there was always an easy co-existence of these two actors.  In the 
negotiations over the Geneva Conventions of 1949, there was considerable disagreement about 
whether, in the absence of the ability of warring states to agree on a protecting power, the ICRC 
could assume this role (more on this below).  The ICRC was itself conflicted about its 
willingness to assume this title, due to fear that adopting the political functions of the protecting 




states assuming the role of protecting power sometimes appeared hesitant to fulfill humanitarian 
functions out of ostensible concern with how this might affect political neutrality.  For instance, 
Peirce reports that early during its period of neutrality in World War I, the United States in its 
role as protecting power avoided issues related to prisoners of war for just this reason (p.98).  
After the Second World War, however, use of the protecting power declined markedly.  The only 
uses of the institution in the post-war era were in the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1961 Indian conflict 
over the Portuguese colony of Goa, the 1961 conflict between Tunisia and France over the 
territory of Bizerte, the 1971 India-Pakistani conflict that led to Bangladeshi independence, and 
the 1982 Falklands War between Argentina and the UK (Peirce).
24
   
 There is a certain irony in the eventual obsolescence of the protecting power, as early in 
IHL history states demonstrated a clear preference for the protecting power over the ICRC when 
it came to most monitoring functions.  In the draft version of the 1929 Geneva Convention that it 
presented at the Diplomatic Conference, the ICRC proposed that the ICRC itself be named as the 
actor that would oversee implementation of the convention (Levie, 1961, p. 32).  However, states 
rejected this proposal, preferring instead that the protecting power fulfill this function.  Thus, 
Article 86 of the 1929 Convention
25
 states that the protecting power - and not the ICRC -  should 
be permitted to visit any place where prisoners of war are held (Convention relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 27 July 1929).  Yet, while at the time states seemed to 
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prefer that the role of guarantor of the Convention be played by the protecting power rather than 
the ICRC, just several decades later the ICRC would de facto replace the protecting power in this 
capacity.   
 How did this happen?  Notably, the de jure status of the protecting power did not change 
significantly between the 1929 Convention and the 1949 Convention.  The main concern of 
states at the time of the 1949 Diplomatic Convention was that in certain circumstances 
belligerent states were unable to agree on a protecting power.  This was primarily because 
recognizing a neutral as protecting power for a warring party was thought to presuppose 
recognition of the warring party's statehood.  For instance, during World War II the Soviet Union 
refused to accept a protecting power for Poland, as it did not recognize Poland as an independent 
state (Peirce, pg. 104).  As a result, at the time of the 1949 Convention a great concern was how 
to provide for a substitute in cases in which a protecting power was not mutually agreeable.  
Though, as mentioned above, the ICRC was not itself keen to adopt what it considered the 
political functions of the protecting power (though it would change its mind on this point by the 
time of the Additional Protocols), it was willing to accept the humanitarian functions of the 
protecting power in cases in which such a power was not available for whatever reason.  Thus, 
Common Article 10 of the 1949 Conventions provides for "a humanitarian organization, such as 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions performed 
by Protecting Powers under the present Convention." (qtd. in Peirce p. 111)  
 One noteworthy development in the 1949 Conventions, however, would pave the way for 
the ICRC to overtake the Protecting Power as primary IHL monitor in the post-World War II 




applicability of the Conventions during internal conflict.  The primary conflict pitted the ICRC, 
which sought to protect victims of internal conflict, against states that feared that low-level 
rebellions would be granted recognition as international conflicts.  The compromise solution was 
Common Article 3 which made certain basic humanitarian protections - protection of those "hors 
de combat," for instance, or prohibition of humiliating and degrading treatment - applicable "in 
the case of armed conflict not of an international character " (Levie, 1987).  Importantly, 
Common Article 3 took a further step that would prove particularly significant in the post-war 
period: it sanctioned a role for the ICRC or another "impartial humanitarian body" as a provider 
of somewhat-vaguely- described "services" in internal conflicts.  Notably, the Protecting Power 
was no where named in the text of Common Article 3, as its role, unlike the humanitarian role of 
actors like the ICRC, had been exclusively tied to interstate war.
26
  Thus, a legal framework, 
however tenuous, was set for the ICRC to exert a role in armed conflict not of an international 
nature; notably, no such framework was outlined for the Protecting Power.  This critical 
difference would set the stage for the virtual obsolescence of the protecting power in the post-
World War II period.  
 The logic of my argument parallels Fazal's (2012) argument about the dramatic decline in 
states' declaration of war over the same time period.  Fazal argues persuasively that, with the 
marked increase in the costs of complying with IHL that accompanied the burgeoning demands 
of IHL in the middle of the twentieth century, states gained incentives to avoid declaring war as a 
way of increasing ambiguity about the applicability of IHL to their behavior.  Two related 
reasons suggest a similar logic by which the Protecting Power met a fate basically identical to 
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that of war declaration.  First, as Peirce persuasively argued and is discussed above, the utility of 
the Protecting Power was dramatically hampered by its de jure inapplicability to non-
international conflicts given the increased proportion of all conflicts that were non-international 
in the post-World War II period.  Though appointing a protecting power was viewed as 
equivalent to recognizing the legal status of one's combatants, granting access to the ICRC was 
not so viewed given its place in Common Article 3.  However, this leaves open the question of 
why the protecting power did not continue to be used in wars clearly of an interstate nature.  
Here Fazal's logic is applicable.  I argue that appointment of a protecting power constituted yet 
another type of legal "bright line" that made it difficult to maintain ambiguity about one's legal 
obligations under IHL.  Indeed, appointment of a Protecting Power is possibly even a more direct 
statement of legal commitment than is declaration of war, as the former is explicitly expressed in 
codified law as a form of third-party surveillance of IHL implementation.  
 It is instructive in this regard to compare two sets of outliers: the post-1945 instances of 
war declaration and the post-1945 uses of the protecting power.  As evident in Table 2.2, there is 
significant overlap, but not complete convergence, across these two categories.  Post-1945 cases 
of war declaration include both India and Pakistan in their 1971 conflict over East 
Pakistan/Bangladesh and India in its 1962 conflict with China.  The protecting power, on the 
other hand, was employed in the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 1961 Indian conflict over the Portuguese 
colony of Goa, the 1961 France-Tunisia conflict over Bizerte, the 1971 India-Pakistani conflict, 
and the 1982 Argentina-UK conflict over the Falklands (Peirce, 1980; Bugnion, 2003; Pfanner, 
2009).  Notably, the 1971 India-Pakistani conflict is in both categories.  The degree of overlap 
here provides tentative support for the notion that the same mechanism explains the decline of 




Interestingly, part of this discrepancy may hinge on one's definition of declaration of war.  Fazal 
creates her own dataset of such declarations and defines declaration according to the formal 
mechanisms for declaration operant within each state.   She argues that in Indian law declaring a 
state of emergency is equivalent to a declaration of war.  Peirce, however, describes the 1962 
Sino-Indian conflict as one in which no war was declared by either side and, in fact, diplomatic 
relations were maintained by both parties (p. 122).  In fact, it was this continuation of normal 
diplomatic relations that China used to argue that a protecting power was unnecessary.  Thus, 
what may constitute a declaration of war domestically may not be viewed by one's opponent as 
tantamount to such a declaration.  Yet even China's argument in this case reinforces the notion 
that declaration of war and the appointment of a protecting power go hand and hand.  What of 
the other four cases?   
 The Indian-Portuguese conflict and the France-Tunisia conflict do not meet the 
Correlates of War threshold of 1,000 battle-related casualties and so are not included in Fazal's 
dataset, though they remain instances of undeclared war.  India had in peacetime named Egypt as 
its protecting power, and, upon the severance of diplomatic ties, Portugal appointed Brazil in this 
capacity (Peirce, pg. 124; Forsythe, 1976).  The Suez conflict was similarly one in which the 
protecting power was employed absent a declaration of war, though an acceptable protecting 
power was not agreed upon for all warring parties, as Egypt refused to accept either a protecting 
power or the ICRC as protecting power substitute due to its contention that Israel was not a 
legitimate state (Peirce; Forsythe).  It is difficult to understand why a state would choose a 
protecting power but refuse to declare war, insofar as, per Peirce's argument discussed above, a 
recognition of a protecting power may be viewed as recognition of a state of war.  However, one 




safeguard their interests than to increase legal obligation.  Yet, were this so, one would expect 
more frequent recourse to the institution in the post-WWII period than is in fact the case.  It is 
perhaps notable that three of these outlier cases - no war declaration but use of the protecting 
power - take place relatively early in the post-war period and prior to the ratification of the 
Additional Protocols.  This is compatible with the view that changes in the political context in 
the post-World War II period made use of the protecting power increasingly unlikely, though it 
took some time before the use of the traditional institution completely faded from the system.  
The recourse to the institution in the Falklands war appears, then, as more anomalous given its 
occurrence a decade after the previous use of the institution.   
 It is perhaps useful at this juncture to examine in more detail the relative costs and 
benefits of employing the protecting power versus employing the ICRC in a monitoring role. See 
Table 2.3 for a summary of the primary ways in which the two institutions differ.  At issue here 
are organizational costs and political costs.  One of the classic accounts of the utility of 
international institutions emphasizes the greater efficiency and lower transaction costs that 
accompany the establishment of a standing institution (Martin and Simmons, 1993).  Thus, rather 
than negotiating on an ad hoc basis, states can benefit from the existence of a previously 
negotiated regime that applies to a large number of relevant cases.  Interestingly, this 
organizational gain is often - but not always -  accompanied by some significant degree of 
delegation to the institution, so that freedom from ad hoc negotiations also means the cession of 
some degree of state autonomy to make decisions on a case by case basis.
27
  In the case of the 
ICRC, however, the degree of delegation remains largely the same, as states retain the freedom 
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to grant access on a case-by-case basis.  What they gain is a go-to actor with some reputation for 
neutrality that has a good chance of being acceptable to the opposing state.  Thus, it is likely that 
use of the ICRC constitutes a definite advantage in terms of the reduction in transaction costs as 
much less energy need be consumed in the choice of a state willing to assume the protecting 
power functions that is likewise acceptable to one's opponent.  Additionally, this efficiency gain 
comes at little cost as there is no real delegation to the ICRC made a priori by states.  
     What, then, of the differential political costs of the two options? Here it is important to 
distinguish between political costs in intra-state wars versus political costs in inter-state wars.  In 
intra-state wars at issue is legitimating domestic resistance and granting external actors 
interference in domestic affairs.  Thus, it is not surprising that states would be reluctant to use an 
institution like the protecting power which has been explicitly codified for applicability only in 
international armed conflicts.  Does the ICRC pose the same risk? As Peirce argues, the ICRC 
benefits from the ambiguity it is able to cultivate about the legal sources of its mandate for 
humanitarian action.  Because, unlike the protecting power, the ICRC is legally able to monitor 
in both international and non-international armed conflicts, the organization can both justify its 
presence in a wide array of conflicts and side-step debates about the legal status of the 
belligerents.  As Peirce argues, by failing to make explicit the legal source of its action in a 
particular conflict,
28
 the organization can avoid paralyzing debates and can take advantage of a 
"thin wedge of access" to expand its reach as a conflict escalates, whereas in contrast the 
protecting power faces "threshold barriers" (p.126) to access.  In an international armed conflict, 
the political implications of the choice of protecting power versus the ICRC are less stark, 
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though here, as discussed above, it is likely that the more highly legalized role of the protecting 
power allows for less legal and political ambiguity than does use of the ICRC.  Formality, it 
appears, can sometimes be a liability.        
 By the time of the negotiations that would become the 1977 Protocols Additional, the 
relative non-use of the protecting power put two issues squarely on the table: first, whether the 
role of the protecting power might be resuscitated, and, second, whether an organization might 
be created that could go beyond monitoring and into enforcement of international humanitarian 
law.  Let us consider them in turn. 
 Last Gasp for the Protecting Power?  
 Faced with the virtual non-use of the institution of the protecting power in the post-World 
War II period, states at the Diplomatic Conferences of 1974, 1975, and 1976 were faced with the 
task of creating legal innovations that would sidestep the problems that had plagued the 
institution and rescue it from impending obsolescence.  As mentioned above, a number of 
problems had conspired to produce the precarious position in which the institution found itself by 
the mid-1970s.  Though, for reasons that will be discussed further below, the most formidable 
problem facing the institution - its inapplicability in conditions of internal conflict
29
  - was not 
considered one that could be solved via institutional innovation, other problems were deemed 
potentially surmountable by wise institutional revision.  These included the problems of warring 
states' inability to agree on acceptable protecting powers, as well as the increasingly frequent 
refusal of states to legally recognize their opponents and/or the condition of belligerency.   
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 The central question at hand was how to prevent the all-too-common situation in which a 
war was fought without the appointment of a  protecting power, a state of affairs that left the 
duties of the protecting power unfulfilled.  This was a problem that had been foreseen in 1949, 
and the solution arrived at then was to suggest that an "humanitarian organization, such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross" might fulfill the humanitarian functions of the 
protecting power.
30
  Yet, this solution had not proven sufficient to forestall the waning vitality of 
the wartime institution.   
 At the time of the 1974 conference, then, many states, among them Egypt and Norway, 
held the position that a more dramatic solution was necessary, one that would establish an 
automatic protecting power substitute in conditions in which states couldn't readily agree on a 
protecting power of their own accord (O.R. Vol. VI, pg. 77).  Of course, other states - notably the 
Communist states -  were more tightly wedded to traditional notions of state sovereignty and 
highly resistant to any notion of automaticity, which would necessarily supersede state 
discretion.  Whereas the boldest proposals suggested the formation of a standing body to act as 
official substitute,
31
 at the other end of the spectrum were proposals that simply exhorted states 
to find an agreeable protecting power or substitute but made no concrete provision for the cases 
in which states failed to so act.  Given this divergence of opinion, efforts to reach agreement 
unsurprisingly resulted in the dilution of the strongest proposals and movement towards the 
lowest common denominator.   
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 In the end, the revised Article 5 of Protocol I made a number of rather modest 
improvements on Article 10 of the 1949 Conventions.  As in the 1949 convention, the language 
used implies obligation, for instance through the invocation of states' "duty" to secure a 
protecting power and the statement that states "shall without delay" designate such a power.   
Beyond that, a contingency plan is developed for the cases in which a protecting power is not 
agreed upon.  First, as recounted in paragraphs two and three, the ICRC is to play a role in 
helping the warring parties to find a state or states that each finds acceptable as protecting power.  
The specific procedure suggested is that the ICRC request a list from each state of five states it 
would find acceptable as its protecting power, as well as five states it would tolerate as its 
opponent's protecting power.  From these sets of lists, the organization is to facilitate mutual 
agreement.  As Peirce discusses, these sections of Article 5 were relatively undisputed.  Matters 
became more contentious, however, when it came to the fall-back procedure to be used in the 
event that the ICRC's mediating role proved insufficient.
32
  It was here that the question of 
whether there would be an automatic substitute and, if so, who that substitute would be, was 
heatedly debated.  The final version had the ICRC listed as possible official substitute, though 
only pending its own approval and the consent of the relevant states; the text also made clear that 
the mention of the ICRC did not preclude another neutral organization from undertaking this 
task.  Over the course of negotiations, the possibility that the UN might play this role was 
considered, though some states - mostly members of the Western bloc - doubted the neutrality of 
the UN bodies.        
 One noteworthy aspect of these negotiations was the continued effort placed in the 
revitalization of the protecting power despite quite clear evidence that its days were numbered. 
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This might be thought of as a sort of institutional stickiness - faced with the task of solving a 
problem previously played by a particular institution, states' default strategy seemed to be to 
"fix" the institution.  Yet, they were unable to agree upon the very measures that might 
resuscitate the institution.      
 An additional way in which states attempted to resuscitate the protecting power was by 
attempting to make a legal distinction between the use of the institution and the legal recognition 
of one's opponents or of the state of war.  Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 5 attempt to address this 
issue by stating, first, that designation of a protecting power has no bearing on the legal status of 
the warring parties and, second, that maintenance of diplomatic connections between parties is 
no barrier to the use of a protecting power.  An observer can perhaps be forgiven for finding 
some naiveté in this statement - it is as though the political ramifications of an act can be willed 
away with the statement that such implications shouldn't follow.   
 One question that arose during negotiations was whether tasks of investigation and public 
reporting fell within the purview of the protecting power and, by extension, its substitute.  
Interestingly, the ICRC took a conservative stand on this question, arguing that the protecting 
power's duties did not extend that far; this was, in fact, part of the argument for a separate and 
distinct enquiry commission.  The organization likewise took a cautious stance on the question of 
whether the protecting power's duties extended to direct monitoring of hostilities.  Again, 
interpreting the role of the protecting power narrowly, with its tasks limited to those expressly 
stated in the Geneva Conventions, the organization argued that an active role in the combat 
theater was not within the protecting power's scope. 
 Interestingly, the ICRC was also a voice against a truly automatic protecting power 




that it wanted to preserve its own autonomy, providing itself an opt-out clause in the event that 
performing in the capacity of a substitute would interfere with its other humanitarian tasks.  
Operating contra state consent would place the organization in a more confrontational role than it 
preferred to play vis-à-vis states in the course of its humanitarian efforts.  One might marvel at 
the restraint the organization displayed in the face of these opportunities to expand its reach.  It 
seemed the organization viewed such expansions of its powers as dangerous temptations that 
would likely reduce the organization's effectiveness in the long run.   
 As was the case with the IHFFC (see below), states seemed not to be under many 
illusions about the likely effectiveness of the "revised" protecting power.  Several states that 
voted in favor of revised Article 5 - among them Canada, Mexico, Spain, and Greece -  
expressed in no uncertain terms their intense disappointment that an automatic system had not 
been established.  The Greek delegate, for instance, described the resultant system as "not an 
efficacious development of the institution of Protecting Powers (O.R., Vol. VI, pg. 78)," while 
Egypt charged that "this consensus [on Article V] was basically between East and West, but not 
so much with the countries of the third world, the main victims of recent armed conflicts, which 
preferred a more compulsory system of implementation (O.R., Vol. VI, pg. 77)."  Thus, that the 
revisions to Article 5 failed to make changes sufficient to resuscitate the institution of the 
protecting power was not a surprise but was foreseeable at the time of the Protocol I 
negotiations.   
    The IHFFFC: Anatomy of a Failure 
 With the protecting power system falling prey to nonuse in the post-World War II period 
and attempts at revitalizing that institution falling short, potential hope lay in the establishment 




requiring warring powers to agree on monitoring parties and procedures on an ad hoc basis.  
Given that this idea had been contentious when first introduced by the ICRC, that states managed 
to agree on the establishment of an International Humanitarian Fact Finding Commission at all is 
something of a victory.  Yet, this victory would prove pyrrhic, as, at least as of 2014, there is 
little sign of the IHFFC being utilized in an efficacious manner - in fact, there is little sign of it 
being used by states at all.  From an institutionalist perspective, this is a failure that states might 
wish to avoid repeating.  Significant time and resources were consumed, initially in bargaining 
and later in the establishment of the institution, that did not reap the hoped for dividends in terms 
of efficacious monitoring or, more ambitiously, improved compliance.  Thus, this account of the 
establishment of the IHFFC will have an eye for the sources of what we might call an 
institutional failure.  It is also worth noting at this juncture that in one important respect IHL 
monitoring bears a certain resemblance to GATT/WTO monitoring: for both regimes, a more 
centralized mechanism would come to be dead letter, while a less centralized one would instead 
thrive.   
 In comparison to the protecting power, the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding 
Commission (IHFFC or the Commission) is a relatively recent institutional innovation in the 
realm of IHL monitoring. Though it was introduced in the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions, it did not receive the necessary state signatories to enter effect until 1991.  
The IHFFC is a permanent standing body charged with the power to investigate alleged breaches 
in IHL, though it can only conduct its mission when both involved states consent to the 
Commission's involvement.     
 What led to the inclusion of the IHFFC in Protocol I, and what explains the fifteen year 




to help fill in the accountability lacuna that existed in the domain of IHL. There had long been 
interest in creating mechanisms for responding to massive violations of IHL on the part of states, 
but agreement on specific mechanisms had been difficult to come by. The 1929 Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Sick and Wounded in the Battle Field 
contained one article (Art. 30) outlining in relatively vague language the possibility of 
establishing an "enquiry" into an alleged violation at the request of a belligerent in a manner to 
be decided by the involved parties (Kussbach 1994). In the 1930s, the ICRC increasingly 
advocated for a more automatic enquiry procedure.  This issue was discussed at the 1937 
Commission of Experts; at the 1947 Conference of Government Experts the organization 
recommended the formation of a Commission of Enquiry to be nominated by a "single, central, 
and permanent authority" (Pictet, 1952).  However, states deemed this mechanism too 
"complicated" and accepted instead Common Article 149 of the 1949 Conventions, which is very 
similar to the text of the 1929 agreement, except this time there is recognition that it may be 
difficult for warring parties to agree on the procedures for the enquiry.  In such cases, "the 
Parties should agree on the choice of an umpire who will decide upon the procedure to be 
followed."  Of course, why it should be possible for the warring parties to agree on the identity 
of an "umpire" is entirely unclear - we are left with the same problem that plagues the use of the 
protecting power mechanism, discussed above (Bothe 2007; Dormann 2007).  At the time of 
Protocol I negotiations, then, the absence of a sound enquiry procedure remained a problem.   
 In its commentary on the Protocol I Additional, the ICRC highlights the contentious 
nature of the debate and vote on Article 90 establishing the IHFFC.  The fact-finding 
commission was in fact the less rigorous of two proposed mechanisms, the other which was 




which was never passed. The ICRC describes the conflictual nature of the negotiations in no 
uncertain terms: "Voting [in Committee] took place almost paragraph by paragraph, and the text 
was finally adopted as a whole with 40 votes in favour, 18 against, and 17 abstentions (ICRC 
Commentary on the Additional Protocols, p. 1040)." Similarly, the tally in the plenary vote was 
49 votes in favor, 21 against, with 15 abstentions.     
 Something of states' ambivalence about the Commission is surely captured by the fact 
that the necessary 20 states accepting the Commission's authority were not obtained until 1991. 
There were no real surprises among the first ten states to accept the Commission's competence. 
The first five states to do so were all Nordic, while the next five included several Western 
European states as well as a few of the Nordic stragglers.
33
  Among the next ten states, however, 
were a few unexpected signatories, particularly Algeria and Russia,
34
 which both accepted the 
Commission's competence in 1989.  This is a pattern similar to the one noted by Simmons and 
Danner (2010) in their intriguing analysis of states committing themselves to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC).  They find that two sets of unlikely bedfellows quickly ratified the ICC: 
on the one hand peaceful democracies extremely unlikely to face the prosecution of their 
nationals and, on the other hand, non-democracies with a recent history of civil conflict.  These 
latter states, so the argument goes, signed in an effort to self-bind and to credibly commit to their 
domestic adversaries and audiences to "keep the gloves on" and refrain from use of violent 
means deemed criminal by the ICC's charter.  Though I have not conducted an empirical test of 
this hypothesis with the IHFFC acceptance data, the decision of Algeria and Russia to consent to 
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the Commission's competence at a pivotal time of national political transformation is certainly 
consistent with the Simmons-Danner hypothesis.
35
  Ukraine and Belarus are less clear examples, 
since they didn't suffer from the same history of internal conflict, but the sheer newness of their 
governments could certainly justify a hands-tying mechanism.  Figure 2.1 depicts the number of 
states newly accepting the Commission's competence in each year since the entry into effect of 
Protocol I.  There is an obvious peak in the number of new signatories in the period 1989-1993, 
with 1992 being the year in which the highest number of states (8) newly acknowledged the 
competency of the body.  What is remarkable, however, is how clearly the number of states that 
recognizes the competence of the Commission declines after the mid-90s.  The last decade has in 
particular been bleak for the organization, with only four states newly coming on board since 
2006.  Thus, though it may have appeared in the early '90s that something like a "normative 
cascade (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998)" was taking place, in fact from our current vantage point 
the story looks quite different. There was a period in which the IHFFC possessed a real 
momentum - unsurprisingly it was the period of immense international political and domestic 
change ushered in by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War - but this 
period was short-lived and did not have the effect of getting the vast majority of state actors on 
board.  Today, 72 states have acknowledged the competence of the IHFFC, compared to 132 
states that have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. When one 
considers how much more the ICC asks of states - how much greater the potential sovereignty 
costs are to states of the ICC compared to the IHFFC - this discrepancy becomes truly 
remarkable.    
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 More damning than the relatively low number of states that have accepted the 
competence of the Commission is the poor use that has been made of the Commission by these 
and other states.  To date, the fact-finding services of the IHFFC have not been used in a single 
conflict.  In 2011 the IHFFC published a report of its work "on the occasion of its twentieth 
anniversary" (IHFFC) that had the character of a soul-searching enterprise.  It reviewed the steps 
it had undertaken to prepare for fact-finding missions it might receive and described its new 
"proactive" approach.  Earlier reports, too, sometimes took on an (unintentionally) comedic tone, 
for instance in the organization's statement that during the time period in question it had "almost" 
been asked to conduct a fact-finding mission, in this case in regard to the conflict in Colombia 
(Report of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission: 1997 - 2001).
36
  
 There is again something puzzling about the innovation of a more centralized de jure 
monitoring mechanism only to have it continue to be over-shadowed by the decentralized 
monitoring mechanism already in place.  That the IHFFC was proposed at all, let alone ratified 
and entered into effect, is indication that some actors were dissatisfied with the decentralized 
character of the status quo and wished to replace it with a standing body that would 
automatically have the jurisdiction to monitor IHL compliance in wars between signatory states. 
Yet, the failure of that body to replace in practice a legally weaker regime is also quite telling. 
The obvious reading of this state of affairs is that states preferred the ad hoc monitoring regime 
already in place to the alternative proposed by the IHFFC.  To understand further how it came to  
happen that states created an institution that would utterly "fall by the wayside," let's consider in 
some detail the negotiations that led to the formation of the ill-fated institution.  
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 By the time of the1974 Diplomatic Conference, the ICRC, perhaps mindful of how 
contentious the idea of a protecting power "replacement" had been in 1949, had moved on from 
the idea.  Thus, tellingly, there was no suggestion of an enquiry commission in the draft 
convention submitted to states by the ICRC in 1972.  Perhaps surprisingly, the initiative at the 
Red Cross Conference of 19 March 1975 for an enquiry commission initially came from states.   
The first proposal for such a commission (hereafter "The Four State proposal") was made by 
Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden; Pakistan made its own proposal ten days later.  
As these proposals and the flurry of amendments and working papers that would accompany 
them were discussed in Committee, Working Group, and, finally, plenary meetings, a number of 
issues proved especially divisive. These included the mandatory or optional nature of the 
commission's competence, the breadth of issues about which the commission could inquire, and 
the degree of publicity that would be granted the results of the commission's work.  Also at issue 
was the degree of neutrality that the commission could be expected to display.  Each of these 
concerns is addressed below.  
 Mandatory Competence  
 The Four State Proposal held that the commission could enquire into alleged Protocol I 
violations either at the request of a party to the conflict or upon its own initiative.  The Pakistan 
proposal made the criteria for launching an investigation somewhat stricter, limiting the 
competence of the commission to those situations in which either a party to the conflict or a 
protecting power called for an enquiry.  Both proposals left open the possibility, however, that  a 
state might find itself the subject of an enquiry without its consent.  Unsurprisingly, this was a 
situation with which many states took issue.  Indonesia, for instance, reiterated that it could not 




opinions was the significant dilution of the initial proposals, as the states in favor of a centralized 
Commission conceded to compromises in order to increase the likelihood that an enquiry 
commission in some form would receive approval.  Perhaps the most far-reaching of these 
compromises was the requirement that a target state proffer consent on an ad hoc basis for the 
establishment of a formal enquiry about its wartime behavior.  Obviously, this requirement 
dramatically decreased the extent to which states were meaningfully delegating authority to the 
IHFFC, as the body would be powerless to act without positive state consent.  
 Interestingly, the United States was itself the originator of a second compromise that 
appeared to be an attempt to assuage the states that had been firmly committed to mandatory 
competence.  According to this proposal, (CDDH/I/GT/119; CDDH/416), states retained the 
option of making a declaration upon ratification of Protocol I that they "recognize ipso facto and 
without special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the 
competence of the Commission"
37
 to investigate alleged grave breaches of the Convention (the 
issue of the types of questions the Commission was deemed entitled to investigate is discussed 
further below).  This innovation at least allowed for the possibility that a subgroup of like-
minded states would delegate more significantly to the Commission, which might then be 
empowered to enquire into a wider array of conflicts.  However, this amendment, in conjunction 
with the U.S.-proposed requirement that the Commission only enter into effect once twenty 
states accepted its competence, also had the effect of significantly delaying the entry into effect 
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of the Commission, which Switzerland perspicaciously observed in its own response to the 
proposed amendment.
38
     
 Scope of Competence    
 Another contentious issue concerned the scope of IHL matters that the Commission was 
tasked with investigating.  As was the case with the issue of mandatory competence, both the 
Four State proposal and the Pakistani proposal envisioned a stronger Commission than other 
states were willing to accept.  Both proposals tasked the Commission with investigating "any 
alleged violation of the Conventions and the present Protocol and other rules relating to the 
conduct of international armed conflict."
39
  A number of states found this mandate to be far too 
broad - particularly the rather vague and potentially expansive addition of "other rules relating to 
the conduct of international armed conflict" - and preferred instead the limitation of the enquiry 
procedure to matters involving "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions and/or the Protocol I 
Additional.  Among the states in favor of a narrower interpretation of the Commission's 
competence were, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain.  Again, 
something of a compromise was reached as the final text provided for the competence of the 
Commission to enquire into both grave breaches and "other serious violations," though the 
reference to "other rules" was omitted.   
 There was also some debate about the temporal dimension of the Commission's 
competence, with some states  - Japan, most notably - proposing that the Commission should not 
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be limited to investigating violations after their occurrence but should also be tasked with taking 
action to prevent violations.
40
  Other states found this statement vague or feared the implication 
that the Commission might have authority to make decisions about situations that had not yet 
manifested.  The Japanese proposal found its way into the final version in only a very minor 
form, as the Commission's competence to "facilitate, through its good offices, the restoration of 
an attitude of respect for the Conventions and this Protocol."
41
        
 Publicity of Findings 
 Particularly relevant to the topic of this dissertation is the issue of the publicity of 
Commission results.  As is a consistent theme of this work, one of the most salient attributes of 
the ICRC is its general commitment to discretion, though there has been significant debate in the 
political science literature about the efficacy of publicity as an instrument with which to 
influence state behavior.  In this light it is indeed instructive that states themselves demonstrated 
a great deal of concern about the publicity of enquiry results.  Again, the original proposal was 
stronger than the final version, as the original Four State version provided for publicity of the 
Commission's findings as a default policy unless the Parties agreed otherwise (negative consent), 
while the final version enabled publicity only if the involved state parties expressly approved 
(positive consent).  In this case, however, the Pakistani proposal was more modest than was the 
Four State Proposal, as the former made provision for the results to be submitted only to the 
involved parties and the Commission depositary.  
 What is striking in the debates about publicity is the consistency with which states treat 
publicity as a powerful - and potentially dangerous - instrument.  Those states that most 
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vehemently advocated publicity - for instance, Sweden and Norway - tended to view publicity as, 
in the words of the Swedish delegate, "the best way of inducing compliance with international 
law" via "pressure from world public opinion" (Vol. IX, p. 192, Par. 12).  On the other hand, 
states opposed to publicity, such as, notably, Switzerland, were concerned that publicity would 
lead to misuse, for instance via "propaganda and false accusations from each side" (Vol. IX, p. 
205, Par. 74).  Importantly, though the empirical literature is divided on the question of the 
efficacy of publicity as an instrument for inducing change in state behavior, states appear not to 
doubt that publicity is potentially a powerful weapon.  They disagree, instead, about whether this 
is a weapon they wish to unleash.  Given this state of affairs, another way in which the proposed 
enquiry commission became weakened over the course of negotiations was via the addition of 
stricter criteria about the circumstances in which the products of the fact-finding commission 
would be made public.      
 Relative Advantage     
 Unsurprisingly, during the debates over the proposed enquiry commission arose the 
question of what types of states might be systematically advantaged or disadvantaged by the 
proposed rules.  Once the requirement of mutual state consent took mandatory competence off 
the table, a number of states expressed the belief that this requirement advantaged stronger states 
- would-be occupiers - over weaker states, the would-be occupied.  As an attempt to address this 
problem, a large coalition of states, many of them part of the non-aligned movement, proposed 
Amendment CDDH/I/415, which held that, in cases of occupation, only the consent of the 
occupied state need be received to launch an enquiry commission.  Predictably, reception to this 
proposal was highly divided, particularly among those states that professed commitment to the 




closer to mandatory competence and thus an improvement over the original text, while other 
states thought that it suggested a muddled and ill-justified mockery of mandatory competence.  
Nigeria, Mexico, and Argentina were among those supporting the amendment; Italy, Canada, and 
Switzerland opposed it while professing continued support for a general principle of mandatory 
competence.  Still other states - India, for instance - expressed their commitment to opposing 
occupation, but were not willing to support any step in the direction of mandatory competence.  
In the end, a roll-call vote failed to result in the needed two-thirds majority, though a simple 
majority of states favored the proposal; the final tally was 54 states in favor, 28 against, and 14 
abstentions.
42
  Those in favor were so adamant that they immediately attempted to pass an almost 
identical amendment,
43
 which met a similar fate.  An occupation exception having failed twice, 
its - fairly numerous - supporters continued to profess fear that the requirement of mutual state 
consent would reinforce the ability of more powerful states to resist the efforts of other states to 
subject their wartime behavior to scrutiny.   
 Coalitions, Historical Contingency, and the Bargaining Process 
 Having considered the evolution of the proposed enquiry commission over the course of 
the bargaining process, we can now revisit the apparent puzzle of how states ended up creating 
an institution that would prove utterly ineffectual.  In this section we will consider several factors 
that might explain this state of affairs.    
 Preferences of Powerful States 
  An obvious factor to consider when positing the failure of a regime is the interest of 
particularly powerful states.  In this case, the opposition of one superpower and the ambivalence 
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of another seemed to be an inauspicious configuration.  On one side, the Soviet Union  - along 
with its communist brethren - was definitively opposed to the enquiry commission, which it 
viewed as an unacceptable violation of state sovereignty.  Soviet Delegate Bobylev expressed his 
position unequivocally:  "The international inquiry commission would, in fact be a supranational 
body, which might derogate from the national sovereignty of countries, especially in a non-
international conflict,44 and might constitute interference in their internal affairs" (O.R., Vol. IX, pg. 
212, para. 36).  He likewise referred to the Commission as leading to a "dangerous path."  On the 
other side, the United States was far more sympathetic to the imperative, but even it was 
lukewarm about the most ambitious or centralized proposed variants of the commission.  During 
the Working Group meeting of 13 May 1976, American delegate Mr. Dowling expressed a 
number of concerns about the technical details of the initial proposals, concerns that centered on 
insufficient assurances of the commission's neutrality based on the procedures at hand.  In 
expressing such concerns he concluded that the American delegation "doubted whether a 
permanent commission was really necessary" and worried that "the commission might perhaps 
not have enough to do" (Vol. IX,  pg. 213, para. 39).  He likewise expressed the opinion that a 
flexible, as opposed to a permanent, enquiry commission might be better indicated.  Despite 
these objections, the United States ultimately played a key role in the creation of the commission 
by engineering the ipso facto compromise discussed above.  Still, with one superpower opposed 
and another supporting only a much weaker variant than was originally proposed, it is clear that 
a strong superpower coalition in support of a centralized enquiry mechanism was lacking.  In this 
regard, the power preferences hypothesis successfully predicts the inefficacy of the commission.  
 An Inhospitable Context?  
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 At one level deeper than that of superpower preferences is the international power 
structure that perhaps gave rise to those preferences.  Though the Cold War was still very much a 
reality in the mid-1970s, this was also the period that came to be known as detente, a period that 
reflected a relative cooling in inter-bloc tensions after the heightened strain of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (Walker, 1995).  Thus, though bipolarity may not have favored agreement, the specific 
state of relations between the poles may have been more auspicious at this time than at many 
other periods during the Cold War.  However, this was also a time when the Non-aligned 
Movement continued its attempts to resist domination on the part of both poles (Roy, 1988), 
meaning that divisiveness and contention were not limited to inter-bloc rivalry.   Indeed, the first 
session of the Diplomatic Conference, meeting in February 1974, devolved into political 
wrangling over, among other things, the rights of national liberation movements, with the result 
that only a tiny proportion of the proposed legal principles were agreed upon (Cantrell 1977; 
Baxter, 1975).  In this light, it is perhaps instructive that, though formal agreement on the 
enquiry commission was reached at the 1977 conference, it was not until after the end of the 
Cold War that sufficient numbers of states acceded to the commission to permit its instantiation.  
Further, this variable of the divisiveness of the political context helps to shed light on the 
apparent puzzle that states were willing to grant so little power to an enquiry commission in 1977 
but were willing to delegate much more meaningfully to a powerful International Criminal 
Court, adopted in 1998 and entering into force in 2002.  That is, the adoption of Protocol I 
coincided with an international context in which state interests were more highly polarized and 
agreement on meaningful delegation to monitoring bodies likely to be rare.  




 The two prior factors created a climate in which agreement meant dilution.  Given many 
states' ambivalence about a strong enquiry commission, the process of developing a commission 
that would be accepted by the required two-thirds majority of states resulted in an undeniable 
dilution of the commission.  As obvious from the disappointed statements of those that had 
desired a stronger commission, those most committed states reluctantly agreed to the watered-
down version out of the hope that it might nevertheless be a small step towards the desired 
monitoring system.  Still, it is unclear what alternative proposition, if any, might have rescued 
the IHFFC from obscurity.  Given the decreasing number of international armed conflicts as a 
proportion of total wars and the much smaller role imagined for an enquiry commission in cases 
of non-international armed conflict (more on this below), even a relatively automatic enquiry 
commission is likely to have been uncommonly used.  Still, more than any other decision, the 
requirement of mutual state consent likely hamstrung the commission.  Using Brown's language, 
one might say that state interest in a centralized enquiry commission could not outpace the 
sovereignty costs that establishing a commission with mandatory competence would introduce.  
The only commission that would secure sufficient state agreement was one destined to be 
ineffectual.  
 One important question here is to what extent the creation of an ineffectual institution 
challenges the rationalist paradigm.  According to Martin and Simmons (1998), predictability is 
a key factor for establishing the extent to which unintended consequences cast doubt on the 
rationalist institutional explanation.  In their view, unintended consequences that were not 
predictable challenge rationalism far more than do unintended but predictable consequences.  
The question arises, then, of whether the ineffectual nature of the IHFFC was predictable at the 




evidence that, at the time of the Diplomatic Conference, the enquiry commission being created 
was unlikely to be efficacious.  First, there are the mournful/lugubrious statements of those 
delegations who were committed to a stronger version of the commission.  In fact, several states 
justified their vote in favor of the commission by expressing their hope that, despite the 
disappointing product of the negotiations, the commission was nevertheless a step forward.  On 
the other side, there is the evidence that the commission ultimately established was approved by 
a number of delegations that had originally been skeptical of a stronger commission, such as the 
United States, France, and, in some respects, Switzerland.  Thus, it seemed that, whether or not 
states supported a strong commission, they knew what they were getting in the end - a weak 
commission, unlikely to be efficacious.
45
  In this respect, then, that states created an institution 
that would fall prey to obsolescence is not itself evidence against a rationalist institutionalist 
position.   
 An Overdetermined Outcome 
 After we've considered a number of factors that contributed to the constitution of a weak-
at-best enquiry mechanism, it now appears far from surprising that states "got what they paid 
for," that is a highly inefficacious system that was never really expected to be otherwise.  Yet, 
why did the ICRC prevail where the IHFFC failed?  Here, again, the organization's relative 
informality was an asset, as its mechanisms of operation sidestepped intractable negotiations that 
left states unwilling to agree on more centralized formal mechanisms.     
 Far more surprising is that states formally created an even weaker legal monitoring 
regime to govern non-international armed conflict, though in the decades after Protocol I 
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negotiations de facto monitoring in the two realms would look remarkably similar.   Let us turn, 
then, to the domain of non-international armed conflict.        
  The Non-International Armed Conflict Rub  
 If Protocol I negotiations resulted in a heavily diluted monitoring system, Protocol II 
negotiations, unsurprisingly given states' wariness of interference in matters of non-international 
armed conflict, resulted in absolutely no formal provision for monitoring.  However weak it may 
have been, the final Protocol I introduced a much stronger monitoring mechanism than had been 
proposed in the original ICRC draft, while the final Protocol II stripped several important 
monitoring elements from the original ICRC draft.  Clearly, states found IHL monitoring in 
situations of non-international armed conflict much more threatening than they did monitoring 
under conditions of international armed conflict.  
 To begin with, the ICRC draft had had modest aims, never daring to suggest anything 
like an enquiry commission.  Instead, the organization hoped the text would further validate its 
right to offer its services in situations of non-international armed conflict, a right granted it in 
paragraph 2 of Common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  This text stated, "An 
impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its 
services to the Parties to the conflict" (First Geneva Convention, 1949).  In line with this 
organizational role, the original ICRC draft had proposed an Article 39, entitled "Co-operation in 
the observance of the present Protocol," which also held that parties to the conflict could call 
upon an organization "offering all guarantees of impartiality and efficacity, such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, to co-operate in the observance of the provisions of 
the present Protocol (Official Records, Vol. 1, pg 291)."  The proposed article also went one 




conflict.  However, importantly, nothing in the article dared to impose an obligation on states but 
merely permitted an organization such as the ICRC to offer something to states which they 
remained free to reject.       
 The debate over Article 39 in committee was notable for the sheer extent of its 
polarization.  On one side were states which feared dramatically destabilizing consequences from 
the way in which Article 39, they claimed, invited challenges to state sovereignty.  Such states, 
with Mexico a particularly vocal proponent of this position, feared that an impartial relief 
organization's offer of services could empower domestic opposition groups and threaten the 
state's control of its territory and thus constituted "an intolerable interference in the internal 
affairs of a country" (Mexican Representative Caceres, O.R. Vol. IX, page 247, para. 56).   On 
the other hand were a number of states - Greece and Belgium, for instance - that found the article 
quite unremarkable in that they viewed it as redundant with rights and duties already established 
in Common Article 3 (O.R. Vol. IX, pg. 248-249, para. 65 and 68).
46
  For its part, the ICRC took 
a position somewhat in between these two extremes.  It attempted a delicate balancing act, 
articulating the importance of the article even as it attempted to reassure states that its power was 
limited at best.  The organization took the position that the article was primarily aspirational, as 
states would maintain the ability to refuse the offer of relief services.  The ICRC was likewise 
unconvinced that a mere offer of services would unduly influence domestic power struggles 
(O.R., Vol IX, pg. 246, para. 52-55).  Still, the organization was quite unequivocal about its 
disappointment when amendments began to whittle away at the article.  During Working Group 
B (4 June, 1976), Vice President of the ICRC Pictet articulated the organization's "serious 
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concern" in uncharacteristically bold language.  He spoke of a "retrograde step" since 1949, a 
step that would be "a deplorable setback and an abdication" (O.R. Vol IX. Par 12, pg. 292).  He 
likewise decried the fact that, contra its mention in the 1929 Conventions, the 1949 Conventions, 
and Common Article 3, the text then under consideration did not mention the ICRC at all.   
 What of the preferences of the major powers? The United States supported - if somewhat 
tepidly - Article 39.  It was of the view that the article primarily reinforced the role for the ICRC 
outlined in Common Article 3, without imposing additional obligations on states.  Still, the U.S. 
delegate, Mr. Bettauer, argued that the article would be useful in "providing a basis for action" 
for the ICRC (O.R. Vol. IX, pg. 247, Para. 58).  The Soviet Union was not particularly vocal 
about this issue, though the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic argued for the article's deletion 
(O.R., Vol. IX, pg. 249, Para. 67).        
 Somewhat curiously, the article survived Committee only to be rather unceremoniously 
"rejected by consensus" in plenary, along with Article 33 on relief societies, Article 36 on 
measures for execution, and Article 38 on special agreements to bring the Protocol into force.    
Each article was in some way a modest provision to encourage compliance with the treaty's 
provisions.  State response to the Article 39's rejection mirrored the polarization of the earlier 
debates.  Some states, such as Pakistan (which had, incidentally, proposed the vote to strike 
Article 39 and its sister articles), reiterated that the article had been unnecessary as it duplicated 
Common Article 3 (O.R., Vol. VII, pg. 151, Para. 65-66).  Other actors, such as the Holy See, 
seemed to view the deletion of the article as a blow against the ICRC, one that didn't recognize 
the significant contributions the organization made to states (O.R., Vol. VII, pg. 159).  The 
ICRC, for its part, was much more measured in its response after the decision had been made.  It 




organization's right of initiative as recognized in Common Article 3 (O.R., Vol VII, pg. 151, 
Para. 64). 
 The intensity of the negotiations over the role of ICRC -or any outside organization, for 
that matter - in non-international armed conflict makes clear that the mention of the organization 
in Common Article 3 was quite a coup.  It sanctified a role for the ICRC that would become 
significantly less popular in the more divisive context of the late 1970s.  Indeed, though some 
states justified their vote against Article 39 by invoking the still applicable Common Article 3, 
other states made no secret that they took issue with the common article itself.  The Iraqi 
delegate, for instance, described it as "badly drafted" and stated that it "had led to difficulties in 
the past" (O.R. Vol. VII, pg. 152, para. 67).   
 In light of the ICRC's failure to ensure in Protocol II the desired reinforcement of its role 
in non-international armed conflicts, it is striking that this relative defeat seems to have affected 
its activities remarkably little, as the ICRC continues to seek - and to obtain - the ability to 
monitor in conditions of non-international and international armed conflict alike.  This is 
particularly puzzling - how did the ICRC's de facto role come to outpace its formal one?   
We Couldn't have created it better ourselves: ICRC Organizational Preferences and State Interest 
 Part of the story of how a relatively informal, decentralized monitoring system won out 
over a more centralized alternative lies in the combination of coincidence and strategy that made 
the ICRC particularly well-suited to navigate major exogenous changes in the nature of war in a 
manner highly consonant with state interest.  First, particular aspects of the ICRC's functioning 
made it very much resemble the organization that states attempted to create via the IHFFC.  As 
the discussion above on the negotiations over the IHFFC makes clear, states deeply valued the 




two characteristics that the ICRC already possessed to a high degree.  Though the ICRC's 
neutrality was not beyond reproach - the Eastern Bloc, in particular, had its doubts about the true 
extent of the ICRC's professed neutrality (Forsythe, 1974) - it is nevertheless striking that the 
organization had more or less independently cultivated principles that were virtually identical to 
those preferences expressed by states in their deliberations over the IHFFC.  The organization's 
default mechanism of operation both depended on ad hoc state consent and promised conditional, 
if not universal, confidentiality in regard to information gleaned during its monitoring missions.  
This meant that, for its own reasons, the organization lacked just those traits that were deemed 
most threatening to states.  
 In addition to having general modes of operation that were relatively unthreatening to 
states, the ICRC also possessed a way of thinking and acting in situations of non-international 
armed conflict that enabled it to navigate exogenous changes in the nature of war more adeptly 
than could other organizations.  The ICRC had never accepted the hard-line distinction between 
international and non-international armed conflict that states themselves professed.  From its 
earliest operations, the ICRC was eager to help victims of conflict whether the conflict was 
between warring state governments or was instead between a government and an organization 
that lacked statehood.  The organization provided relief in 1882 in Bosnia, in 1885 in Peru, in 
1890 in Argentina and the Transvaal,  and in 1895, 1897, and 1912 in Cuba, among many others 
(Delupis, 2000; Moreillon, 1973; Jo, 2006).
47
  For this reason, though the organization certainly 
took seriously the legal basis for its action (for instance, Common Article 3 vs. the laws 
applicable only in situations of international armed conflict), the involvement of the ICRC never 
developed the same association as did the protecting power to exclusively international armed 
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conflict.  As Peirce notes, because of this, "threshold effects" were present for other types of 
institutions - the protecting power, potentially the IHFFC - that were not present for the ICRC.
48
 
All of this gave the ICRC an unusual degree of flexibility that allowed it to adapt to changes in 
the nature of war with minimal changes in the legal and political basis of its operations.   
 Though many of the attributes that so benefitted the ICRC during this time of immense 
international change are long-standing and may be thought of as intrinsic to the organization's 
culture, the organization was also, of course, evolving in response to a dynamic international 
environment.  During the course of the negotiations that ultimately gave rise to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and, later, the Additional Protocols, the ICRC was continuing to grapple with the 
nature and limits of its international humanitarian role.  The question of whether new roles - such 
as serving as replacement for the protecting power - might jeopardize its traditional humanitarian 
functions was particularly salient.  As Peirce recounts, during the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, 
the ICRC was not willing to fulfill all of the functions of the protecting power, as it deemed at 
the time that not all of these were precisely humanitarian functions (p. 113).  Professing the 
belief that performing all of the duties of the protecting power might jeopardize ICRC 
humanitarian neutrality, the ICRC was in 1949 only willing to provisionally substitute for some 
of the roles of the protecting power.  By the time of the diplomatic conferences of the 1970s, 
however, the ICRC had changed its position in this regard and now held the view that all of the 
functions of the protecting power were humanitarian and thus within the ICRC's purview.   
 This issue also arose in the debate over the IHFFC.  The initial Four State proposal 
envisioned the ICRC as a key player in the operation of the commission.  The proposal tasked 
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the ICRC with appointing and administering the commission, though it added the qualification 
that the organization "shall in no way be responsible for the enquiries undertaken or the findings 
which emerge from them" (CDDH/I/241 and Add. 1, 19 March 1975, Paragraph 1).  During 
debate in Committee I (12 May, 1976), the ICRC delegate expressed his approval of what he 
termed this "escape clause," which he hoped would protect the organization's humanitarian 
neutrality even if it undertook the role imagined in the proposal (O.R., Vol. IX, pg 195, para. 25).  
As it came to be, the organization's role as administrator of the IHFFC was phased out over the 
course of negotiations in favor of a commission president selected by states.  Still, the picture 
that emerges here - of a cautious-yet-flexible actor ever attentive to the pitfalls of proposed 
innovations in its role - is instructive.   
  Further, that the ICRC's organizational culture in many ways aligned with state 
preferences does not mean that the organization was unwilling to push back at times against state 
interest.  Nowhere was this clearer than in the case of non-international armed conflict.  Though, 
as discussed above, the Protocol II that emerged in 1977 was a deep disappointment to the ICRC, 
the organization maintained from the start that this loss would not interfere with the 
organization's work in situations of non-international armed conflict, as it held the view that 
Common Article 3, which sanctioned a greater role for the organization in non-international 
armed conflict than did Protocol II, remained in effect.  Indeed, the organization continued to 
seek out a role for itself in non-international armed conflict in the post-Protocol II era, consistent 
with its own reading of Common Article 3.
49
        
 Discussion and Conclusion 
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 This chapter has placed in greater historical and theoretical context the IHL monitoring 
regime and attempted to explain why the ICRC was able both to supersede an historical 
institution - the protecting power - and to thrive while a nascent competitor - the IHFFC - proved 
dead letter.  The answer to this apparent puzzle lies in the affinity between ICRC organizational 
culture, particularly its long-established commitment to neutrality and discretion, and state 
interest, as well as the greater flexibility of the ICRC as an institutional actor in comparison to its 
competitors.  This flexibility in terms of legal and political bases for action allowed the 
organization to navigate rather seamlessly dramatic exogenous changes in the nature of warfare, 
while its competitors were stymied by the ways in which their formal bases of action left them 
hamstrung.  In some ways, the ICRC was ideally constituted to play this role - close enough to 
state interest that states found its continued existence and operation bearable, but independent 
and flexible enough that it did not simply become captured by states.   
 Theoretically and methodologically, this chapter has drawn attention to ways in which 
the rationalist account of institutionalism exaggerates the predictability of institutional 
consequences.  One would have been hard pressed to predict in the pre-World War II era the 
eventual de facto replacement of the institution of the protecting power by the ICRC, as this era 
heralded dramatic changes in the nature of warfare - particularly the increased salience of non-
international conflicts - and in the perceived ramifications of legal commitments made in the 
realm of war-fighting.  To be clear, rationalist explanations cannot be faulted for failing to 
predict these changes, but rather for advocating a view of institutionalism that exaggerates the 
extent of this domain's predictability.   
 Benvenisti and Cohen (2014) have recently and convincingly argued that IHL was an 




control unwieldy numbers of soldiers.  One efficient solution to this problem, according to 
Benvenisti and Cohen, was cession to IHL, which helped to resolve the regulation problem by 
empowering third parties to serve as "fire alarm" indicators of violation, by creating a credible 
threat of external enforcement with which to keep agents in line, and by tying the civilian 
leadership's hands with legal commitment.  Part of the evidence they provide for this is that 
states with large militaries originated IHL and constituted a large portion of early signatories.  
How well does this argument fare in light of the history presented here?  On a general level, this 
argument neglects the role of non-state actors - particularly the nascent ICRC - in the creation of 
IHL.  Though it is certainly indicative of state interest in codification that states followed the 
lead of actors like Henri Dunant, to put the origin of IHL only in the hands of states is a 
misreading of the history.  What about the more specific aspects of IHL discussed here: how 
would Benvenisti and Cohen's argument explain the obsolescence of the protecting power, the 
failure of the IHFFC, and the (relative) success of decentralized monitoring by the ICRC? In 
their article they use the relatively late development of the law on internal armed conflict as 
supporting evidence, as, they contend, principals possessed relatively little desire to constrain 
their agents in such contexts.  While this argument is not itself inconsistent with the argument 
advanced in this chapter, it misses a critical part of this story - that concern about the expansion 
of IHL in arenas of non-international armed conflict and the changing significance of IHL 
incentivized a reversal in degree of delegation to formal monitors.  Does this mean that in the 
post-1945 period states had less need for external mechanisms to help regulate their armed 
forces? This is doubtful; rather, it is far more likely that greater incentives emerged to utilize a 




 An important and related substantive implication of this chapter is that, though the 
literature often treats centralization or delegation as a component of a more effective institution, 
decentralization or institutional flexibility also possesses definite advantages.  It was because the 
ICRC had been less definitively linked with a particular legal order - the order governing 
interstate war as a particular animal - that changes in the salience of that legal order proved far 
less devastating to the ICRC than it did to the protecting power.     









Open the Gates? De Facto Variation in State Monitoring Decisions 
 Introduction  
 The previous chapter has put the unique monitoring regime that exists for IHL in broader 
context and attempted to identify several factors that account for the particular form this 
monitoring regime has assumed.  This chapter seeks to probe the uses states have made of this 
rich de facto monitoring system.  A central contention of this chapter is that the decisions states 
make about the level of access to grant monitors constitutes an important dependent variable in 
its own right. This is because the answer to one important question - whether and to what extent 
the presence of monitors increases state compliance with the relevant law - cannot be 
successfully answered until this intermediate question about the circumstances under which 
states grant monitors access is answered.  In this chapter, then, we are probing the selection 
effect, attempting to understand the strategic decisions that states make about when to let the 
monitors in, when to kick them out, and when to engage in an intermediate strategy that permits 
them partial but incomplete access. To the extent that monitor access is endogenous to other 
variables of importance, treating access as if it's exogenous will lead to erroneous conclusions, 
most likely the exaggeration of the independent effect of monitors on compliance.
50
  
 Indeed, this chapter finds compelling evidence that states' access decisions are strategic.  
All states are not equally likely to grant monitors access. In particular, realist variables that 
approximate the potential security cost of granting access are highly statistically and 
substantively significant. However, there is also strong evidence for the significance of key 
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liberal institutionalist variables such as regime type and a measure that approximates reciprocity, 
and the direction in which strategic variables operate is sometimes contra realist expectation.  
What's more, narrowly strategic variables interact with regime type in compelling ways, with 
democracy exerting a more subdued effect on access when the military-strategic environment is 
more dire and, conversely, the strategic environment having a greater effect at higher levels of 
democracy.  While realists get a lot right, they miss a critical part of the story as they fail to 
sufficiently appreciate the ways in which signaling compliance - even if insincerely - can itself 
be a source of political power.   
 This chapter also provides evidence that states may have incentives to offer monitors an 
intermediate level of access, allowing monitors in but placing some important limits on their 
independence, geographic range, or issue area coverage.  In so doing, states may reap some level 
of reward for "good behavior" without having to cede control over the  most controversial and 
potentially damaging aspects of wartime behavior. Moreover, though a tendency towards 
intermediate access is noted throughout the dataset, certain types of democratic regimes - 
presidential in particular - appear to create particularly compelling incentives for such behavior.  
In line with Krasner's (1999) argument about sovereignty, one might usefully think of 
intermediate access as a hypocritical or insincere statement of state commitment, in which states 
are able to "have their cake and eat it too."   
 This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature on law 
of war compliance and state monitoring decisions to formulate a set of hypotheses about the 
determinants of state decisions vis-à-vis one monitoring organization in particular, the 




results of the statistical analysis. Section IV concludes with a discussion of the statistical results 
and their implications for IHL monitoring.    
  Review of the Literature  
 Over the past decades the political science literature has become increasingly interested 
in the factors that influence state behavior in regard to international law.  Here I review the most 
salient works, beginning with research that is highly skeptical of the ability of law to influence 
state behavior over and above more narrowly instrumental variables.  
 Because much of the relevant literature addresses the sources of state compliance or 
violation of IHL, it is worth discussing the relationship between compliance and access.  Though 
the dependent variable of interest in this chapter is access, not compliance, the literature on law 
of war compliance is nevertheless highly relevant here. This is because a state's level of 
compliance is one variable highly likely to influence the costs and benefits of access.  At the 
simplest level, if the conditions are such that compliance is low-cost, then granting access to 
monitors should likewise be low-cost.  However, when compliance is costly, the costliness of 
monitor access will vary according to the specific institutional and political features of 
monitoring arrangements.  Thus, it remains an open question the extent to which access is an 
accurate indicator of a state's intended level of compliance.  
 This relationship between access and compliance has been particularly enlightened by the 
game theoretic literature on signaling, previously discussed in Chapter 2.  This literature has 
suggested that certain institutional arrangements create incentives that lead states to sort 
themselves by their level of commitment to compliance.  Some institutions, often marked by 




employ the costly signal while the less committed states do not. This is in contrast to a pooling 
equilibrium, in which both highly committed and less committed states employ a particular 
signal.  One goal of this chapter is, by uncovering the determinants of states' access decisions 
vis- à -vis law of war monitors, to help illuminate whether the institutional features of this de 
facto monitoring regime are most likely to produce a separating equilibrium or a pooling 
equilibrium.  
 Realist Perspectives on the Law of War 
 Unsurprisingly, realists are skeptical of the ability of relatively "soft" variables like law to 
influence meaningfully state behavior, particularly in a realm as fraught and significant as that of 
security. Thus, the general realist expectation should be that compliance with the law of war is 
low and recourse to IHL monitors either rare, as states are reluctant to delegate aspects of 
sovereignty in such a sensitive area, or meaningless, with monitors' presence entailing little 
meaningful delegation.
51
  In addition to this general expectation of low compliance, realists also 
emphasize certain military strategic contexts that make compliance with the law of war in 
general or with specific aspects of the law particularly costly and therefore unlikely.  
 One law of war issue area that has been particularly well-researched in this regard is that 
of civilian targeting.  A number of scholars have done careful empirical research on this topic 
and consistently found that certain military-strategic contexts create compelling incentives to 
engage in anti-civilian strategies.  Though not all of these studies focus on compliance with IHL 
as such, they nevertheless use dependent variables that capture important sources of IHL 
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violation.  Valentino (2005), for instance, studies mass killing, defined as the "intentional killing 
of a massive number of noncombatants" (p. 10), with "massive" operationalized as at least 
50,000 noncombatants over five years or less.  Such an action clearly constitutes a violation of 
principles of civilian protection codified in IHL.  Downes (2006, 2008) has compellingly 
identified two strategic contexts that create strong incentives for anti-civilian military strategies: 
wars of attrition and wars with territorial aims.  In wars of attrition, anti-civilian strategies may 
be a way of continuing to persevere in the military effort while assuming lower costs than are 
assumed by attacking military targets. Secondly, wars with territorial aims may create incentives 
to target civilians whose presence threatens the combatants' claim to and hold on the contested 
territory.  Valentino, both alone (2005) and with his co-authors (2004, 2006), makes a 
complimentary argument, highlighting in particular the  incentives for civilian targeting created 
by counterinsurgency wars. The strategic logic here is that, because guerillas often depend for 
their survival on obtaining resources from the civilian population, targeting this population can 
be an effective means of deterring such assistance and, if deterrence fails,  "draining the sea in 
which the guerilla fish swim." The implications for the present project are obvious.  In such 
military contexts, states have higher incentive to violate IHL; as a result, granting access to 
monitors will be more costly in these very settings. Several hypotheses thus arise from this 
strategic literature.  
Hypothesis 1: States should be less likely to grant monitors access when they are engaged in 
wars of attrition.  
Hypothesis 2: States should be less likely to grant monitors access when engaged in 




   In addition to these specific military contexts, other variables can be inferred from the 
general realist approach.  Variables that capture the severity of the conflict - number of battle 
deaths, intensity, duration  - should increase the incentives for IHL violation and therefore 
decrease the incentives for monitor access.  
Hypothesis 3: States should be less likely to grant monitors access when they suffer higher 
numbers of battle deaths. 
Hypothesis 4: States should be less likely to grant monitors access when engaged in wars with 
more powerful states.   
 Regime Type and Access 
 A second set of influential arguments looks to the second image, particularly to ways in 
which distinct domestic regime types might have implications for law of war compliance or IHL 
monitoring more broadly.  
 Why should we expect regime type to affect state willingness to grant access to 
monitoring organizations such as the ICRC?  Because regime type is thought to influence a 
number of variables that should in turn affect a state’s willingness to grant access to monitors in 
a sphere as central as that of security, it seems likely that regime type will exert at least an 
indirect effect on state access decisions. However, it is by no means clear in what direction 
regime type will influence access or even if regime type will be found to be a significant causal 
factor at all once other relevant issues are taken into account.  Let us consider in turn the 




variable that has gotten the most consistent and impassioned consideration in the literature, that 
of democracy.  
 Democracy and Compliance 
 A lively debate has been underway about the effect, if any, democracy should have on the 
likelihood that a state will comply with international law in general and with the law of war in 
particular. Drawing on the democratic peace tradition, many thinkers have argued that 
democracy should lead to greater compliance with a range of international commitments.  The 
reasons proffered for this consequence of democracy are several: the rule-bound nature of 
democracies makes them prone to taking legal commitments seriously (irrespective of the 
content of these commitments) (Morrow 2007; Neumayer 2005); democracies evidence a 
commitment to the normative ideals of respect for life and human dignity that many international 
agreements seek to impart (so the content of humanitarian agreements is important here) (Doyle 
1983); democratic publics, particularly when kept informed by a free press, keep their 
governments honest when these governments attempt to engage in activities seen as contra 
democratic ideals (Merom 2003).   Indeed, there has been limited empirical support for this 
theorized association between democracy and law compliance (Prorok and Appel, 2013; 
Simmons, 1998.).  
 Morrow (2007) conducts an impressive empirical review of law of war compliance and 
finds that democracy exerts a complicated and conditional effect on compliance.  When they 
have not ratified the relevant law of war treaties, democracies fare worse than other states on 
measures of compliance.  Yet, when they have so ratified and particularly when both they and 




regimes. For Morrow, the primary mechanism of this effect is what he terms "institutional 
commitment."  When the state publicly signifies its intention to abide by a particular agreement, 
democracies possess domestic features that incentivize upholding these commitments. From this 
perspective, democracies are not automatically good law of war compliers; however, when they 
choose to bind themselves by particular laws, they are unlikely to be insincere signatories.   
 It is not entirely clear precisely what features of democracy lead to this tendency, as 
argued by Morrow, for democracies to honor publicly made commitments. A mechanism that 
has been oft cited in this regard relates to audience costs.  From this perspective, democracies are 
more likely than are other regimes to uphold their commitments because of the broad base of 
public support that democratic regimes need in order to survive.  Failing to honor publicly made 
commitments, so the argument goes, is apt to have electoral consequences that militate against 
shirking. However, there is another, more direct, route by which audience costs might affect 
access decisions.  It is possible that in at least some states failing to grant the ICRC access could 
have negative reputational costs for the government in power.  That is, some domestic publics 
may expect their governments to grant the ICRC access such that there will be significant 
domestic reputational costs to government refusal to grant full access. Further, it seems that these 
costs are most likely to be experienced by democracies, particularly democracies with a history 
of granting access.  This is because: 1) via the same mechanism elucidated above, democratic 
governments are especially beholden to popular opinion and 2) following the normative 
democratic peace arguments, democratic governments may be particularly likely to define 
themselves as states that grant access to organizations like the ICRC. This, then, is another 




 This argument, however, is not without its limitations. It may be prone to exaggerating 
the extent to which democratic publics both rate access to monitoring organizations positively 
and value this issue in comparison to other foreign policy issues.  The American public, for 
instance, has evidenced some real ambivalence about internationalism and has been willing to 
countenance “go it alone” strategies when doing so seemed in American national interest.  
Perhaps a more realistic way of expressing the role domestic publics play in government access 
decisions is that in democracies it is likely that there is at least some domestic constituency that 
will find government failure to grant access to the ICRC undesirable  and that will thus make this 
decision at least somewhat costly to the government. The result is that, other things being equal, 
we should expect more access from democracies than from other governments, but we should 
not expect this factor to consistently override other factors influencing the decision calculations 
of governments.  
 However, the claim that democracy incentivizes law of war compliance has certainly not  
gone uncontested.  Alexander Downes (2006) has argued brilliantly that institutional features of 
democracy may in fact incentivize violation of the law of war, particularly in the area of 
intentional noncombatant deaths. In contrast to many of the exponents of the “democrats make 
better compliers” argument, who tend to highlight the normative strand of democracy, Downes 
draws attention to the structural strand emphasized by, among others, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita 
and his co-authors (1999). This strand stresses that the feature of democracy most important for 
understanding the international behavior of democratic governments is the mechanism by which 
leaders are held accountable to the citizenry.  Because democracies are characterized by 
mechanisms by which the citizenry may punish leaders who engage in unpopular actions, 




casualties in the service of a victory.  As a result, democratic leaders may sometimes find it 
especially propitious to engage in anti-civilian strategies as a way of staving off defeat with a 
tactic that poses relatively low-risk to domestic soldiers.  Indeed, in a careful research design that 
considers the intensity, rather than merely the incidence, of anti-civilian strategies and controls 
for all of the usual suspect confounders, Downes finds that democracies are no less likely to 
target civilians than are other states and that democracies in wars of attrition are especially likely 
to take anti-civilian measures.   
 Note that Downes is focusing in particular on democratic incentives in regard to the 
specific issue area of civilian targeting.  Another issue area in which the level of compliance 
might be both pertinent to military outcomes and influenced by regime type is the treatment of 
prisoners of war.  In this regard, the issue of torture is particularly relevant, as it is both timely in 
light of the recent controversy in regard to American treatment of enemy combatants and 
seemingly timeless as a recurring theme, à la Foucault (1975), of the enactment of state power 
upon individual bodies.  What might be the relationship between democracy and torture? On the 
one hand, it is straightforward to see how the arguments considered above about the law-bound 
and constrained nature of democracies might lead to predictions about a general disinclination on 
the part of democracies to engage in practices of torture. In contrast, Darius Rejali (2009) has 
proposed a powerful refutation of this idea. He draws upon extensive and painstaking empirical 
research to demonstrate that, far from being blind to the possible uses of torture, modern 
democracies – in particular, Britain, France, and the United States of America – pioneered “clean 
torture” techniques designed to effectively inflict pain without leaving physical scars that might 
be evidence of maltreatment.  In a nice illustration of the ways in which states respond 




such techniques in response to increased public monitoring of government treatment of prisoners 
and other people under state control.  This is thus another argument to the effect that democracy 
may not lead unambiguously to motives for law of war compliance. One key difference between 
this argument and Downes’ is that Rejali is not proposing that democracy incentivizes law of war 
violation per se but that it incentivizes disguising violations in a particular way.  Thus for Rejali 
the motivation for violation comes outside the model and is not explained primarily by regime 
type.  
  In general, there are good reasons to be cautious about the assertion that democratic 
governments make better law of war compliers than do other regimes. Robert Jervis (1976) has 
written about the human propensity to avoid recognizing value conflicts. That is, instead of 
facing the complexity of empirical reality, in which a phenomenon typically has some outcomes 
we would rate positively and others we would rate negatively, humans have a tendency to fall 
prey to an “all good things go together” naiveté. Of course, that humans have this capacity does 
not mean that good things never go together. However, our awareness of human cognitive 
fallacies in this regard should remind us to hold ourselves to high standards when assessing a 
phenomenon that for whatever reason we tend to view positively. Secondly, and relatedly, there 
is often a tone of self-congratulation in this debate that should give pause to anyone who has an 
awareness of any of the unsavory actions in which democracies have engaged (see Barkawi and 
Laffey 1999). 




 Hypothesis 4: Democracies should be more likely to grant monitors access than should other 
regime types, particularly when they have ratified the relevant law of war treaties, as they are 
likely to be better law of war compliers.  
Hypothesis 5: Democracies should be less likely to grant monitors access when engaged in 
conflicts that incentivize law of war violation, such as wars of attrition or counterinsurgency.   
 Democracy and Interest 
 Of course, as critics of the democratic peace argument have noted, it is quite possible that 
democracy itself is not exerting any significant effect on whatever – typically positive – outcome 
is under study but that it is instead proxying for another variable of interest. As Erik Gartzke 
(2000) has insightfully argued, it is possible that democracy itself is less important in bringing 
about outcomes like peace than are the general preferences currently shared by many of the 
world’s democracies. In regard to the question of monitoring access, what seems most relevant is 
the relationship of the ICRC to the world’s established western democracies. The roots of the 
ICRC are markedly Swiss. Because of this, it is possible that the organization best expresses the 
preferences of Western democracies, thus making their higher rates of access unsurprising.  In 
this view, then, any association between democracy and higher rates of access could be a relic of 
the association that exists between democracy and the particular states that have been closely tied 
to the ICRC from its origin.  
 The temporal period of the data collected here, ranging from 1950 – 2000, is quite 
obviously dwarfed by the Cold War. Scholars have observed how efforts at internationalism and 
the use of institutions like the United Nations were significantly limited by the rigid division of 




this reality to affect the phenomena investigated here?   A (very) naïve observer might declare 
that, because the ICRC is a professedly neutral organization, the harsh reality of Cold War 
politics should have little effect on its activities. However, one doesn’t have to think too hard to 
see the extent to which the ICRC, in spite of its most lofty neutral ambitions, is inextricably 
linked to the Western bloc. Why? First, though we don’t wish to fall prey to the “fallacy of 
origins,” the organization’s roots in the Swiss federation, at least from the perspective of the 
Eastern bloc, are incriminating. Despite its historical commitment to neutrality, the government 
and economic system of Switzerland made it a de facto member of the Western bloc.  
Furthermore, evidence suggests the presence of strong anti-communist sentiment in both the 
Swiss Federal Council and the ICRC governing board (which had significant overlap)  (Forsythe 
2005).  Second, it could be said that the very ideals of the ICRC  - inviolability of the individual, 
for instance - possess an ideological affinity with the type of liberal individualism professed by 
the Western bloc (Forsythe).   
 Yet if the extreme position about the irrelevance of Cold War politics to understanding 
state access decisions is wrong, the opposite, and perhaps more tempting, extreme – in which 
Cold War politics trumps all the interesting questions – is equally misguided.  Even if we accept 
prima facie the assumption that Western bloc states will be inclined to grant access and Eastern 
bloc states to deny access, some intriguing empirical puzzles present themselves. How, for 
instance, might we explain states that diverge from this pattern? A notable instance of this 
divergence is the China-North Vietnam border war of 1979, in which both parties granted the 
organization access.  One feature of this conflict points to an interesting hypothesis in regard to 
when we should see behavior that departs from the expectation of access from Western Bloc 




War – that is conflicts between a Western bloc state and an Eastern bloc state – states should 
behave as their ideological commitment predicts. Yet, in wars within a bloc, as in the war 
between China and North Vietnam, states may be more likely to depart from the expected 
behavior.  Why? In this case, the ideological status of the ICRC may be less salient and other 
functional and reputational reasons for wishing to grant access may assume greater importance. 
The function of ICRC access as a signal of bloc membership is no longer needed, so its other 
roles may become more salient.  
Hypothesis 6: During the Cold War, States allied with the Western bloc should be more likely to 
grant the ICRC access than should states allied with the Eastern bloc.  
Hypothesis 7: Eastern bloc states should be particularly less likely to grant access when engaged 
in wars with Western bloc states.  
 Variants of Electoral System 
 Though the international relations literature has been keen to discuss the effects of regime 
type on foreign policy formation, it has been far less quick to draw on more nuanced discussions 
of variation in domestic political systems that are prominent in the comparative politics 
literature. In particular, the comparative politics discipline has highlighted the effect of key 
features of electoral systems – most notably, presidentialism versus parliamentarism – on such 
outcomes of interest as electoral stability and minority representation (see, for instance, Linz and 
Valenzuela 1994). That the significance of variation in electoral system has been of less note to 
scholars of IR may be the result of a) IR scholars’ lower level of interest and expertise in the 
intricacies of domestic regimes as compared to comparativists and b) the centrality of the bright 




alike. However, I argue here that there are good theoretical reasons to expect foreign policy 
decisions of states to be influenced by a number of regime characteristics that shape the 
incentives held by political leaders.  
 The debate on the extent to which democracies will be effective belligerents also has 
implications for ways in which variation across democracies might influence foreign policy 
behavior.  The basic logic of the argument that regime type matters for foreign policy outcomes 
is that the institutions that govern the formation of policy in a state make some types of outcomes 
more or less likely. Thus, for instance, democracies are less bellicose with each other because the 
larger size of the winning coalition relative to the selectorate encourages effective provision of 
public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999), or more simply because regulated procedures for 
executive removal create incentives for cautious foreign policy behavior.  By this logic, we 
should also expect different types of democratic regimes to behave differently depending on the 
concrete incentives the electoral regime establishes.  
 While there is far from consensus in the comparative literature on the effects of 
presidentialism versus parliamentarism, that these systems operate according to distinct political 
logics is clear. I will review below several ways in which parliamentary systems and presidential 
differ and the implications of this for foreign policy formation.  
A) The Relationship Between the Executive and the Legislature  
 The defining characteristic of parliamentarian systems is the selection of the executive by 
the legislature. The implications of this are dramatic. The means of selection of the executive 
ensures a degree of coordination between the executive and the legislature that is often notably 




selected.  One effect of this is that parliamentary systems may be more efficient in that coalitions 
can more easily be formed to  initiate dramatic changes in state policy. In contrast, presidential 
systems tend to encourage competition between the executive and the legislature that makes 
change more difficult and hence encourages a higher degree of stability in policy formation. 
How might such a difference influence foreign policy? One hypothesis is that parliamentary 
systems are prone to wider swings in foreign policy decisions compared to presidential. The 
characteristics of parliamentary systems that make them more efficient and less stable, provided 
(and this is an important qualification) that foreign policy is formed via the same institutional 
mechanisms as domestic policy, should result in more substantive shifts in foreign policy as a 
coalition is able to exert its influence for a time and then subsequently falls from power.    
 Relatedly, the somewhat lower efficiency of presidential systems in implementing 
significant policy changes may incentivize certain policy choices that we might call symbolic or, 
somewhat more controversially, hypocritical (Krasner 1999). Given the difficulty of securing a 
coalition that can implement policy change, policy makers may  have incentives to engage in 
policy commitments that appease certain domestic and international constituencies without 
necessitating more meaningful and dramatic policy change.  Emile Hafner-Burton (2005) has, for 
instance, highlighted the way in which signing international human rights treaties might fulfill 
such a function for states.  This dissertation provides evidence that offering international election 
monitors an intermediate level of access may be a similar type of policy choice for states in that 
they may reap some level of reward for "good" behavior without having to cede control over the 




 B) A related feature distinguishing parliamentary systems from presidential is the fixed 
term limits of most presidential systems compared to the variable terms of parliamentary 
systems. This has direct consequences for the responsiveness of the executive to the electorate. 
While in both systems there are electoral checks on the actions of the executive and the 
legislature, in presidential systems these checks occur only at fixed intervals, giving elected 
officials more freedom of action in the interim period between elections.  If public opinion 
disapproves of presidential actions, under a presidential system the electorate has little recourse 
until the president is up for reelection. In fact, one way of punishing the president, penalizing his 
party in legislative elections, may be one reason divided government is common in many 
presidential systems, such as the U.S.  In parliamentary systems, in contrast, a sufficiently 
dissatisfied electorate can pressure the legislature to dissolve the government and initiate new 
elections. In terms of the principal-agent problem, the principal clearly has more control over the 
agent if the agent can be fired at will rather than only at fixed intervals (here I am heuristically 
conceiving of the electorate as the principal and the executive as the agent).  One likely 
implication of this state of affairs for foreign policy is that foreign policy decisions may be more 
temporally stable in presidential regimes than in parliamentary, as foreign policy in 
parliamentary regimes is more quickly responsive to changes in public opinion.  In the best 
scenario this may manifest as relatively quick learning in parliamentary regimes from adverse 
developments in foreign policy.  One example of such a phenomenon is the decision of the 
newly elected Spanish government to withdraw from active participation in the American-led 
war against Iraq shortly after the Madrid bombings.
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  In other words, if, as Reiter and Stam 
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(2002) have evocatively suggested, public support for war is an hourglass in democracies, the 
hourglass may be smaller and more quick to elapse in parliamentary regimes than in presidential.  
 A few caveats are in order here. Though much research has argued that presidential and 
parliamentarism have distinct effects, making causal claims about institutional variation is 
notoriously difficult.  This is primarily because choice of regime type is likely endogenous to 
many other variables of interest. Shugart (1999), for instance, has noted that presidentialism is 
more likely to occur in large heterogenous states with complex histories, precisely the types of 
states that might benefit from presidentialism as a way of incentivizing public good provision in 
the absence of strong national parties. Thus, it may not be possible to tease apart the effects of 
institutional systems themselves from the effects of variables that make one institutional system 
more likely than another.  
 Moreover, though presidentialism and parliamentarism are distinct systems, significant 
heterogeneity exists within each governmental type.  This variation may exert a significant effect 
on outcomes of interest.  For instance, Elman (2000) classifies democratic regimes according to 
the degree to which they embody majoritarian principles. Parliamentary regimes that rely on 
coalitions fall on the low end of that spectrum, while Westminister-style parliamentary regimes 
fall on the high end.  To the extent, then, that majoritarianism is the critical mediating variable, 
knowing simply whether a regime is parliamentary or presidential may not be sufficient.  
Similarly, Tsebelis (1995) argues that it is not presidentialism or parliamentarism that is 
significant per se but rather the number of veto players that exist in a given system. These 
players are "actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo." (p.289) The 




language, coalition-style parliamentary systems may have many more veto players than 
Westminister, which again may have significant policy implications. It's unclear how the number 
of veto players should impact decisions in regard to law of war monitors. The answer to this 
question may depend on the locus of government in which decisions about delegation to 
monitors are made. Assuming that the executive has province over this decision, it is possible 
that a larger number of veto players may paradoxically incentivize delegation in cases in which 
the executive is genuinely committed to law of war compliance. This is because in governments 
in which there are large numbers of veto players an independent executive decision in this realm 
may have the effect of tying the hands of other governmental actors.  
  How might differential responsiveness to public opinion impact state behavior 
international monitors?  This variable my operate in both directions.  Heightened responsiveness 
may make delegating to monitors more costly to the extent that monitors' determinations exert 
meaningful effects on domestic audiences.  That is, if an agency's finding of law of war violation 
is likely to reduce public support for the war effort AND a state's institutional structures create 
relatively high levels of responsiveness to public opinion, then states may have less incentive to 
delegate to monitors insincerely. In other words, in such a system delegating to monitors may be 
more of a costly signal than cheap talk. On the other hand,  when state commitment to law of war 
compliance is high, meaningful delegation to monitors may be useful precisely for the signal it 
sends to domestic (and perhaps international) audiences.  
Hypothesis 8: Presidential regimes will be  more likely than parliamentary regimes to grant 




 The common retort to arguments about regime type and foreign policy is the so-called 
House on Fire analogy that suggests that, when it comes to foreign policy, second image 
variables like regime type will tend to be trumped by third-image security imperatives – when a 
house is on fire, you don’t need to know much about the characteristics of the persons inside to 
know that they will attempt to flee the house (see Jervis 1976).  A more moderate version of this 
argument might suggest that, whatever differences may exist between/among electoral systems 
in policy formation, the effects of these differences are apt to be minimized in the realm of 
foreign policy as the security interests of the state come to trump other factors.   I make both 
theoretical and empirical objections to such a claim. Theoretically, such a perspective 
exaggerates the objective nature of threats and the uniformity with which they can be recognized 
and responded to.  What’s more, in the complex world of international relations, there inevitably 
exist more than one exit from the house, and second image characteristics may be relevant to 
predicting just what exit is taken.  In regard to the variable highlighted here – presidentialism 
versus parliamentarism -  it may matter whether the residents of the house can immediately 
punish the fire department for its faulty handling of the crisis or must wait two years for the bi-
annual fire house review.  
 Non-Democratic Variation and Access Decisions 
 Recent international relations literature has made significant gains in differentiating 
among those non-democratic regimes that have typically constituted the unexplained “other” in 
the democratic peace literature.  These regimes may be categorized by their level of regime 
consolidation (Eck and Hultman, 2007), by their use of a personalist, single-party, or military 
basis of power (Peceny, Beer and Sanchez-Terry, 2002), or even by the age of their leader 




between authoritarian and mixed regimes on the basis of the extent of regime repression (mixed 
regimes use moderate levels of repression while authoritarian regimes use high levels) and the 
proportion of the population included in the policy making process (mixed-regimes typically 
include a larger proportion of the population than do authoritarian regimes).  A few of these 
categories yield useful predictions in regard to law of war access decisions. Any predictions in 
regard to single-party regimes are dwarfed by the association of single-party regimes with 
communism.  Because of the ICRC’s ideological association (despite its best efforts to maintain 
strict neutrality) with the Western democratic countries during the Cold War, a negative 
association between single-party regime type and access is expected. One should note, however, 
that such a prediction says less about the structural mechanisms operant in single-party regimes 
than it does about the dynamics of ideology and interest during the Cold War.  
 As for military regimes, there are reasons to expect both higher than average levels of 
access and lower than average levels. Military regimes root their legitimacy in a martial ethos; as 
a result, they may be likely to grant law of war monitoring organizations access to illustrate the 
professionalism of the military and ideals of military honor.  Note that such a motivation to 
illustrate military honor may contrast strikingly with the behavior of the military domestically, as 
illustrated by the paradox of Argentina’s general compliance with the law of war in the Falklands 
War in stark contrast to the simultaneous devastation the military was wreaking on the domestic 
Argentine population.  On the other hand, however, military regimes may be inclined to 
jealously guard military autonomy and so may doggedly resist granting access to external 
monitoring organizations.  Given these competing imperatives for military regimes, we might 
expect them to act very differently in interstate wars than in colonial or civil conflicts. In 




characteristic ruthlessness to protect themselves from domestic enemies.  In interstate conflicts, 
in contrast, the notions of military honor and dignity may prove more salient and create 
incentives for delegation to monitors as symbols of military commitment to the law of war. 
 Jessica Weeks (2008) has recently and usefully considered the vulnerability of disparate 
types of autocratic regimes to audience costs.  Challenging the traditional wisdom that 
democracies possess a signaling advantage over autocracies due to their unique vulnerability to 
audience costs, Weeks provides theoretical and empirical evidence that most types of autocratic 
regimes are vulnerable to audience costs that are visible to foreign observers and thus conducive 
to signaling. Weeks distinguishes especially between regimes in which leaders can be punished 
by key domestic audiences - especially single-party regimes and military regimes - and regimes 
in which the leader is largely free of such domestic checks on his/her power, personalist or 
sultanist regimes.  She likewise describes two distinct types of monarchy. Dynastic monarchies, 
she argues, provide some mechanism of domestic punishment of the leader in the form of the 
royal lineage, while nondynastic monarchies function more as personalist regimes. Though 
Weeks addresses these distinctions in the context of arguments about signaling in international 
dispute resolution, they also likely have relevance for monitoring decisions.  To the extent that 
Weeks accurately identifies non-democratic sources of vulnerability to forms of domestic 
opposition, she may have also highlighted the types of regimes in which granting access to 
external monitors risks activating domestic channels of opposition. As with Weeks' primary 
topic, signaling, the domestic effects of delegating to international actors have been primarily 
emphasized in democracies. She draws our attention to the relevance of these processes in non-




Hypothesis 9: Military regimes will be more likely to grant monitors access than other regime 
types during interstate wars. 
Hypothesis 10: Single-party regimes will be less likely to grant monitors access than other 
regime types.  
 Regime Change and Transitioning Regimes  
 Mansfield and Snyder’s prominent caveat to the democratic peace literature about the 
potential bellicosity of transitioning democracies (1995) reminds us of the importance of 
variation in level of regime consolidation.  Nascent or unconsolidated democracies may bring 
about outcomes that are far from the rosy picture expected from mature or consolidated 
democracies, just as unstable autocracies are likely to function differently than stable ones.  
Chronic regime instability or a recent transition may increase the perceived risks of delegation to 
external actors, even as such events may create incentive for the regime to seek additional 
sources of legitimacy, of which admitting IHL monitors may be one. 
 Generally, there is reason to expect that higher levels of regime stability will increase the 
regime's willingness to grant monitors access.  Recently transitioning regimes, however, may 
face competing incentives. They may be eager to demonstrate their ability to function 
effectively, but they also may be reluctant to unleash unpredictable forces into an already 
precarious situation.  The direction of a recent regime change - whether in the direction of 
greater autocracy or greater democracy - may also exert an effect on access decisions, though it 
is difficult to predict the direction of such an effect. On the one hand, because democracy in 
general is held to be more conductive to access, democratic regime change may increase a state's 




regime to tie its hands and forestall an autocratic regression.  On the other hand, it is possible that 
newly democratic regimes have alternative sources of legitimacy and are less in need of external 
signals than are regimes that have undergone a change in the direction of greater autocracy.       
Hypothesis 11: Regimes will be more likely to grant monitors access the more stable the regime, 
as measured by length of time without major regime transitions.   
Hypothesis 12: Regimes that have recently experienced a transition in the direction of greater 
autocracy will be less likely to grant monitors access than other regimes.  
Hypothesis 13: Regimes that have recently experienced a transition in the direction of greater 
democracy will be less likely to grant monitors access than will other regimes.  
 The Strategic Calculus of Granting Access to IHL Monitors  
 The review of the literature has generated a substantial list of hypotheses that may 
explain the circumstances under which states are likely to grant the ICRC access as monitors of 
IHL. Before proceeding to outline the research design, I wish to return in a broader way to the 
question of what states gain and lose by granting access to IHL monitors. Of course, the 
competing paradigms in international relations will take distinct views on this question.   
 From the realist perspective, the primary interest of a warring state is to win at as little 
cost as possible.  As a result, there is likely little that can be gained from granting an outside 
organization access.  However, realism is not surprised if a state uses moral rhetoric insincerely 
or engages in low cost actions that might offer some political or ideological advantage. Thus, 
realism might be willing to concede that something can be gained from demonstrating one's 
commitment to IHL via the admittance of monitors, but this something is apt to be quite small 




 From the institutionalist perspective, a state that has bound itself by law likely has some 
interest in complying with this law. However, the extent to which committing to law captures 
sincerity of intent will vary dramatically according to the particular institutional arrangement that 
governs said law.  When an agreement requires little in terms of actual compliance on the part of 
states, institutionalists, quite like the realists discussed above, will not be surprised if states make 
cheap commitments that are not ultimately fulfilled.  Given this state of affairs, one incentive for 
granting monitors access is to increase the likelihood that the state and its enemies are able to 
abide by the law to the extent consonant with their interest. There are several mechanisms by 
which monitoring might increase the probability of compliance. By signaling one's intent  to 
comply, it may facilitate the functioning of reciprocity, preventing the premature breakdown of 
reciprocity under conditions of noise (Morrow 2007). Thus, here the key audience of interest is 
one's opponent.  Alternatively, monitoring may constitute a form of self-binding, a way of 
increasing the costs to one's self of reneging on a commitment that is in one's long term interest 
even if in the short term there are ample incentives to shirk.  For many institutionalists, a central 
avenue through which the costs of reneging are raised lies in domestic audiences that may punish 
a regime for failing to fulfill certain commitments.   
 Of course, audiences - both domestic and international - may motivate the admittance of 
monitors under more sinister conditions.  Rather than being simply a mechanism by which 
compliance is achieved, these audiences may also be an end in their own right. That is, granting 
access to monitors may be a way to convince domestic and international audiences of one's intent 
to comply, regardless of one's actual intent.  Why might states wish to demonstrate their IHL 
commitment to these audiences?  The political value of appearing to be in the moral right may be 




significance of moral claims, the fact remains that regimes expend a great deal of energy 
convincing their publics, other states, key international actors, and possibly even themselves that 
they are in the moral or legal right
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 in a given case. Thus, even if admitting monitors does not 
effectively tie states' hands and increase the probability of compliance, doing so may be desirable 
if it can be used to signal one's "rightness" to audiences that matter.  
 How can we distinguish between these two possible roles for audiences, as mechanism 
for tying one's hands or as ends in themselves? One factor affecting the desirability of these 
competing strategies is the general costliness of admitting monitors.  The costlier it is to delegate 
access in this way, the more likely it is that states will choose this option only when deeply 
committed.  However, the lower the cost of granting access, the more tempting it will be to do so 
insincerely solely to earn "brownie points."   
 How costly is it, then, to grant access to the ICRC as law of war monitor?  My contention 
is that granting some degree of access to the organization is a relatively low cost activity that 
creates some incentive for misuse, that is for making the signal absent genuine commitment. This 
is because the organization's default policy of confidentiality means that, even absent full 
compliance, granting the organization access is unlikely to result in a condemnation of the state's 
policies.
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 Because it is a relatively low cost activity, granting access is unlikely to be efficacious 
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 Of course, as will be considered in a discussion of "naming and shaming" humanitarian strategies in the next 
chapter, it's unclear that even an extremely critical statement from a monitoring organization is very costly to a state. 
However, if the likelihood of such a statement were high, it would significantly reduce the ability of a state to use 





as a way of binding one's hands.
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  It is, however, likely to be appealing as a way of gaining 
political capital.  
 I have perhaps given short shrift in this chapter to the constructivist view of costs and 
benefits of access. In some ways constructivism is harder to characterize than the other 
paradigms, as many of its assertions are highly context-dependent and lead to a certain 
theoretical indeterminacy.  What's more, constructivism often gets over simplified, as for 
instance suggesting that compliance should be typical or that normative concerns should 
unambiguously trump instrumental ones.  However, when thinking of the incentives that exist for 
monitor access, constructivism may help to enlighten why sending a signal of one's intention to 
comply with IHL might constitute a source of political power. That is, we may need to turn to 
constructivism for an explanation of why signals of IHL compliance might constitute a form of 
political or ideological power.  
 Research Design 
 This chapter tests the above hypotheses on an original dataset documenting state access 
decisions vis-à-vis the International Committee of the Red Cross in the time period 1950-2000. 
Through a procedure to be detailed below, states involved in warring conflicts in the relevant 
time period were assessed for their level of access. A few notes on the general research design 
follow.   
 Much Ado about Nothing?  
An attentive social scientist may object that my exclusive focus in this section on state 
decisions vis-à-vis the International Committee of the Red Cross compromises both the 
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generalizability and relevance of the research question.  Let me address each of these concerns in 
turn. One reason the ICRC is a good candidate for study is that it maintains extensive operations 
with warring states over a long temporal period. As I note elsewhere, at least in the last several 
decades, the ICRC has aimed for involvement with all warring states to such an extent that we 
need not worry about selection effects in regard to the location of ICRC activities. Furthermore, 
the fact that the ICRC has been a central actor in the field of humanitarian law monitoring for the 
entirety of the twentieth century creates a rich empirical universe that can be usefully subjected 
to systematic study.  This, of course, does not speak to the issue of whether what we find here 
can be appropriately generalized to other actors. After all, the ICRC likes to pride itself on being 
an organization with a rather unique status in international law. Yet, it is reasonable to expect 
that what we find in regard to the ICRC will shed light on other monitoring organizations as 
well.  The arguments advanced here highlight the utility of variables that can be used to make 
predictions about state behavior vis-à-vis other organizations.  
It is also important to note that good methodological concerns about comparability 
explain the decision to focus in this section exclusively on the ICRC. Because other monitoring 
organizations such as HRW or AI do not depend on state consent, there is no way to measure 
state decisions to grant access to these organizations
56
 and hence, no clear variable to compare to 
ICRC access decisions.   
 The Problem of Secrecy 
The same factor that makes the ICRC so intriguing as an object of study also poses 
significant challenges to the researcher. This is the quality of secrecy.  In this section I’ll 
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consider the ways in which the confidential nature of the ICRC as a monitoring organization 
influences the tasks I’m attempting to complete.  
 Use of the Annual Reports 
An attentive reader may note a certain tension in the claims I advance and the methods I 
use to evaluate these claims.  On the one hand, I stress that the ICRC’s unique modus operandi – 
its general policy of maintaining secrecy in regard to the findings of its monitoring missions – 
creates a particular set of incentives for states, raising interesting questions about both state 
strategy and the ultimate task of monitoring organizations.  However, the means I utilize to study 
this organization rely primarily on public material, particularly the organization’s own Annual 
Reports.  How can this tension be reconciled? First, it is important to distinguish between 
secrecy about the simple fact of the organization’s involvement with a particular state and 
secrecy about the content of its findings in the course of a monitoring mission in a particular 
state.  The ICRC typically maintains strict secrecy, though with notable exceptions, in regard to 
the latter but not in regard to the former.  For obvious reasons, states are not particularly 
sensitive to organization publicity to the effect that a state is granting some level of access to the 
ICRC.  States are typically happy to advertise widely their willingness to work with the ICRC.  
And interestingly, by itself announcing the states in which it is working, the ICRC does partially 
embrace a publicity model, though in providing information that states generally find to be 
advantageous to their interests, one could say this is the “carrot” alternative to the punitive 
naming and shaming model.  Of course, the organization does not in these reports 
unambiguously praise the extent of access granted by states. The general tenor of the reports is to 
provide information about the level of access offered by the relevant state and to gently and 




Generally the harshest statement that the ICRC will make in these reports is that “No reply to the 
request was received by the end of the year."
57
 Second, it is important to distinguish between the 
rather low level of publicity represented by a disclosure in the course of an annual report as 
compared to the type of extensive public pressure campaign that would be advanced by, say, 
Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch.   It is also important to note that in referencing 
the secretive nature of the organization I do not mean to suggest that the information made 
publicly available is erroneous or deceptive.  The ICRC recently took a significant step towards 
greater openness in reducing from sixty years to forty the amount of time required before the 
confidential materials housed in the archives would be made publicly available (Forsythe).  
Thus, the opened archive materials, as well as several histories written by scholars granted full 
access to the archives (such as Bugnion 2003), offer some evidence about the extent to which 
information revealed in the annual reports departs from reality. What we see is that published 
information is not blatantly false or misleading, but rather that this information is marked by a 
certain reservation about details.      
 Another criticism that might be made of my use of the annual reports centers not on the 
secrecy issue but on the extent of the empirical contribution made, as it may appear that I am 
simply using publicly available materials.  The empirical contribution of this study, though 
admittedly modest, stems first from collecting the data and quantifying it in a way that makes it 
amenable to systematic analysis (Jo and Thomson 2013).  Further, the secrecy of the 
organization also makes this a more difficult data collection exercise than it might seem at first 
glance.  As even the published annual reports are not readily available in the U.S. for each year 
of interest in the dataset, this researcher collected the annual reports and supporting details 
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during a month-long research trip to the Archives of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (Geneva, Switzerland), where photographs were taken of relevant materials so that more 
systematic coding of the data could take place upon return to the States.      
 Universe of Cases 
 The universe of cases is gleaned from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 
4-2009). This dataset differs from the Correlates of War most notably by the lower threshold of 
casualties necessary to warrant a conflict’s inclusion. Whereas COW uses a 1,000 battle-related 
casualties threshold, UCDP employs a more modest 25-casualties criterion.   A more generous 
definition of conflict is justified in this case because the ICRC itself endeavors to assume its 
function as law of war monitor in a wide array of conflicts.  It is possible that the organization 
prioritizes higher intensity conflicts. However, having a more inclusive definition of conflict will 
enable the testing of just this hypothesis, whereas a more exclusive definition of conflict assumes 
such a view without subjecting it to empirical verification.  
The UCDP dataset classifies wars into four categories: 1) extra-systemic or extra-state 
(essentially anti-colonial wars); 2) interstate; 3) internal; and 4) internationalized internal. 
Because this dissertation focuses on the law of war applicable to international armed conflict, 
exclusively internal wars are excluded from the analysis.  Interstate wars are, obviously, 
included.  More ambiguous, however, are wars that fall in categories 1 and 4.  Extra-systemic 
wars take place between states and non-state actors outside the state’s territory. (CB, page 7) 




so the applicability of the international law of armed conflict is in question.
58
  I include these 
types of wars because they constitute a unique pattern of conflict and thus may shed interesting 
light on the conditions under which states grant high levels of access to international monitors. 
Conflicts that fall into the fourth category, internationalized civil wars, are sometimes excluded 
and sometimes included in the analysis. Internationalized civil wars are included when they 
involve actual military conflict between an external state and a party to an internal armed conflict 
(either the government or opposition) in the relevant year.  This is because these 
internationalized dimensions of internal conflict resemble interstate war in that a state is 
engaging in combat outside of its territory. However, an external state’s provision of resources 
such as arms and money to either side in an internal war is not sufficient to warrant inclusion for 
that year.  This is because indirect involvement on the part of a state in an internal conflict gives 
rise to obligations under international humanitarian law that are uncertain at best. Moreover, 
some of the conflicts coded as internationalized civil wars by PRIO in reality evidence 
exclusively civil war dynamics, in that the only direct violence that occurs is between a state and 
its local opposition; such conflicts are excluded from the universe of cases.   
 There is another mechanism by which states may be included among my universe of 
cases.  Though PRIO codes only conflicts that are active for any given year, inactive conflicts 
may nevertheless sometimes give rise to monitoring activities on the part of the ICRC. The most 
common reason for ongoing monitoring in an inactive conflict is the continued holding of 
prisoners of war by one or more parties to the conflict.  Intriguing variation may be observed in 
state decisions to grant the ICRC access in the context of a concluded or stalemated war; thus, it 
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would be unfortunate if such cases were excluded from the analysis.  To prevent such omission, 
ICRC reports on states previously party to a PRIO conflict are monitored for 3 years after that 
state ceases to appear in the PRIO dataset as a party to an active conflict. If the reports provide 
indication that law of war monitoring activities related to the inactive conflict are on-going, the 
state is included in the dataset for that year. These “holdover” cases are coded as such so that we 
might evaluate whether access decisions for such conflicts differ significantly from access 
decisions for hot conflicts.  
 Measuring the Dependent Variable 
 A 5-point scale representing increasing state access was constructed. The scale used to 
assign these scores is displayed in Table 3.1.  A score of 0 was granted to states that experienced 
a complete rupture with the International Committee of the Red Cross, refusing to permit the 
organization to undertake any activities within state borders.  For states given this score in 
particular years, the ICRC report typically describes the organization’s many repeated and 
unsuccessful attempts to secure access. Such a score was assigned, for instance, to North Korea 
in 1950 – 1953 and, more recently, to Iran in 1992 in response to its ouster of ICRC delegates 
seeking to continue monitoring activities related to Iran’s stalemated conflict with Iraq.  
 States that permitted the organization to work within the state but that placed severe 
constraints on the activities the organization could undertake were given an access score of 1. 
Such constraints usually involved prohibiting the ICRC from undertaking any visits with persons 
detained in the state, thus completely denying the organization the ability to perform one of the 
activities clearly central to its mandate. States that did not permit ICRC access to a particular 
region or that otherwise granted the ICRC partial but incomplete access to places or persons 




to states in which full access was granted after a significant temporal delay, while a score of 4 
indicated full access. Table 3.2 lists the proportion of states given various access scores in the 
full and interstate only versions of the dataset. Notably an access score of 0 is the rarest score, 
with only 6.83% of cases receiving that score. The most common score is 1, with 28.05% of 
cases receiving that score, while the remaining scores are given to roughly 20% of the cases. 
Table 3.3 displays the scores given for each year included in the dataset. Particularly noteworthy 
is that scores of 0 become much less frequent after 1980, with 23 cases receiving a score of 0 
before 1980, and only 5 receiving such a score after 1980. Of these 5, only 1 occurred in the 
1990s.   
 In order to facilitate ordered logistical analysis, this 5-point scale of access was collapsed 
to create a 3-point scale displayed in Table 3.4.
59
  The revised scale codes the original 0 and 1 
cases as 0, indicating low access, and the previous 3 and 4 cases as 2, indicating high access. The 
cases formerly deemed 2 at the middle of the scale are recoded as 1 in the new system and 
continue to represent moderate access. The distribution of access scores for the revised measure 
is displayed in Table 3.5, with approximately 36% of cases scored as 0, 42% scored as 1, and 
21% scored as 2. 
 In an intriguing recent article, Jo and Thomson (2003) utilize a dependent variable in 
some ways quite close to mine and in some ways quite distinct. They have coded the access 
decisions made by states in regard to ICRC prisoner of war monitoring conducted in civil wars 
during the time period 1991 - 2006.  Obviously, this is a different temporal and substantive focus 
from mine.  Furthermore, Jo and Thomson’s dependent variable is exclusively based on prison 
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visits undertaken by the ICRC.
60
  This choice is logical insofar as prison visits are one of the 
defining tasks undertaken by the ICRC and represent a significant degree of delegation on the 
part of the state over a sensitive security domain. Yet, there are other ways in which the ICRC 
executes its monitoring function, the most straightforward of which is simply its presence in the 
state.  Permitting the organization to maintain presence within the state may not seem like a 
significant act, but in fact it should be appreciated as such.  Controlling who is permitted to enter 
the state is a privilege of state authority, one that is particularly relevant during wartime. 
Organization presence in and near warzones poses the risk that illegal behavior will be observed 
and commented upon, though ICRC statements in this regard tend to be mild and to avoid 
pinpointing blame, in line with its confidentiality policy.
61
 Organization presence also tends to 
invoke the injunction to respect the neutrality of humanitarian workers and the Red Cross 
emblem, thus risking negative press.  Overall, the dependent variable I create is broader than that 
employed by Jo and Thomson.     
 One way in which states may grant access to the ICRC is not considered here as assent to 
a form of monitoring.  Agreements made with the organization over the conditions of relief 
provision are considered to be distinct from acceptance of the organization’s monitoring role.  As 
Forsythe has noted, the ICRC sometimes draws too stark a line between its assistance (relief) 
activities and its protection (monitoring) activities, and we might be accused of doing the same 
here.  Clearly, outlining the conditions under which the ICRC may provide relief supplies to 
one’s population or on one’s territory is a politically significant act and one that is likely subject 
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  By excluding here we do not mean to claim that its status is somehow 
neutral or apolitical but rather that the acceptance of assistance is a distinct act from the 
acceptance of the organization’s monitoring duties.    
Independent Variables 
Descriptive statistics for all independent variables in the model can be found in Table 3.6.  
Dyadic Level Variables 
 Battle Deaths 
 The intensity of the conflict in the year of interest was captured by the number of war-
related deaths experienced that year. These deaths were again coded from the PRIO Battle 
Deaths Dataset V 3.0 (Lacina & Gleditsch, 2005), which defines battle deaths as “deaths 
resulting directly from violence inflicted through the use of armed force by a party to an armed 
conflict during contested combat (Codebook, p.3).” Such a definition includes both soldiers and 
civilians that died as a direct result of fighting, but excludes indirect deaths from war-related 
disease or destroyed infrastructure, as well as direct deaths that took place “outside of the context 
of any reciprocal threat of lethal force (e.g. execution of prisoners of war).” Due to the difficulty 
of accurately calculating the number of battle deaths per year, the PRIO dataset produces 3 
distinct measures: 1) a high estimate of annual battle deaths; 2) a low estimate of battle deaths; 
and 3) a best estimate of the battle deaths from available sources. Each of these measures was 
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employed here so that the impact of any discrepancy in battle death estimation on the outcome 
measures of interest could be determined.  Though the best estimate measure has obvious appeal, 
because in many cases no best estimate can be determined, relying solely on this measure would 
have the undesirable effect of dramatically increasing the number of cases for which data was 
missing.  The PRIO battle deaths measure  has the significant advantage of measuring battle 
deaths annually, something that, due to its obvious difficulty, is quite rare. Annual measurement 
is particularly important for the task at hand here because the dependent variable is measured 
annually as are the majority of the independent variables. However, a major disadvantage of the 
measure is it's dyadic rather than monadic nature - the measure estimates the total number of 
deaths caused by that conflict in the year at question but does not calculate the number lost by 
each side in the conflict, information that may well be relevant. One might expect, for instance, 
that a state may act differently vis-à-visthe law of war if it has bore the brunt of deaths in the 
conflict than if it has suffered a roughly equivalent number of deaths to its enemy.  The dyadic 
nature of this measure, however, treats those two situations equivalently.   
     In order to capitalize on the annual nature of this data while also acquiring useful 
monadic-level information, the PRIO battle-death measure - annual but dyadic - is supplemented 
by the COW battle-deaths measure - monadic but summarizing battle deaths only for the total 
duration of the conflict. The COW definition of battle deaths is also narrower than the PRIO 
definition, as COW includes only "battle related deaths sustained by a participant's armed forces 
in the war." An additional limitation of this measure is that, as mentioned above, COW only 
includes conflicts in its dataset after the threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths is reached. This 
means that the COW battle deaths measure is not available for a significant portion of conflicts 




observations). Though it's less than ideal, the fact that these conflicts meet the PRIO threshold of 
25 but not the COW threshold of 1,000 gives us some information about battle deaths that can be 
used to form an estimate of total battle deaths for each side in the conflict. Splitting the 
difference, an estimate of 500 battle deaths was given for each of these sub-COW threshold 
warring states in one version of this variable to reduce the number of missing observations and 
make ample use of the information we do have about the number of these states' battle deaths.
63
   
  Enemy Access Decisions 
 Given that each state is engaged in military conflict with at least one other state, it is 
plausible that each state's access decisions are at least partly influenced by the access decisions 
of the other party/parties in the warring dyad. Thus, the level of access granted by the enemy 
state is included as a variable of interest. It's expected that the higher the warring party's level of 
access, the more likely is a state itself to grant a high level of access. Some problems, however, 
are presented by the inclusion of this variable, most notably simultaneity bias. Because the other 
state's level of access is measured across the same unit of time (the same year) as is the primary 
dependent variable, it is impossible to state with any certainty that the one variable takes causal 
precedence over the other. Morrow (2007) has addressed this problem by the use of instrumental 
variables.  Here, I have chosen to accept the limitations posed by the presence of simultaneity 
bias. Because it is more important, however, for me to note that a state's level of access tends to 
correlate with the access level of its warring party than it is for me to make a causal claim about 
the relationship between two parties' level of access, I will take the simpler step of including the 
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variable as is and making note of the limitations of this method due to the problem of 
simultaneity bias.
64
 In addition, in a robustness check (see Appendix A), I employ one simple 
solution to this problem, using a lagged measure of enemy access.  
 Capability Asymmetry  
 Capability asymmetry is a dyadic variable capturing the extent to which the warring 
parties are equally capable. Following Beck (1999), the measure is calculated from Ray and 
Singer’s (1973) formula as follows: Asymmetry = Sqrt (2*(Cap A/Cap A + Cap B)^2 + (Cap 
B/Cap A+Cap B)^2 - .5). For ease of interpretation, this score is subtracted from 1 to create a 
measure of increasing symmetry. Scores closer to 1 reflect more symmetrical dyads, with power 
shared equally between the warring parties; scores closer to 0 reflect less symmetrical dyads.  
Monadic Variables 
 Regime Type and Duration 
 Regime type was measured using the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002). 
Following convention, the polity2 measure, which is calculated by subtracting a state’s autocracy 
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and reciprocity between the two states is high. This suggests, by definition, that the current state as low access, so 
it's unclear what is gained in an explanatory manner by adding both to the data set (though predictive utility might 
be high). Because both variables together seemed illogical and because the effect of the enemy access measure 
dwarfed that of the reciprocity measure, in the statistical analysis included below only the enemy access measure is 
included. 




score from its democracy score, was used.
65
  This results in a scale that ranges from 10 to -10. 
The polity2 distribution for this dataset is displayed in Table 3.9. Polity IV assesses a state’s 
degree of democracy across the following dimensions: openness and competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, the extent of constraints on the chief executive, and the competitiveness 
of political participation. Autocracy is assessed across the same dimensions, with one additional 
dimension, the regulation of political participation, also included.  It is important to note that the 
decision to collapse these distinct variables into one unified measure, while extremely common 
in the quantitative literature on regime type, is controversial. Marshall and Jaggers (2007) warn 
that “the simple combination of the original DEMOC and AUTOC index values in a unitary 
POLITY scale, in many ways, runs contrary to the original theory stated by Eckstein and Gurr in 
Patterns of Authority (1975) and, so, should be treated and interpreted with due caution”(p. 17). 
The authors’ main concern is that elements of autocracy and democracy can coexist side by side 
and that, consequently, assuming simplistically that one is the simple opposite of the other is 
problematic. To ensure that such an erroneous assumption did not compromise the accuracy and 
utility of this analysis, the democracy and autocracy measures were also used separately as 
robustness checks, as were the subsidiary components of these distinct variables.  
 In addition to regime type, measures of regime stability were also gleaned from Polity IV. 
The "durable" variable denotes the number of years that have passed since a major change in the 
state's  regime. Change is defined as a movement of  3 or more points in a state’s polity score 
over 3 years or less or movement out of one of the standardized authority scores (indicating a 
period of foreign control, interregnum, or transition). Thus, a state with a durable score of 15 
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hasn't experienced such a change of regime in the past 15 years. In addition, the "change" 
variable was utilized to evaluate whether or not a state had experienced a significant change in 
regime in the year of interest. This variable coded the change that had occurred since the state's 
last polity score provided that less than 3 years had passed since the previous score and that the 
change occurred exclusively in a positive or negative direction. Scores on this variable could 
thus range between 20 and -20, with scores of -66 and -77 reserved for cases of authority 
interruption and authority collapse, respectively. Because this variable was only coded when 
such a change had occurred, data was missing for most of the cases in the dataset.  To correct 
this, a new variable was created, autoregimechange, which measured the extent of regime change 
in an autocratic direction since the last polity coding. States that experienced no significant 
regime change (and thus had no score on the polity change variable) were given a score of 0, as 
were states that had experienced change in a democratic direction (i.e. states that  had positive 
change scores.) The resulting distribution of scores ranged from -13 to 0. A measure of 
democratic regime change was constructed via a parallel method.  
 In recent years scholars have displayed increased interest in distinguishing among types 
of political regime in a more nuanced manner than simply as autocratic or democratic. Scholars 
have argued that there is reason to be alert to both varieties of democratic governance, most 
notably presidentialism versus parliamentarism, and varieties of non-democratic regime. To 
explore these variations in regime type, Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's (2010) measure of 
regime type was utilized. Their "regime" variable is a six-fold variable that classifies regimes 
into one of the following categories: parliamentary democracy (0), mixed (semi-presidential) 
democracy (1), presidential democracy (2), civilian dictatorship (3), military dictatorship (4), and 




quantitative analysis, this measure was converted into a series of binary variables
66
, with a state 
receiving a score of 0 if it did not have the regime type in question and a score of 1 if it did.      
 Classification of a democracy as presidential, parliamentary, or mixed is done according 
to only two coding questions. The first assesses whether the executive is responsible to the 
assembly. If this is not the case, then the regime is necessarily classified as presidential. The 
second question asks if there exists a head of state "popularly elected for a fixed term in office 
(p.15)." If the first criterion is endorsed and the second is likewise, the regime is classified as 
semi-presidential or mixed. Endorsement of criterion 1 and rejection of criterion 2 leads to a 
classification as parliamentary. Here Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland assert that the most 
important criterion in distinguishing presidential regimes from parliamentary is whether the 
executive, once elected, can be removed by the legislature by a vote of no confidence.  
 Cheibub and his co-authors classify non-democratic regimes in a straight-forward coding  
procedure that emphasizes the sources of the leader's power and the manner in which the 
"effective ruler" is apt to be removed from office.  A regime is deemed monarchic if the effective 
ruler is called "king" AND the king has a hereditary successor or predecessor. If criteria for 
monarchic rule are not met, it is next considered whether the  effective ruler is a current or past 
member of the armed forces (past service during World War II is not considered necessary 
indication of military affiliation due to the ubiquity of military service at this time, especially in 
Eastern Europe), in which case the regime is considered to be military.  If criteria for neither 
monarchical regime nor military regime are met, the regime is classified by the residual category 
of civilian.     
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  Tsebelis Veto Player Data 
 Tsebelis (1995) made an important and seminal contribution to the regime type literature 
through his focus on the number and quality of veto players across political systems. Rather than 
debate the relative merits of presidentialism versus parliamentarism, Tsebelis drew attention to 
the way in which, other things being equal, larger numbers of veto players - which he defines as 
"individual or collective actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo" 
(p.289) - decrease the likelihood of policy change and thus may increase government or regime 
instability.  Henisz (2002) has created a dataset that quantifies the veto players present in a given 
political system according to criteria very similar to those identified by Tsebelis. Henisz created 
an algorithm, described fully in the 2002 article, that uses information on the institutional 
structures and political alignment of the legislative and executive branches of a state to create a 
quantitative measure of the degree of political constraint extant in the system. He calls this 
measure "polconiii." A full description of this measure is outside our scope. A lower score 
represents fewer political constraints/veto players while a higher score represents greater 
constraint. The measure ranges from 0 to .75, while in the dataset here the range is narrower, 
from 0 to .68, with a mean of .14 and a standard deviation of .21.   
 Methods: Generalized Ordinal Logit 
 The dependent variable of interest here is ordinal level. This means that, while the access 
score can reasonably be interpreted as indicating increasing levels of access, it cannot be 
assumed that the intervals between scores are equivalent. That is, the difference between a 0 
score and a 1 score may not be equivalent to the difference between a 1 score and 2 score. 




technique assumes that the effect of the independent variables is equivalent across different 
values of the dependent variable -  the assumption of parallel lines. Straightforward statistical 
tests can be conducted in Stata to evaluate whether or not the parallel line assumption is met.  
The data here violate this assumption. This is to some extent unfortunate because it necessitates 
more complex methods that produce results that are less intuitively interpretable. Fortunately, 
however, generalized ordered logit/probit can analyze the ordinal level data without imposing the 
assumption of parallel lines.     
 Data were analyzed using user written software gologit2 (Williams 2006), which has 
certain advantages over the original gologit software.  For instance, the autofit function models 
the restricted version for those variables that do not violate the parallel lines assumption and the 
unrestricted version for those variables that do.  This offers the best of both worlds - the more 
simplistic results for variables for whom these results are not misleading and the more complex 
output, distinguishing among values of the dependent variable, for variables for whom the 
parallel lines assumption is violated. Robust standard errors were employed, as was clustering by 
state ID. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, the user written spost commands 
were utilized (Long and Freese 2005).     
 Results  
 Results are displayed in Table 3.11.  Remember that generalized ordered logit 
coefficients belie the relatively straightforward  interpretations associated with OLS.  To 
facilitate interpretation,  odds ratios are reported.  In normal ordered logit models, odds ratios 
measure the extent to which movement on the independent variable influences the likelihood that 
the dependent variable takes a specific score.  For instance, the odds ratio of 295923 for the 




grant an access score higher than 0 compared to a non-presidential regime. However, generalized 
ordered logit does not lend itself to as intuitive an interpretation.  Thus, to interpret these 
coefficients more meaningfully, predicted probabilities are calculated at key levels of each 
independent variable while holding the other variables constant. See these predicted probabilities 
displayed in Tables 3.12 and 3.13 and graphed in Figure 3.1.  Table 3.14 lists each hypothesis 
outlined above and the relevant results.  
 Recall that the violation of the parallel lines assumption indicates that the independent 
variables don't necessarily exert the same effects at low levels of the dependent variable as they 
do at higher levels. In other words, our independent variables of interest might differentially 
affect low access as compared to high access.  
 Military Urgency Trumps other Variables  
 Though on its own the odds ratios of the battle deaths variables are unimpressive (both 
perilously close to 1 at .99999), substantively this variable is the most significant.  This is partly 
because the ranges of the battle death variables are by far the largest of the variables in the 
dataset. The annual-dyadic variable ranges from 0 to 763,000, while the monadic variable ranges 
from 0 to 750,000. This means that, while any single battle death has a marginal effect on a 
state's access decisions, collectively variation in battle deaths can have a profound impact on the 
access choices of states.  Notably, this is one of only three variables in the dataset
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 powerful 
enough to change the level of access most likely for states in the dataset. For states that have the 
lowest levels of battle deaths, the most likely outcome is high access, with the probability of such 
an occurrence (holding other variables at their means) being .6543. See Figure 3.2. With battle 
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deaths at their mean values, however, the modal outcome is the intermediate access score, with 
the likelihood of high access now only .0220. This means, consistent with the realist expectation, 
if you were interested in predicting state access to international monitors by any one variable, 
your best bet would be the number of battle deaths suffered by the state in question.  
 Two other variables found significant in the model point to the relevance of the military-
strategic context for understanding state behavior vis-à-vis monitors. These are capability 
symmetry and the level of access granted by one's enemy (see Figures 3.3. - 3.8).  Increased 
capability symmetry  - marked by opponents with more equitable rather than less equitable 
military capabilities - facilitates higher access across the board, though this variable is only 
statistically significant when predicting low access compared to medium or high.  This result is 
somewhat puzzling in that higher levels of capability symmetry should also be indicative of a 
more compelling military threat, which should in turn decrease state willingness to grant 
monitors access.     
 This puzzling result may be at least partly the product of state expectations about the type 
of wars in which monitor participation is legitimate.  In colonial wars, for instance, capability 
symmetry tends to be low; in these wars, also, the dominant power may have a propensity to 
deny the conflict the label "war" and, accordingly, to deny external bodies the ability to 
participate. Some support for this argument is found by the fact that capability symmetry is no 
longer significant when interstate wars are removed from the dataset. In contrast, when only 
interstate wars are included, the variable becomes even more substantively significant (see the 




 However, the direction in which capability symmetry exerts an effect on access is also 
consistent with the argument that offering monitors access is a source of political power.  Thus, 
the variable operates contra the direction realism predicts because realism assumes that access is 
only or primarily a burden, an added cost. That access might be a source of leverage, made more 
useful in wars that are more daunting, is not predicted by realism. Institutionalism would also be 
able to make sense of this finding, as one might have more need for the signaling or self-binding 
functions of monitors in more serious wars that would presumably create more incentive for 
violation.  Still, it is somewhat puzzling that the battle deaths variable fits so neatly the 
predictions of realism while the capability symmetry variable does not. This is a pattern that will 
return in the interstate war analysis.     
 The significance of the enemy access variable might be interpreted in related ways.  
Higher access on the part of one's enemy makes likely higher access for the state in question. 
There are multiple ways of interpreting this effect. It's possible that whatever objective 
conditions make access on the part of one's enemy more likely also make more likely higher 
access for the state in question.  In this case, the correlation between one's level of access and 
that of one's enemy would not necessarily have casual significance.  On the other hand, it is also 
possible that the level of access granted by one's enemy has a causal effect on one's own access 
decisions. It is possible that one doesn't wish to deny monitors access while one's enemy grants 
this access, as such asymmetry might grant one's enemy a significant political or ideological 
advantage.  In this way, then, enemy access is a variable that approximates reciprocity.  From the 
quantitative analysis alone it is not really possible to mediate between the solely correlational 
and the causal interpretation of this variable.  As mentioned above, one source of further 




access variable lagged one year (see Appendix A). In the full version of the dataset, the lagged 
enemy access variable retains significance, thus providing some support for the idea that the 
level of access offered by one's enemy exerts a causal impact on one's own access decisions.
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 Regime Type  
 Though the battle deaths variable dwarfs other variables in its substantive significance, 
the results consistently tell a story in which many different aspects of a state's domestic regime 
impact its decisions vis-à-vis monitoring organizations. Several of the domestic variables exert a 
consistent effect across different levels of access, while others primarily exert their influence as 
floor effects - that is they reduce the likelihood that a state will demonstrate low access even as 
they have no significant effect distinguishing between moderate and high access.  
 Unsurprisingly, higher levels of democracy consistently result in greater access to law of 
war monitors, and the size of this effect is consistent across the range of the dependent variable. 
Higher levels of democracy increase the probability that a state will evidence moderate/high 
access over low access and high access over moderate/low access.  
 The durability variable is similarly consistent, with again the size of the effect consistent 
across levels of access (i.e. the parallel lines assumption is not violated for this variable).  See 
Figures 3.9 - 3.11. As in the case of the battle deaths variable, though the size of the odds ratio is 
quite small, this variable assumes large substantive significance across the range of values that it 
takes (in this case 0 - 191). Along with the battle deaths variable and the polity variable 
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only version of the dataset. This suggests that, at least for interstate wars, the correlation between enemy access and 
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(discussed above), it is one of the few variables considered here with the power to change the 
modal outcome variable. At durability values above about 100, the modal outcome becomes high 
access, whereas below 100 the modal outcome, holding other variables constant, is moderate 
access.   
 It is somewhat difficult to interpret the significance of the durability variable because in 
this data set durability and polity score covary significantly.
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 All of the states with durability 
scores above 100 are states with polity scores approaching 10 (unified command calculations put 
some of the scores between 9 and 10).  Though in principle the inclusion of the polity variable 
"controls" for the effect of polity, the relationship between these variables complicates the 
interpretation.  If, in the real world, extremely high durability is a consequence of democracy (as 
it appears to be) then to interpret this variable as if it is independent of democracy is 
fundamentally flawed. This is why I am somewhat less celebratory about the substantive 
significance of the durability variable as compared to the battle deaths variable, the independence 
of which is less ambiguous.  
 A number of the other regime type variables are significant only when the lowest level of 
access is compared to moderate and high access: these variables have the effect of decreasing the 
likelihood that a state demonstrate low access, though they do not significantly influence whether 
a state demonstrates moderate or high access.  These variables include the measures of adverse 
regime change, presidentialism, and parliamentarism. The veto player measure is not statistically 
significant in this model, nor is military dictatorship.  
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 Adverse regime change is statistically significant but substantively small. See Figures 
3.12 - 3.14.  Moving across the full range of that variable, from 0 to -13, is associated with about 
a .1 decrease in the probability of low access. There is an intriguing inverse relationship between 
this variable and access.
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  This is counterintuitive but is consistent with the idea that regimes 
that have experienced change in the direction of greater autocracy may be in particular need of 
mechanisms to demonstrate their legitimacy. However, this variable is only significant when 
comparing low access to moderate and high - the variable makes moderate access more likely 
but not high access.  Regime change in the direction of greater democracy was not statistically 
significant, nor was a regime change summary variable that combined democratic and autocratic 
regime change.    
 Regime type variables presidentialism and parliamentarism likewise violate the parallel 
lines assumption and differentially influence low access compared to moderate and high. The 
size of their effect, however, is substantively greater compared to the adverse regime change 
variable. Presidentialism reduces the likelihood that states will evidence low access; 
parliamentarism has the opposite effect.  These effects are only significant, however, when states 
with low access are distinguished from states with medium to high access.  
 The parliamentarism variable has odd effects that are partly the result of the limitations of 
the generalized ordered logit model. This model can under certain circumstances produce 
negative predicted probabilities, which are of course nonsensical; two observations in the model 
have this result. Here odd predicted probabilities result for this variable when other variables are 
held at their means: the predicted probability for low access is 1, while the predicted probability 
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for moderate access is negative.  This is partly the result of the fact that no parliamentary systems 
exist at the mean values of the other variables, as the minimum polity score obtained by 
parliamentary systems is 2, in comparison to the mean polity score of -2. In order to interpret this 
variable correctly, however, the significant interaction effect between parliamentarism and polity 
score must be considered. 
 The polity and parliament variables display an interaction effect such that, the lower the 
polity score, the greater the negative effect of parliamentarism on access decisions.  At polity 
scores 5 and below, parliamentarism is associated with a very large increase in the probability of 
lowest access.  However, in contrast, at the maximum polity score, parliamentarism has no 
significant effect on state access decisions. Thus, it's the not fully democratic parliamentary 
states that appear to be driving the negative effect of parliamentarism on access. See Tables 3.15 
and 3.16.    
 Surprisingly, one of the most consistent results in the regime type section is that royal 
dictatorship consistently results in higher access decisions compared to other regime types. 
Unlike presidentialism, however, this effect is not limited to reducing the probability that states 
exercise low access but also increases the probability of high access decisions.  The probability 
that a royal dictatorship will demonstrate high access is .12, compared to only .006 for a 
presidential regime. What might explain this counterintuitive finding? Interestingly, Jessica 
Weeks may have provided an explanation in her discussion of distinct regime types' ability to 
effectively signal. She identified personalist regimes as being particularly invulnerable to 
domestic opposition.  As a result, they may not suffer the same types of audience costs to which 




organization, royal regimes may have higher confidence in their ability to manage the fall-out 
without significant threat to the regime. However, Weeks would only expect such an effect for 
non-dynastic royal regimes, which, absent the check on power of the family, are more likely than 
are dynastic regimes to act according to a personalist logic.   
 Regime Type-Battle Death Interactions  
 Thus far we have obtained two sets of results that may seem at first glance to be 
somewhat in tension with each other. Features of the military-strategic context, most notably 
battle deaths, matter immensely, but so do a myriad of regime type variables.  How might we 
integrate the second and third images?  Though there is no inconsistency in stating that each set 
of variables matters independently, it is especially intriguing to consider how these variables 
interact. To this end an interaction term composed of the battle deaths and polity variables was 
included in the analysis. Results indicated that there was a negative interaction between these 
two variables, though this relationship was only statistically significant when high access was 
compared to  medium and low.  See Tables 3.17 and 3.18 and Figure 3.15.  Simply, the higher 
the number of battle deaths, the smaller are the effects of the democracy variable on state access 
decisions.  Though democracy tends to increase the probability of high state access decisions, 
this increase is smaller if battle deaths are high.  If, for instance, battle deaths are at their 
minimum, a movement from the minimum polity score to its maximum increases the probability 
of high access by .86. If, on the contrary, battle deaths are at their maximum, an equivalent shift 
in polity score no longer exerts a statistically significant effect on high access. In fact, the 
predicted change in the probability of high access, though not significant, is negative at -.04. On 




polity score. If polity is at its minimum score, moving from the smallest to the largest number of 
battle deaths decreases the probability of high access by only .09. If polity is instead at its 
maximum, such an increase in battle deaths decreases the probability of high access by .99. 
 The Selection Effect in Theory and Practice 
 As mentioned above, one of the reasons that studying the monitoring activities of the 
ICRC makes sense as an empirical strategy is because, for much of the time period covered here, 
the ICRC’s activities are geographically expansive, with the organization seeking to have a role 
in the overwhelming majority of conflicts around the globe. This means that studying the ICRC 
is not plagued by the same selection effects that have necessitated innovative and 
methodologically sophisticated empirical approaches in the study of subjects such as 
peacekeeping (Fortna 2004). However, this methodological advantage is less true in the early 
decades studied here – the 1950s and the 1960s – when the organization had not yet achieved the 
geographic reach and substantive ambition it would come to hold.  As a result, data was collected 
here that would permit the empirical examination of the conditions in which the ICRC was most 
likely to seek a monitoring role in a conflict situation.  
 Recall that the universe of cases was gleaned from the PRIO dataset of armed conflicts. 
This means that all conflicts that met the inclusion criteria enumerated above were entered into 
the dataset, regardless of whether or not the ICRC undertook monitoring missions in those states. 
A dichotomous variable, icrcselect, was created. Conflicts that met the PRIO criteria but were 
not objects of attempted monitoring by the ICRC (as indicated by the organization’s account of 
its yearly activities in its Annual Reports) were coded as 0, while conflicts in which the ICRC 
sought a monitoring role were scored as 1. Note that this variable does not reflect the state’s 




monitoring for the warring states. Of 680 directed dyads in the full dataset, 194 received a score 
of 0 indicating that the ICRC had not sought a role in the conflict at hand.  Table 3.19 lists the 
distribution of the ICRC selection variable. As expected, the number of conflicts left unpursued 
by the organization declines each decade, with 76 directed dyads left unpursued by the 
organization during the 1950s, 56 in the 1960s, and just 2 in the 1990s.  
 Why is this potential selection effect such a concern? If not sufficiently corrected, a 
selection effect can significantly compromise the accuracy of the conclusions reached via 
quantitative empirical analysis. Logical inference in the human sciences is greatly complicated 
by the fact that the phenomena we study are not randomly assigned to the conditions of interest 
but instead select themselves in various ways into those conditions (Geddes 1990).  This means 
that we must develop ways of modeling the selection effects plaguing our data if we wish to 
increase our chances of accurately estimating the effects of key independent variables.  Here, 
especially for the decades in which the ICRC is not yet seeking a monitoring role with near 
uniformity in every conflict worldwide, we must first understand the factors that influence ICRC 
selection decisions before we can draw conclusions about state behavior vis-à-vis the ICRC more 
generally.  
 In order to empirically investigate the determinants of the ICRC’s selection decisions, a 
number of measures were collected. These measures were primarily taken from the UCDP/PRIO 
armed conflict dataset. One measure of conflict intensity evaluated dichotomously whether or 
not at least 1,000 battle deaths occurred in the year under investigation. The UCDP/PRIO coding 
was altered slightly so that a score of 0 indicated less than 1000 battle deaths in the relevant year 
and a score of 1 indicated at least 1,000 such deaths. A second measure captured the cumulative 




more than 1,000 battle deaths and a score of 0 if this threshold had not been surpassed during the 
entire duration of the conflict. In addition to these intensity measures the type of conflict was 
thought to be related to the ICRC’s selection criteria. As mentioned above, the UCDP/PRIO 
dataset classifies armed conflict into 4 categories: extra-systemic, interstate, internal, and 
internationalized internal conflict (Codebook, p. 7).  A cursory overview of the data suggested 
that a disproportionate number of extra-systemic wars were not selected for involvement by the 
ICRC.  Though 27% of the observations in the dataset are classified as extra-systemic, 52% (102 
observations) of those conflicts not selected for involvement by the ICRC were so classified. 
Only about 18% of extra-systemic wars were selected for involvement by the ICRC.  To test 
whether this variable exerted a statistically significant selection effect once potential confounders 
were controlled, a dichotomous variable was created, with extra-systemic wars coded as 1 and all 
other war types coded as 0.  
 Heckman models (Heckman 1979) can be used to model the selection effects and correct 
for them in the estimation of the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable of 
interest. If there are non-trivial, systematic differences between observed and unobserved values, 
then there may be confounders that need to be addressed in the model. Sample selection bias, in 
the Heckman framework, is considered a cousin of omitted variable bias, and this may mean the 
model results are generalizable to the unobserved conflict dyads. For instance, in this analysis, 
one could hypothesize that variables of conflict intensity, interstate conflict, and territorial 
conflict proxy unmeasured variables that predict our outcome of interest. In other words, these 
are latent variables that capture a probability or propensity of inclusion in the observed sample. 
As Achen (1986) notes, these variables should be modeled using a selection equation, as 




 One challenge for the present study, however, is that Heckman models cannot be run with 
ordered logit. One solution to this dilemma is to treat the dependent variable as though it were 
continuous and run a Heckman model.
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  The results of the Heckman analysis is somewhat 
surprising. Though the variables chosen for the selection equation do successfully predict ICRC 
selection,
72
 the overall model does not permit us to reject the null hypothesis that there is no 
statistically significant sample selection present. See these results in Table 3.20.  This suggests 
that, while there is surely a “selection effect,” and while the variables that affect ICRC selection 
can be reliably identified, this selection effect has not systematically biased the results. This can 
only be because the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable 
do not differ significantly between the selected cases and the unselected ones.  In sum, we can 
have confidence that our original models are not biased by a selection effect. Note, however, that 
we can only enjoy such confidence because we have taken care to gather data relevant to 
assessing the selection effect and to thoroughly run the available selection models.  
 Interstate Only Methods and Results 
 Interstate wars are studied separately for substantive and methodological reasons. 
Substantively, there is reason to expect wars between states to demonstrate distinct dynamics 
from other types of wars.  Methodologically, measures exist for interstate wars that are not yet 
available for other types of wars. Most notably, the interstate only data permits here the study of 
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the effects of two fascinating variables on states’ access decisions: law of war compliance and 
Cold War power politics.  Descriptive statistics for the interstate only dataset are displayed in 
Table 3.21.  
 Compliance  
 Morrow and Jo (2006) have collected an impressive and useful dataset of state 
compliance with the laws of war in the twentieth century.  Measuring law of war compliance is a 
daunting empirical task, one that Morrow and Jo approach systematically and with rigor. They 
employ four different variables - magnitude, frequency, centralization, and clarity - to evaluate 
law of war violations across nine issue areas. These four variables collectively serve to capture 
well the often contentious and ambiguous nature of evaluating law of war compliance. 
Magnitude and frequency are relatively straightforward measures of capturing the substantive 
and temporal intensity of violations. Centralization serves to evaluate the degree to which 
violations are clear elements of state policy or are instead the activities of rogue subordinates and 
the like. Clarity recognizes the significant variation that exists in the degree of legal consensus 
present on the permitted or prohibited status of a given act. Though these variables are richest in 
totem, following Morrow (2007) I employ a simpler conception of violation as the product of the 
magnitude and frequency of violations. An additional strength of the Morrow and Jo dataset is 
the availability of data quality measures that can be used to differentially weight observations 
according to the extent of the evidence available to justify coding decisions. These measures are 
employed here as robustness checks, with analyses conducted, for example, while excluding 
those observations with a data quality score of 0 (representing the standardized coding used in 




 Here the compliance data in the issue areas of prisoners of war and treatment of civilians 
are employed as indicators of the relationship between compliance and access. The issue area of 
prisoners of war is a particularly relevant one considering that inspection of prisoner of war 
camps is one of the most salient aspects of the ICRC’s work.  Given this, there is great reason to 
expect that a state’s expected level of compliance with the law of war relevant to prisoners of 
war will influence its willingness to grant monitors access. The issue area of treatment of 
civilians is also selected for consideration for several reasons. First, it is an issue area with great 
substantive significance, with compliance or violation dramatically influencing large numbers of 
human lives.  Furthermore, though monitoring of the treatment of civilians is not as closely 
associated with the work of the ICRC as is visiting of POW camps, it is nevertheless a significant 
example of the other, more general law of war monitoring activities that the organization 
performs. Additionally, it is an issue area in which violation is common and in which strong 
military-strategic motivations for violation exist.    
 One obvious problem, however, attaches to the use of this compliance variable, the 
problem of endogeneity as relates to the directionality of the causal relationship. The model here 
assumes that the compliance variable is not caused by the access variable.  Of course, it is 
entirely possible that this assumption is wrong. In fact, it is ostensibly because monitoring has an 
impact on compliance that monitoring has been created in the first place. Were annual 
compliance data available, one option for evaluating the extent of endogeneity would be to 
regress lagged measures of compliance against access. This would at least ensure the temporal 
precedence of the compliance variable. However, unfortunately, the excellent compliance data 
collected by Morrow and Jo understandably codes compliance for the conflict as a whole rather 




must be taken into account when interpreting the results. That is, it's not possible to definitively 
state that compliance causes access rather than the other way around. However, there are good 
reasons to think that the assumptions made here are more conservative than the alternative.  
Rather than assuming that the institution is efficacious in inducing compliance as (some) 
institutionalists would predict, the less contentious assumption is made that the extent of 
compliance - and hence how likely the state is to be identified as a violator - drives the decision 
about access. Moreover, because compliance is likely to be driven by many distinct factors 
related to the military and political terrain in which states find themselves, modeling it as 
exogenous and causally prior to access seems the more conservative assumption. Assuming the 
opposite - that access drives compliance - would be an extremely bold move absent some 
methodological innovation like the natural experiment that Hyde (2004) was able to design and 
conduct in regard to the presence of election monitors.  
  Cold War Alliance Data 
 As mentioned above, the temporal focus of this study is dwarfed by the Cold War. As a 
result, Cold War alliance dynamics is an obvious hypothesis when considering ways in which 
realist power politics might have exerted an influence on the access patterns studied here. Cold 
War influence seems especially likely when one considers the inevitable association that existed 
between the ICRC and the Western bloc, despite the organization’s significant – and in some 
respects highly successful – aspirations towards neutrality. As a quintessentially Swiss 
organization (Forsythe 2005) and an organization espousing humanist values that might also be 
deemed Western, one might expect the so-called Eastern bloc states to be far less likely to grant 
access than were those states allied with the United States.  Cold War history, particularly in the 




Cold War affiliation. Coding of states’ Cold War affiliation proceeded in several steps.  It was 
complicated by the frequent tension between states’ formal affiliation and their de facto relations 
with the world’s competing poles. Thus, the Correlates of War alliance dataset was first 
employed to note formal alliances between either the United States or the Soviet Union and the 
other states in the dataset, but attention was also granted to the extent to which the actual reality 
of dynamics on the ground mirrored these formal alliances. If the historical review found that the 
formal alliances accurately reflected states’ geopolitical positioning, states formally linked to the 
Soviet Union were scored as a 2 on the Eastern Bloc measure, while states formally connected to 
the United States were scored as a 0 on this measure. Scores of 1 were given to states who were 
formally non-aligned or even formally aligned with the West but whose patterns of foreign 
relations, as indicated by, for instance, military assistance, evidenced a definitive “tilt East.” A 
dichotomous version of the variable was also created.  
 Strategic Variables  
 Another advantage of studying interstate wars separately is the availability of more 
nuanced measures of key strategic variables that the literature suggests should be highly 
influential on law of war compliance and, by extension, monitor access.  Here use is made of 
three variables from the Valentino, Huth, and Croco (2006) dataset.  These authors initially 
categorized state military strategies according to six categories: attrition, mobility, 
counterinsurgency, guerilla, decisive engagement, and reactive defense (p. 362). Their theory, 
like the general literature we reviewed above, led them to conclude that attrition and 
counterinsurgency strategies would particularly create incentives for law of war violation.  The 
attrition variable employed here captures the percentage of the conflict in which the combatant 




wear down the adversary’s ability to fight by destroying or capturing large portions of the 
adversary’s military forces in a large number of large-scale battles." (p. 362). The 
counterinsurgency variable measures the percentage of the conflict in which the combatant 
employs counterinsurgent tactics in response to the opponent's guerilla tactics. Their definition of 
counterinsurgency tactics highlights formal control of territory, small anti-guerilla mobile units, 
and population control measures. Valentino and his co-authors also created a dichotomous war 
aims variable, which awards the state a score of 1 if its goals include regime change or conquest 
and a score of 0 if its goals were other (prewar status quo, policy coercion, or limited territorial 
change).  
 Results 
 In general, the results of the interstate only analysis were consistent with the results of the 
analysis of the full sample. With the exception of a few of the more nuanced regime variables, all 
of the variables significant in the larger analysis remain significant here, and they assume the 
same sign. See Tables 3.22 and 3.23 and Figure 3.16.   
 Comparing the predicted probabilities of the interstate only version of the dataset to those 
found in the analysis of the full version (see Table 3.12), we find that the predicted probabilities 
are strikingly similar, with moderate access being the most likely outcome in both datasets when 
the independent variables are held at their means.  Though the confidence intervals are 
overlapping, it appears that low access is slightly more likely in the full version of the dataset 
than in the interstate only version (with other variables at their means) and high access slightly 
more common in the interstate only version compared to the full version. Of course, this is likely 
partly due to differences in the mean values of the independent variables across these two 




mean number of battle deaths is higher for the interstate only wars.  This is interesting as it 
should predict lower access, but this is not the pattern we see here.  One possible explanation of 
this unexpected finding (higher battle deaths accompanied by higher access levels) is that states 
are more willing to grant access in interstate wars  - in which the applicability of the relevant law 
of war is relatively uncontested - compared to colonial wars or internationalized civil wars.  
Aside from the battle deaths measure, other variables don't differ markedly at their mean levels 
between the full version of the dataset and the interstate only version.   
 Another striking feature of the interstate only results is that here moderate access is much 
more consistently dominant, with no variable having the power independently to move the most 
common access score to low or high.  The variables that come closest to having this effect, 
however, are counterinsurgency and war goals. When each of these variables are at their highest, 
the probability of moderate access is at its lowest, at .67.  
  In the interstate only version of the dataset, unlike the full version, including the 
indicators of regime type  - parliamentary, presidential, semi-presidential, royal dictatorship, and 
military dictatorship - alongside the polity measure caused problems in the model, most likely 
because of the significantly smaller sample size in the interstate only version (n=133 when all 
regime variables are included, compared to n= 251 in the full version).
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  As a result, the model 
was first run excluding these variables.   
   Here the battle deaths variable ceases to be statistically significant, most likely due to the 
inclusion of the three additional strategic variables.
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 It is retained, however, as a control 
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variable. The three strategic variables are all statistically significant when low access is 
compared to moderate and high; counterinsurgency and war goals are statistically significant 
across the entire range of the dependent variable.  
 Importantly, however, two of these strategic variables operate opposite the predicted 
direction when low access is compared to medium and high. Counter the realist prediction, 
attrition and counterinsurgency strategies (Figures 3.17 and 3.18) both have the effect of 
increasing the likelihood that a state offers moderate or high access rather than low.  
Furthermore, both of these variables violate the parallel lines assumption, having distinct effects 
at different levels of the dependent variable. While the attrition variable ceases to be statistically 
significant when low/medium access is compared to high, the counterinsurgency variable 
remains statistically significant but exerts the opposite effect.  While counterinsurgency strategy 
significantly increases the likelihood that a state demonstrate moderate access as compared to 
low, it significantly decreases the likelihood that a state demonstrate high access as compared to 
moderate.  This is consistent with the idea that moderate access may be a cheaper strategy that 
states can use to gain political benefits with less cost than is posed by full access.  
 Absolutist war goals consistently decrease the probability that a state offers medium or 
high access, but the substantive effect is greater when low access is compared to moderate/high. 
As displayed in Table 3.24 and Figure 3.19, when war goals are absolutist, the probability of low 
access increases an order of magnitude from .03 to .3.  Capability symmetry (see Figure 3.20) 
again has the effect of increasing access, though this time the effect is consistent across the full 
range of the dependent variable.     
 As in the full version of the dataset, we again find a puzzling pattern in which several of 




war goals and, for some values of the dependent variable, counterinsurgency strategy) while 
others operate in the very opposite direction (attrition, capability symmetry). With the exception 
of the capability symmetry variable, however, these variables have a statistically significant 
effect in the direction opposite that which realism would predict only when low access is 
compared to moderate or high.  This is consistent with my argument that intermediate access is a 
relatively low cost strategy that comes with some political benefit and is thus desirable in 
contexts that increase incentive for violation, while full access is a higher cost strategy and thus 
less desirable in these contexts.  Two of the strategic variables have consistent effects across the 
full range of the dependent variable, though in opposite directions, with capability symmetry 
consistently predicting higher access and absolutist war goals consistently predicting lower 
access.  This result is difficult to explain. One possible explanation lies in the intensity of 
incentives for law of war violation created by these disparate factors.  It is possible, for instance, 
that war goals of regime change or territorial annexation create such high incentives for law of 
war violation that even the (under typical circumstances) relatively cheap option of granting 
intermediate access loses it appeal, as the attractiveness of violation increases the likelihood of a 
critical statement from the monitoring organization. Another, related, possibility is that states 
committed to such absolutist goals no longer have much to gain from attempting to signal their 
moral or legal goodness. Conversely, while increased capability symmetry may somewhat 
increase the incentives for law of war violation, these incentives may still be mild enough that 
granting access to monitors is a good gamble.  This may be because increased capability 
symmetry increases the value of the political leverage gained by monitor access at a greater rate 




 The polity measure (Figure 3.21) is again statistically significant in the predicted 
direction. Across the full range of the dependent variable, higher polity score is associated with 
higher access. Enemy access (Figure 3.22) is again consistently associated with higher state 
access. Prisoner of war compliance (Figure 3.23) exerts a statistically significant negative effect 
across the full range of the dependent variable.
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  Each of these findings is consistent with an 
institutionalist perspective.      
 Interestingly, the variable measuring Eastern-bloc Cold War affiliation is not significant 
in the model. This may be because any effect that Eastern-affiliation has on access is primarily 
via other variables in the analysis, such as the regime type variables.  
  Interaction effects 
 As was the case in the full version of the dataset, significant interaction effects were 
again present between military strategy and regime type, this time between the polity variable 
and counterinsurgency.  See Tables 3.25 - 3.28 and Figures 3.24 - 3.29. At higher polity levels 
the counterinsurgency variable exerts a larger effect on access decisions, particularly militating 
away from both low and high access towards moderate.  
 More Nuanced Regime Type Variables   
 A second model included the more fine-grained regime type measures discussed in the 
full version of the dataset. Here the differential effect of presidential versus parliamentary 
democracies found in the full version of the dataset ceases to be present. Instead all of the 
democratic regime types significantly increase the probability of moderate or high access 
compared to low. None of them, however, exert a significant effect on high access compared to 
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low or moderate. Somewhat surprisingly, royal dictatorship again consistently increases access,
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though military dictatorship exerts no significant effect.  That most (4/5) of the regime type 
variables included here increase the probability of moderate/high access compared to low says 
something about the base category of civilian dictatorships, which appear to evidence lower 
access on average than the other regimes.  
 De Facto IHL Monitoring Reviewed 
 Having explored the patterns of state access decisions vis-à-vis the ICRC, I now wish to 
reflect briefly on the general implications of these patterns in light of recent interesting work on 
another monitoring regime in international politics, that of election monitoring (Kelley 2008; 
Hyde 2011).  Figures 3.31 and 3.32 display the number of states granting the ICRC low, 
moderate, and high access each year from 1950 to 2000.  Though there are certainly years (1971, 
for instance) in which high access appears much more common than low or moderate access, 
there is no clear "cascade" apparent.  Recall that Hyde and Kelley both find evidence for an 
election monitoring cascade after the end of the Cold War.  Though the number of states granting 
low access to the ICRC does appear to decline in the 1990s, there remains a number of states 
choosing this option.  Moreover, if one looks at the broad patterns of ICRC access during the 
fifty years studied here, one sees a number of peaks and valleys rather than a clear pattern of 
increased access.  What, then, might explain why there was a cascade for election monitoring but 
not for IHL monitoring?  
  In her discussion of election monitoring, Hyde reviews the substantial body of empirical 
evidence that suggests that key international actors confer significant advantages on states that 
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demonstrate commitment to democracy (360).  An obvious answer to the puzzle of why states 
don’t evidence similar uniformity in regard to law of war monitoring is that powerful actors 
don’t reward states for law of war compliance in the same way that they reward democracy. This 
is an intriguing puzzle in its own right, but not one that I cannot fully answer in this piece.  I’ll 
limit myself, then, to a few observations.  First, it is not at all self-evident that states would view 
the regime type of other states as a more important signal than the law of war behavior of the 
state.  After all, another state’s level of compliance with the law of war is something that could 
directly affect you – it’s a dyadic, interactive behavioral characteristic- whereas a state’s choice 
of regime is a more narrowly monadic, domestic decision. Second, there is significant historical 
evidence that states once viewed other states’ behavior vis-à-vis the law of war as a signal of the 
state’s degree of civilization and belongingness in certain communities of states.   Nineteenth-
century Japan, for instance, made law of war compliance a priority as a means of showing itself 
worthy of membership in the club of great powers (Morrow and Jo 2006).  The question, then, is 
why powerful states in the contemporary world view the democracy of other states as a variable 
of significant concern, while law of war behavior is deemed less relevant.  One hypothesis is that 
this shift in priorities stems from the marked decline in the frequency of interstate war in the 
post-World War II period (Fazal 2007), such that powerful states now find others’ law of war 
behavior to be unlikely to influence them.  This may particularly be the case given the marked 
military superiority of the United States compared to the vast majority of the world’s regimes.  
Alternately, the explanation may be the predominance of the belief that democracy proxies for a 
wide range of variables of interest to states, including but not limited to law of war behavior.  





    Discussion and Conclusions  
 This chapter has explored the circumstances under which states grant access to the ICRC 
as a monitor of international humanitarian law.  The original dataset demonstrates significant 
variation in states' decisions vis-à-vis monitors.  As is increasingly common in political science 
scholarship, the evidence fails to offer a straightforward victory for any of the three dominant 
international relations paradigms. Though some military strategic variables reflect 
straightforward realist predictions, others prove to exert the opposite effect from that which 
realism would predict.  I have argued that what realism gets wrong here is the way in which 
providing signals of compliance can be an important source of political leverage for states 
undergoing trying strategic circumstances. Moreover, realism is wrong to discount the 
importance of regime type, including more nuanced descriptors of electoral systems or systems 
of autocratic governance in addition to the more straightforward democracy-autocracy divide.  
The significance of these regime type variables, and particularly the consistently positive 
relationship between royal dictatorship and access, suggests that one key mechanism by which 
signaling becomes costly is via domestic audience costs.   
 Another central claim of this chapter has been that states in general and certain types of 
states in particular possess incentives to offer partial but incomplete access to monitors.  This is a 
strategy by which states are able to manage the costs of monitor access while still gaining 
political leverage by appearing to cooperate.  This suggests a potential moral hazard.  Incentives 
may exist for states insincerely committed to law of war compliance to grant some level of 
access to monitors for largely instrumental reasons.  How problematic this is from the 




improvement in the presence and absence of publicity on the part of the ICRC. More on this in 









Strategic Secrecy: Decision-Making in the ICRC 
 Introduction and Rationale 
 In keeping with its penchant for belying “all good things go together” naiveté, political 
science has recently witnessed a barrage of literature about the dark side of actors ostensibly 
committed to humanitarian goals.  These actors can be driven by materialist incentives that 
distract them from their principled objectives (Bob 2005, 2002, Cooley and Ron 2002), adopt 
misguided priorities that hurt the very people they aim to help (Mallaby 2004), or blindly follow 
out-dated or irrelevant rules (Barnett and Finnemore 2004, 1999), to name a few.   This body of 
work is right to strip humanitarian organizations of their halo and to consider the ways in which 
these “do-gooders” can be influenced (some might say corrupted) by the same forces – both 
material and ideational – that shape the activities of less noble organizations.  Yet, even the most 
scathing critics recognize that, even if the tale of humanitarian organizations is not properly 
considered one of good triumphing unambiguously over evil, neither is it the reverse.  This 
project hopes to speak to both the optimists and the skeptics by probing systematically the 
strategic choices faced by one humanitarian organization in particular, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). 
 The ICRC was founded in 1863 after Henri Dunant, a Swiss businessman, chronicled in 
Un Souvenir de Solferino the unnecessary misery he witnessed at the 1859 Battle of Solferino (in 
the Austro-Sardinian War). At the end of this work, which focused primarily on the suffering of 
wounded soldiers in the absence of sufficient personnel to provide medical care or even simple 
necessities such as food and water, Dunant issued a plea for the formation of an organization of 




interested states was convened, a meeting which ultimately culminated in the drafting and 
ratification of the 1864 Geneva Conventions and the formation of the organization that would 
later become the ICRC. The ICRC thus crafted a place for itself as an entrepreneur of 
international humanitarian law (IHL or the law of war), a body of international law that places 
limits on the means states may use during war.  Over time, the ICRC developed a niche as a 
monitor of state compliance with IHL, and it primarily fulfilled this duty in a manner that 
emphasized consensual relations with states and confidentiality in regard to the results of the 
organization’s monitoring mission.  
The ICRC is a good subject for systematic study for a number of reasons.  With an 
average annual budget of approximately $600 million dollars
77
 and operations in five continents, 
the organization is an international actor to be reckoned with. The shear breadth of its operations, 
then, makes the ICRC a subject of interest.  Furthermore, as is often remarked, the security realm 
is one in which states are expected to cede little control to external actors, making the nature and 
extent of state delegation to the organization, with its jurisdiction primarily in the area of state 
wartime behavior, puzzling.  Lastly, two noteworthy attributes of the organization - its general 
policy of confidentiality, as well as its willingness to occasionally breach this policy in the 
service of important objectives - create compelling variation that lends itself readily to study. 
One important strategic decision the organization must make is when to breach its policy of 
discretion or confidentiality in the service of other goals.       
Why, then, should scholars and practitioners of international relations care about the 
strategic decision making of humanitarian organizations in general and of the ICRC in 
particular? This topic, I argue, speaks to the much discussed constructivist-rationalist divide in 
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the literature and, more practically, is relevant to assessing the likely efficacy of monitors in 
inducing desired changes in state behavior.   
There have been numerous calls in the political science literature for scholars to move 
beyond the rigid dichotomy of rationalist versus constructivist theories of state behavior (see, for 
instance, Finnemore and Sikkink 2001, Checkel 1998).  The specific topic of humanitarian 
organizations, I argue, is one that presents an intriguing opportunity to consider the interactions 
of these disparate motivations for actor behavior.  On one hand, by definition, humanitarian 
organizations are motivated at least ostensibly by a normative concern or set of normative 
concerns, something that many rationalist theories of agent behavior have a difficult – though not 
impossible – time explaining.  Yet, this does not preclude rational, strategic behavior on the part 
of the organization as it attempts to achieve these goals.  Indeed, understanding how normatively 
motivated organizations make hard choices - and what empirical understandings of the world 
underlie such choices – is important to evaluating their efficacy.   
There is also a second layer of rationalist-constructivist tension at work in the operation 
of humanitarian organizations.  Scholars have remarked on two distinct senses in which the term 
“norm” may be employed. A norm, as I have used it above, may refer to a normative idea about 
what is desirable or right.  On the other hand, a norm may refer simply to a habit, some behavior 
that has assumed a taken-for-granted status regardless of whether it embodies any distinct 
normative preferences.
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  One source of the so-called dysfunction that has fascinated recent 
scholars of the “dark side” of humanitarian organizations is in fact a norm in this sense – the 
particular rules, whether implicit or explicit, by which an organization functions.  These norms – 
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of styles of decision-making, preferences for one type of intervention over another, for example 
– may sometimes constitute obstacles to instrumental action designed to achieve the 
organization’s goals.   
In addition to this intriguing way in which the topic of humanitarian organizations speaks 
to key theoretical concerns of the discipline, probing the strategic decisions of these 
organizations may also have important practical applications.  One of the central goals of the 
dissertation of which this paper comprises one part is to assess the diverse ways in which 
international law might influence state behavior, beyond the simple dichotomy of whether or not 
it induces compliance.  Yet, to fully probe these effects we need to understand the strategic 
interaction that takes place between states and those entities attempting to influence state 
behavior.  Quite simply, understanding how humanitarian organizations and states strategically 
reason in regard to one other will paint a fuller picture of the range of empirical effects exerted 
by international humanitarian law.  
In relation to the specific case under study here, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, accumulating systematic evidence about the circumstances under which it is most likely to 
breach its general policy of confidentiality is important for assessing the organization’s potential 
efficacy as monitor and advocate of state compliance with IHL.  Hafner-Burton (2008), for 
instance, has expressed significant doubt about the efficacy of naming and shaming strategies – 
in the realist world where material costs and benefits are the focus, shaming seems a relatively 
toothless strategy.  This has particular relevance for the ICRC, which in the vast majority of 
cases does not avail itself of even this limited technique.  Thus, it may be the case that, because 
of the ICRC policy of confidentiality, states view ICRC access as an extremely low-cost strategy 




possibility remains. Given the ineffectiveness of naming and shaming, the policy of 
confidentiality – in conjunction with continuous contact with states – may reap real dividends in 
terms of humanitarian outcomes.  Understanding when the ICRC breaches its policy of 
confidentiality may be a clue as to which of these possibilities is most accurate.  How often does 
the ICRC utilize this reserve option, and against what type of states? 
 As this chapter explores the conditions under which the ICRC violates its policy of 
confidentiality and "goes public," questions may arise about the significance of publicity.  
Perhaps it's the case that everyone already knows who's violating IHL, so that publicity has very 
little impact (in which case this chapter has posed an utterly irrelevant question).  In fact, there is 
ample evidence that publicity is a powerful political tool that has far-reaching implications for 
states and for the ICRC.  First, as discussed in chapter 2, there is the evidence that states 
themselves resist imbuing IHL monitoring organizations with the power of publicity.  Second, 
recent history demonstrates two occasions in which "leaked" ICRC reports indicating significant 
IHL violations had dramatic impacts on international politics.  An ICRC report detailing France's 
use of torture in the Algerian territories, leaked to Le Monde in January of 1960, is widely held to 
have been responsible for a dramatic change in French public opinion in regard to the 
continuation of the war (Lema 2005).  Almost fifty years later a similarly leaked report about 
U.S. torture of detainees in Guantanamo had dramatic effects on American and international 
opinion (Danner 2009), even if it's difficult to pinpoint concrete consequences as readily as is 
possible in the French case.  Absent an ICRC report detailing one's IHL violations, a state can at 
least benefit from plausible deniability; an unambiguously clear report of IHL abuse from an 




certainly prefer to avoid.  There is reason to expect, then, that the variable studied in this chapter 
is of importance to both states and to the organization.  
Accordingly, this chapter proceeds as follows: Section II reviews the relevant literature 
on the political decisions of humanitarian organizations, Section III uses this research to generate 
research hypotheses, Section IV examines the funding structure of the ICRC, and Section V 
explores the hypotheses in light of several case examples.  
 The Strategies of Humanitarian Organizations 
The burgeoning literature on the decisions of humanitarian organizations has identified 
three sets of factors apt to influence the behaviors of IGOs and NGOs tasked with humanitarian 
duties: material incentives, bureaucratic pathologies, and competing normative considerations.  
We can think of these variables as those considerations likely to cause organizations to depart 
from rational instrumental behavior designed to achieve the express goals of the relevant 
organization.  For instance, these variables might explain why an election monitoring 
organization makes an election determination not entirely in accordance with the objective 
amount of fraud detected by the organization (Kelley 2009) or a humanitarian organization with 
a pacific agenda unwittingly permits the rearmament of alleged war criminals in camps 
organized and maintained by the organization (Cooley and Ron 2002).  Less insidiously, these 
factors also might help us to understand how organizations trade-off short-term and long-term 
considerations.  
Cooley and Ron (2002) draw much needed attention to the ways in which humanitarian 
organizations often have the same incentives as private organizations.  Like other organizations, 
they are dependent on material sources for their survival.  As a result, scholars should expect 




organization.  Cooley and Ron argue, for instance, that the proliferation of humanitarian 
organizations, competitive funding, and short-term contracts create incentives for organizations 
to downplay program inefficiencies and continue ineffective activities because of fear that 
accurate reporting will cause the loss of contracts critical to the organization’s survival.  Thus, 
they argue, lessons about firm behavior derived from microeconomic theory should also be 
applied to organizations with a humanitarian agenda.  They, like firms, must continue receiving 
financial assets in order to survive.  Thus, in this view, it is useful to abstract away from the 
specific characteristics of the organizations themselves and to focus instead on the simple facts 
of the system through which they are funded.  
Bob (2005, 2002) likewise highlights the material hurdles faced by actors struggling to 
gain attention for their causes.  Far from being those organizations most deserving or necessitous 
of aid, the organizations that attract and sustain international attention and assistance are those 
that have managed to connect a local grievance with an international concern, gain the support of 
gate-keeping Western NGOs, and secure financial backing and symbolic victories such as 
awards and celebrity sponsorships.   
Aside from the concrete and readily measurable indicator of funding sources, 
organizations may likewise be influenced by less tangible but no less significant political 
considerations.  For instance, organizations may be reluctant to criticize powerful or geo-
strategically significant actors for fear of backlash or loss of symbolic support.  In tentative 
support for this hypothesis, Kelley (2008) finds that election monitoring organizations are more 
likely to endorse elections that take place in states that receive a large amount of foreign aid.  




specific country or region, this finding seems to indicate some degree of political consideration 
in the decisions of the electoral monitoring organizations.   
Barnett and Finnemore (1999) similarly challenge the tendency of political science to 
view the decisions of international organizations as unproblematic.  Yet, they focus not on 
material considerations but rather on the cultural attributes of the organizations as rule-governed 
bureaucracies.  In this account ideas about how things are done are privileged over material 
factors, yet the consequences are similar - organizations can sometimes make choices that are at 
odds with their explicit objectives, leading to dysfunctionalities.  They may, for instance, follow 
standard operating procedures even when they are ineffective or irrelevant (what the authors 
nicely term “the irrationality of rationalization”), attempt to apply a universal framework in 
vastly disparate and ill-fitting contexts, or normalize risky or problematic “exceptions” to the 
point that they become (misguided) rules of their own.  This account presents a picture of 
bureaucratic stasis over strategic adaptation – certain behaviors or rules become a central part of 
the organization’s culture and guide behavior even when doing so is in tension with the 
objectives the organization is committed to achieving.   
Though both Cooley/Ron and Barnett/Finnemore provide useful insights into the often 
puzzling behaviors of organizations, neither work helps to enlighten the way in which these 
actors strategize about how to maximize the empirical effects of their activities.  Both works 
focus on the factors that lead organizations astray.  Such an account surely explains humanitarian 
organization behavior a significant percentage of the time, yet it seems that these organizations 
might sometimes act, like states, as astute and creative political entities employing the strategies 
they expect to result in the greatest payoff in terms of goal achievement.  Though it is important 




attractiveness of a satisficing strategy in many contexts is well-documented (March 2009), even 
Cooley/Ron and Barnett/Finnemore acknowledge the degree to which many actors within 
humanitarian organizations remain committed to achieving the humanitarian goals for which 
their organizations were created.   
Kelley (2008) presents a rare example of research that probes the competing strategic 
factors that shape the decisions of humanitarian organizations.  Her basic hypothesis is that states 
should be more likely to endorse elections the less frequent are electoral irregularities.  This is 
consistent with electoral monitoring organizations’ interest in creating incentives for states to 
hold reasonably free and fair elections.  However, though providing accurate reports of the 
degree of fraud in a given election is one way of encouraging greater democratization in states, 
there may be other means to this end, means that may sometimes conflict with the basic goal of 
report accuracy.  Thus, Kelley finds that electoral monitoring organizations may endorse less 
than pristine elections under several other circumstances: 1) when the election represents a 
significant degree of improvement over previous elections in the state or is some way a (positive) 
turning point in the state’s democratization process; and 2) when significant levels of pre-
election violence provide indications that condemnations of the election may only fuel violence 
and instability in the state.  The way in which these considerations differ from those highlighted 
by Cooley/Ron and Barnett/Finnemore should be apparent.  Acknowledging significant steps in 
the direction of greater democracy and attempting to prevent high levels of post-election 
violence are not necessarily inconsistent with the organizations’ broader agenda of creating 




may be more effective than the others,
79
 an empirical question that cannot be addressed here.  
However, the central point is that these considerations should be considered different paths to the 
organization’s primary objective rather than competing concerns that can lead to dysfunction and 
failure to achieve core organizational objectives.   
In addition to Kelley's work, a number of recent articles have found evidence that the 
"naming and shaming" decisions of NGOs and IGOs are at least partly influenced by the 
objective reality of the state's performance on the dimensions valued by the organization at hand.  
Lebovic and Voeten  (2006) undertake a hard case in examining the shaming actions of the now 
defunct United Nations Commission for Human Rights (UNCHR), an organization long 
notorious for the politicization of its shaming decisions.  Even here, though, they find evidence 
that increased severity of a state's human rights violations significantly increases the likelihood 
that it will be singled out by the UNCHR.  In the post-Cold War period, there is also a significant 
positive correlation between the severity of a state's human rights violations and the severity of 
the action taken by the organization, with public condemnation by the Commission as a whole 
deemed more severe than either a public statement by the chair or a private investigation of the 
state's performance.  Of course, evidence of "politicization" is present as well, particularly in the 
significant differences that manifest during and after the Cold War.  In assessing these results, 
however, it is important to keep in mind that an intergovernmental organization functions via a 
political logic quite distinct from the organizational imperatives of a non-governmental 
organization.  Yet, that even here the "objective" performance of the state exerts an influence - 
albeit certainly not a deterministic influence - on the organization's shaming decisions is 
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significant.  Other noteworthy results from this work include the finding that states that are more 
actively involved in the international community - proxied here by state contributions to 
international peacekeeping operations - are less likely to be targets of shaming campaigns.  
Returning to the realm of nongovernmental politics, several scholars have examined the 
determinants of Amnesty International (AI) publicity campaigns.  Examining the frequency of 
AI press releases and background reports on specific states from 1986 to 2000, Ron, Ramos, and 
Rodgers (2005) find, like Lebovic and Voeten, a significant relationship between the severity of 
human rights abuses in the relevant state and the extent of organization publicity, but again this 
relationship is probabilistic and not deterministic.  Many of the most repressive states were also 
most frequently the subject of AI publicity, but a number of highly repressive states, like 
Afghanistan and Somalia, were not so often highlighted by AI.  Other factors found to have an 
effect included state power, as reflected by wealth and the size of the state's military, and U.S. 
military aid contributions.  Unsurprisingly, the authors also find that the organization is more 
likely to report frequently on a state when it did so in the previous year.   
Meernik and his co-authors (2012) likewise analyze the determinants of AI publicity, but 
they focus on the urgent action (UA) campaign, a particular type of publicity in which 
organization members are encouraged to write letters to a foreign government in protest of a 
particular human rights violation.  Drawing on the "boomerang effect" logic first introduced by 
Keck and Sikkink (1998), these scholars emphasize the availability of human rights 
organizations within the target state as a significant cause of increased publicity in the form of 
UA reports.  They predict a non-linear relationship between this domestic variable and publicity, 
with the increased presence of domestic human rights organizations increasing publicity until a 




human rights record of the state becomes increasingly beyond reproach.  Interestingly, their 
argument lies in direct opposition to the findings of Ron et al., who find no significant effect of 
domestic human rights organizations on publicity outcomes.  It is possible, however, that this 
discrepancy is explained by the distinct types of publicity the authors evaluate, with Meernik and 
co-authors explicitly choosing a mode of publicity they expect to be especially responsive to the 
local context.  Interestingly, Ron et al. also find evidence that distinct forms of publicity might 
operate according to distinct logics, as several of the variables for which they find support (state 
power, U.S. military aid) evidence significance in regard to one type of publicity (i.e. either press 
release or background report) but not the other.   
Democratic Outliers 
Several of the works reviewed here have noted an apparent paradox in nongovernmental 
naming and shaming coverage.  It is not uncommon for states like the United States and the 
United Kingdom to top the list of an organization's targets, despite having generally positive 
human rights records on a number of indicators (a high Polity score as a measure of political 
freedom, or a low political terror score as a measure of extra-institutional violence).  For 
instance, the United States ranks first on Ron et al.'s list of targets of AI press releases during the 
time period 1986-2000
80
 -  above Indonesia, China, the Former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda -  and 
fourth on the background report list (p. 568), despite having the highest possible Polity score 
(10) and either the lowest or second lowest Political Terror (a 1 or 2 out of 5) rating during the 
time period in question.  There are several possible reasons for this strange turn of events. First, 
the power and influence of these states make their human rights records potentially important 
symbols/signals to other states.  Second, because of the close relationship of many human rights 
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organizations like AI to these states, given their origins in many cases in the United States and 
western Europe, these organizations may be particularly hard on such states to avoid accusations 
of bias.  Additionally, organizations like AI may have particular normative commitments, such 
as opposition to the death penalty, that make the United States, for instance, a particularly 
appropriate target.  Finally, via a logic similar to that advanced by Meernik et al. above, it is 
possible that attributes of such states, like their robust democracy, active civil society, and 
numerous human rights organizations (attributes that, anyway, tend to go together), make them 
particularly responsive targets.  Though disentangling these factors may not be so easy, for now 
it is important to keep them all in mind.  
 Competing Strategies of Humanitarianism - the Bullhorn vs. the Blackboard ?  
 One of the reasons the ICRC is such a fascinating organization to study concerns the 
unique humanitarian philosophy it employs and enacts.  Many human rights and humanitarian 
law organizations have sought to improve state behavior via a naming and shaming logic.  In this 
vein, they publicly castigate states for "bad"  behavior in an effort to make the continuation of 
such behavior costly.  The precise logic by which such a strategy is expected to work varies 
according to theorist.  In some views, these tactics are most effective when states have publicly 
accepted the commitments they are suspected of violating, for instance in the form of ratifying 
relevant international treaties.  In such situations, activists can vocally demonstrate the distance 
that exists between the commitments the states have made and their actions.  Such an argument 
has obvious affinities with institutionalist theories.  Still, once the distance between commitment 
and action is verbalized, it is not altogether clear what considerations motivate the state to 
improve given that the current policy of violation most likely exists because it is consonant with 




unclear which audiences are sufficiently interested in the state's noncompliance that they will 
impose costs on the state in response.  International audiences may be relevant when the state is a 
member of valuable international institutions and noncompliance on a particular dimension is apt 
to have reputational costs that are quickly translated to material costs (Hafner-Burton 2005).  On 
the other hand, domestic audience costs may be more salient in certain domestic contexts, 
particularly contexts already democratic enough for human rights organizations to be relatively 
empowered.   
Yet, there are good reasons to be skeptical of the efficacy of a naming and shaming 
strategy.  First, naming and shaming may be a cheap strategy that is attractive to states and 
humanitarian organizations because it is a relatively low-cost way of signaling one's moral or 
political objection to a certain policy or policies.  In other words, it may be a way to earn 
brownie points without attempting more costly - and possibly more efficacious - strategies. 
Additionally, the empirical consequences of such a strategy are complex and multifarious and by 
no means unerringly positive.  As Hafner-Burton (2008) has persuasively argued, aggressive 
naming and shaming campaigns may create incentives for states to make improvements in one 
domain  - often political rights - while counteracting these improvements in another domain, 
often in the sphere of political terror.  For instance, a state may announce elections but use 
violence to squelch the opposition.  Additionally, such shaming might embolden the domestic 
opposition, which could in turn lead to increased violence on the part of the state.  This is not to 
say that naming and shaming is never efficacious, as the empirical evidence remains contested,
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but that there are reasons to doubt that is unambiguously and uniformly so.  
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As should be obvious at this point, naming and shaming is a strategy in which activists 
assume a confrontational stance vis-à-vis states.  The goal is to use publicity to impose sufficient 
costs upon states that they are coerced into reforming their behavior.  The main dilemma facing 
such a strategy is whether and in what circumstances publicity alone is able to usher in dynamics 
that lead to the desired policy change.  The strategy preferred by the ICRC, however, operates 
according to a quite distinct logic.  First, the organization asserts that publicity is much less 
efficacious than is commonly believed.  As evidence, it points to the numerous occasions in 
which vocal criticism has not been met with swift response, with Rwanda during the 1994 
genocide being an especially salient - and tragic  - example there.  It is worth noting that the 
ICRC was far from quiet during the early weeks of the genocide.  Though, in typical 
organizational fashion, it did not use particularly inflammatory language -  "genocide" was never 
explicitly mentioned -  it left little doubt about what was unfolding there, mentioning, for 
instance, "systematic carnage" and "the extermination of a large part of the civilian population" 
(qtd. in Kellenberger, p. 602).  The inaction of key international actors powerful enough to halt 
the genocide, despite this publicity, has been well documented (Power 2002).
82
  Additionally, 
publicity threatens the organization's access to the victims, which is especially problematic 
because the organization is much more optimistic about the ability of access to lead to 
meaningful changes in state behavior.   
Given its belief that publicity is inefficacious and even potentially harmful, the 
organization opts instead for a cooperative policy in which consistent contact between the state 
and the organization is thought to be potentially transformative.  The organization believes that 
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by having regular contact with the state and approaching it privately about aspects of its behavior 
that it finds unsatisfactory, the organization can teach it to be a better state and, particularly, a 
better law of war complier.  The bargain that is made here is that publicity is given up in 
exchange for access.  ICRC President Jakob Kellenberger describes the way in which such a 
policy may be out of touch with the culture of the times.  He writes, "In an age when people are 
quick to pass judgment and histrionic expression of concern and condemnation are highly rated 
regardless of their actual impact on conditions, this reticence may alienate some or disturb others 
because it does not fit with  widely held expectations (Kellenberger 2004, p. 600)."  Thus, there 
is a potential public relations cost to the organization's policy of discretion.  A second, perhaps 
more significant, danger is that the organization will be captured by the state, unable to effect 
change yet equally unable to vocalize its dissatisfaction.  Given this dilemma, the organization's 
reservation of the right to "go public" in certain exceptional circumstances can be viewed as one 
line of defense against being captured by insincere states, as is discussed further below.   
Still, one might ask the same question about mechanisms of transformation that was 
asked in regard to the efficacy of naming and shaming.  How precisely does access lead to 
changes in state behavior?  Though in general I've suggested that the confidential advocacy of 
the ICRC is akin to a constructivist, educative logic of change, rationalist motives for change are 
also operant here.  This is perhaps most obvious in regard to prison visits, a key part of the 
organization's monitoring activities.  Such visits allow the organization to make note of the 
identities of particular detainees and to continue monitoring their well-being over time.  Thus, a 




noted and the state asked to account for it.
83
  This is consonant with the organization's 
descriptions of its work as pragmatic.  By having boots on the ground in conflict zones, the 
organization is able to take concrete steps on behalf of victims that other organizations, left to 
resort to the bullhorn far from the sidelines, cannot.  Moreover, to the extent that noncompliance 
is the result of a lack of knowledge or capacity on the part of a state (Chayes and Chayes 1993), 
the organization's presence may help to improve compliance by educating the state about 
violations and shoring up its capacity - through, for instance, relief provision to detainees - to 
fulfill its IHL obligations.  It's possible also that a more subtle socialization process takes place 
here, in which contact with people ideologically committed to IHL influences the commitment of 
the state to the law.  
Another dilemma with which the ICRC must struggle is how to balance the potential 
benefits of publicity in a particular case with the potential damage such publicity may pose to its 
ability to gain access in other conflicts.  As Kellenberger asks, "By going public about the 
conditions in country A are we denying ourselves access to the victims in Country B or C ? (p. 
604)." This is, obviously, a very difficult question to answer. It evokes questions about how 
states make judgments about the reputations of other states or, in this case, organizations.  
Though Jonathan Mercer (2010) has argued that states make much more nuanced and context-
dependent assessments of other states' actions than was previously thought, it is possible that 
such nuance does not transfer to states' judgments about non-governmental or inter-governmental 
organizations because the incentives for cooperating with such actors might generally be lower.  
That is, if the incentives to grant access to a humanitarian actor in the particularly sensitive realm 
of security are already quite low, the state may not engage in complicated assessments of the 
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likelihood of the organization violating its confidentiality policy in this context as opposed to 
that.       
From one perspective, the reservation of the "going public" option might be thought to be 
something of a paradox given the organization's reported belief that naming and shaming is not 
generally efficacious.  If naming and shaming doesn't generally work, what is the point of 
resorting to such a strategy at moments of crisis?  It is likely that the organization is alert to the 
possibility of being "taken for a ride" by states.  In this regard, then, it retains the option to resort 
to public measures at times when its confidential procedures are grossly misused by states.  In 
this way publicity is a punishment and a disincentive to misuse of the organization's pedagogical 
services.  It is also possible that, though the organization does not expect its publicity to be 
efficacious when used against recalcitrant states, such publicity is a signal to important audiences 
- other states, international organizations, and NGOS - that it has not been captured.  
 Methodological Approach and Research Hypotheses  
 The methodological approach employed in this chapter is appropriate to a particular area 
- the publicity choices of the ICRC -  about which there has been relatively little empirical work.  
The strategy here is to gather systematically sufficient empirical information so that exploratory 
work can be done on a number of preliminary hypotheses.  This work will help to enlighten 
whether or not additional data collection necessary to undertake quantitative analysis is justified.  
Though statistical analysis will not be employed in this chapter, the logic of data collection and 
preliminary hypothesis testing undertaken here does draw upon the basic positivist logic as 
expressed, for instance, in King, Keohane, & Verba (1994).  I systematically gather data on a full 
universe of cases for a ten year period and use 2-by-2 tables to compare patterns across cells and 




unlike statistical analysis, such a strategy is unable to control for other variables that might be 
confounding the relationship under investigation.  However, it provides tentative evidence to 
justify larger scale data collection and statistical analysis.  Furthermore, this systematic empirical 
collection permits zeroing in on cases for further qualitative examination that are apt to be 
particularly illuminating or instructive (per Gerring 2006).           
 Given this methodological approach, let us turn to the hypotheses about the strategic 
decisions of the International Committee of the Red Cross that can be drawn from recent work.  
Cooley/Ron and Bob highlight the importance of organizations' sources of funding to their 
general mode of operation.  Two possible hypotheses in regard to ICRC functioning can be 
derived from this one insight.  The first highlights the effect of the general source of the 
organization's funding in the contributions of states.  This suggests that the organization may 
demonstrate a pro-state bias given that it is beholden to states for its financial survival.  Indeed, 
Jo (2006) has suggested that one source of the distinct strategies organizations like the ICRC and 
Human Rights Watch have taken towards states is their discrepant revenue sources, with the 
former state-funded and the latter eschewing such funds.  This issue may arise in particular when 
states are engaged in wars with non-state actors.  
Hypothesis 1: Given its dependence for states on its financial survival, the ICRC may 
demonstrate a pro-state bias in wars in which states are pitted against non-state actors.  
 Of course, this hypothesis highlights the general source of the organization's funding, 
rather than the specific sources, that is specific states.  A second hypothesis would locate the 
potential for bias in the specific state or states (such as, in recent history, the United States) that 




Hypothesis 2: The ICRC may be less likely to “go public” against states, such as the United 
States, that contribute a significant percentage of its overall funding.   
 See below for a more detailed consideration of the ICRC's financial profile in the post-
1950 period and the possible ramifications of this profile. 
 However, the accuracy of this prediction may depend on whether or not the 
organization’s most significant donors can credibly commit to the withdrawal of part or all of 
their funding. The literature on audience costs might suggest, for instance, that robust 
democracies cannot credibly threaten to withdraw funding or access from humanitarian 
organizations, leading to another hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3: This funding effect may not hold for contributors that are robust democracies with 
a history of supporting the organization, as they may not be able to credibly commit to withdraw 
funding from the organization. 
 Given insufficient empirical evidence about the existence and salience of audience costs, 
it is worth examining in detail the assumption that certain states cannot credibly threaten to 
withdraw aid from the ICRC.  What, in concrete, terms, would the United States lose by 
withdrawing, or significantly reducing, its support for the ICRC?  Though such benefits are 
inherently difficult to measure, it seems highly likely that the United States gains some positive 
reputational points from its support of the ICRC.  This association may be particularly beneficial 
for the U.S. when it is engaged in controversial or unpopular conflicts, such as the recent war in 
Iraq.  Yet, it’s difficult to evaluate in concrete terms the costs the U.S. would suffer from its 
withdrawal of support.  Furthermore, it seems foolish to argue that there are no circumstances 
under which the U.S would risk such costs, given that circumstances have existed in which the 




example, John Bolton’s handling of the United Nations (Bolton 2008).  History suggests that 
under the appropriate circumstances, the United States would be willing to risk international 
backlash and able to convince a sufficiently large percentage of the domestic population that 
going it alone was the correct strategy.  In fact, as will be discussed further below, some 
Republican politicians responded to ICRC criticism of American policy in Guantanamo with a 
call to cut American funding of the organization.   
 Another cost from withdrawing support from the ICRC is the loss of whatever leverage it 
might gain over the actions of the organization from its role as primary financier.  Of course, 
because this sort of benefit is not easily measured, the costs the U.S. would suffer from 
withdrawal of support are equally enigmatic.  It is clear that the ICRC aims to be as unbiased as 
possible and thus avoids actions that would create the impression of it being captured by states, 
particularly states as powerful as the U.S.  Yet, there remains the potential that the U.S. exerts a 
subtle influence over the actions of the organization, preventing it from doing things it might 
otherwise do. 
Aside from financial considerations, Barnett and Finnemore point to the importance of 
considering cultural or ideational attributes of the organization that might affect its decision- 
making process.  The ICRC's non-confrontational approach to humanitarian advocacy, discussed 
above, offers some clues as to the circumstances in which the organization is most likely to "go 
public."  According to the ICRC itself, there are two types of circumstances that warrant a resort 
to publicity: 1) persistent refusal of the state to grant the ICRC access under the conditions it sets 
and 2) gross violations of international humanitarian law (Kellenberger 2004).  From the above 
discussion of the organization’s humanitarian philosophy, it is apparent which of these should be 




violations of IHL, state refusal to grant the ICRC access is more troubling because it disrupts the 
pathway by which the organization expects states to improve their levels of compliance with 
IHL.  Thus, I predict that, assuming that access refusal and gross violations happen at equivalent 
rates, something that will necessitate empirical investigation, the ICRC will be more likely to “go 
public” about persistent state refusal to grant the organization access than about gross violations 
on the part of states.  
However, gross violations may threaten the organization’s philosophy of change 
inducement under certain conditions.  Specifically, if the ICRC has maintained a relationship 
with a particular state for a significant amount of time and the state’s high level of violations has 
continued unaltered, then this might be an indication that the state is somehow a bad student or 
resistant to being taught.  In such cases, the ICRC might reluctantly decide to resort to a more 
coercive strategy.  One might compare this to the mischievous student who receives detention 
and a letter home to mom in order to make him or her more amenable to the teacher’s 
instructions at a later date.   
Hypothesis 4:  Controlling for the relative frequency of these phenomena in the empirical world, 
the ICRC is more likely to “go public” about persistent state refusal to grant the organization 
access than about gross violations on the part of states.  
Hypothesis 5: Other things being equal, the longer a state has had contact with the ICRC, the 
more likely is the ICRC to “go public” in regard to violations committed by that state.  
 Aside from considering the humanitarian philosophy of the ICRC itself, Cooley and Ron 
point to the importance of considering the overall organizational matrix of which the ICRC is a 
part.  These authors raise the possibility of competition developing across humanitarian 




this perspective, another consideration influencing the ICRC's publicity decisions may be its 
perceptions of other organizations' decisions and the implications of these decisions for the 
organization's status in the eyes of important audiences.  If other key organizations - HRW, AI, 
MSF - are highlighting the atrocities of a particular regime, then one can imagine that the ICRC 
faces competing considerations.  On the one hand, its own publicity is apt to have marginal 
impact given the active publicity of others.
84
  In this case, the long list of reasons for which the 
organization generally prefers to stay quiet should seem particularly convincing given the small 
likelihood that its additional voice will add much to the chorus of criticism already taking place.  
On the other hand, however, staying quiet in such a situation may contribute to the impression on 
the part of some actors that the organization has been "captured" by powerful states.   
 Aside from the intricacies of organizational competition, Kelley's work reminds us that 
the overall normative preferences of the organization are apt to exert influence on its key 
strategic decisions.  Recall her argument that election monitors are sometimes motivated by 
concerns other than accurately reporting the amount of fraud observed in a given election – for 
instance, they seek to reward significant steps in the direction of greater democratization and to 
avoid contributing to post-election violence.  In application to humanitarian law monitoring, the 
larger objective of the ICRC is to contribute to an international environment in which states 
comply with IHL most of the time.  In making decisions about which activities are likely to 
advance this overall objective and which are not, the organization is likely to take into account 
the existence of other organizations operating with a similar goal but perhaps disparate strategies.  
In particular, the ICRC is apt to take into account the existence and activities of organizations 
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that regularly use the tool of publicity in their monitoring missions.  However, the particular way 
in which the ICRC responds to the action of shaming organizations could take several different 
forms.  
There are two main differences between these hypothetical worlds.  One concerns the 
ICRC’s beliefs about the empirical effectiveness of naming and shaming.  In one world, the 
ICRC believes it to be an effective strategy but would rather another actor undertake it; in the 
second world, the ICRC does not find it efficacious and is happy if no one undertakes it.  
The second difference concerns whether the reputational costs of the greatest concern to 
the ICRC stem from the states it monitors or from other international audiences evaluating its 
effectiveness as a humanitarian organization. These different strategic worlds in which ICRC 
policies may reside is depicted in Table 1, and the implications of these strategic considerations 
for ICRC “go public” decisions are displayed in Table 2.  
One should note that the bandwagoning outcome has more affinity to the picture painted 
by Cooley and Ron than do the other outcomes.  In this world dysfunctional outcomes are 
produced by organizations duplicating behavior, although in this case the motivation is 
reputational rather than material (although, of course, the two cannot be fully separated).  
In some respects this is a theoretical exercise because 1) we know that generally speaking 
the ICRC is (at least publicly) skeptical of the efficacy of naming and shaming
85
 and 2) it is 
rarely the case that the naming and shaming organizations aren't doing what they do best, that is 
being vocal about violations.  In regard to the second point, though it might sometimes be the 
case that certain states are not receiving attention from the "naming and shaming" organizations 
that is entirely proportional to their violations, it is unlikely that the ICRC is so placed to identify 
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such cases and respond to them.  Given these considerations, the factor that is most likely to vary 
is the audience that is foremost in the ICRC's strategic calculations at a given moment.   
Hypothesis 6: The ICRC will "bandwagon" with naming and shaming organizations in 
situations in which signaling that it is not captured by a particular state is important for key 
audiences.  
That the ICRC might sometimes be motivated by a type of audience costs raises an 
obvious question about the identity of the salient audiences.  The ICRC highly values its 
neutrality and works hard to embody its neutral ideals.  However, the organization's particular 
history and identity make its claims of neutrality more contentious in some contexts than others.  
During the Cold War, for instance, the connection of the ICRC to the Western Bloc was a 
liability that it expended a great deal of effort to overcome, with mixed success.  Though the 
Cold War and its fixation on East and West is now a thing of the past, new geopolitical 
dimensions of conflict pose a similar challenge to the organization's claims of neutrality.  In 
particular, conflicts in which at least some major actors invoke radical strands of Islam to 
challenge the secularism and imperialism of the West pose a dilemma for the organization.  In a 
context in which some political organizations essential to the conflict identify the ICRC as an 
agent of the enemy, the ICRC is particularly hard pressed to provide evidence to the contrary.  
Thus, I predict that the ICRC will be less likely to utilize publicity in conflicts in which 
politicized Islam is a salient dimension.  
Hypothesis 7: The ICRC will be less likely to go public in conflicts in which a major 




 Because this variable, being quite subjective, is particularly prone to post-hoc bias, I also 
employ a more objective indicator and suggest that the organization will be less likely to go 
public against Muslim-majority countries.    
Hypothesis 8: The ICRC will be less likely to go public in conflicts taking place in 
Muslim-majority states.   
  The Consequences of ICRC Funding Structure 
As Cooley/Ron and Clifford Bob remind us, to understand the operations of an organization, 
its financial structure is a good first place to look. One central way in which the ICRC is 
distinguished from other law of war monitoring organizations, such as Human Rights Watch, is 
by its primary reliance on government funds.  Many other advocacy organizations explicitly 
refuse to accept such funds; the ICRC, in contrast, not only accepts these funds but is dependent 
on them. This dependence on the very parties (states) that the ICRC is tasked with monitoring 
may strike some as a conflict of interest, one that could have detrimental implications for the 
efficiency of ICRC monitoring operations.  Given the plausibility of such an argument and its 
importance to understanding the question under investigation here, this section examines in 
detail the ICRC financial structure in the post-1950 period.  
 The close connection of the ICRC to the Swiss Confederation has been oft noted and 
cited as both a primary guardian of and threat to the organization’s neutrality.  Its relationship to 
the Swiss Confederation is supportive of the organization’s neutrality insofar as the 
Confederation itself is a neutral actor avoiding as much as possible the messy world of real 
politick.  However, as Forsythe (2005) and others have noted, the very neutrality of the Swiss 
Confederation may at times place limits on the independence of the organization, particularly 




course, the most salient example of this potential conflict of interest occurred in World War II, 
when the ICRC, sharing several members of its ruling board with the Swiss executive council, 
held its tongue about the Holocaust out of fear that, were the organization to take a more 
confrontational role against the German state, this would compromise Swiss neutrality and 
possibly lead to the German seizure of Switzerland (Forsythe 2005).  
However, if financial connections to the Swiss government are a cause for concern, how 
much more should dependence on states with more active geopolitical roles arouse suspicion? A 
good realist, when considering (briefly) the significance of such an organization, would expect a 
significant correlation between the chief contributors to the organization and the major powers in 
the international system.  The relatively privileged geographic position of Switzerland and its 
fortunate history might explain its interest in humanitarian causes (as might the interest of the 
Swiss in carving out a niche area in which they can exert influence, as their narrow military-
strategic influence on world politics is, to say the least, rather circumscribed), but other states 
might be expected to have more concrete interests in contributing to the organization.  
A committed humanitarian may be of two minds concerning the role of great power states as 
primary funders of a humanitarian organization.  On one hand, history suggests that institutions 
fare better when the great powers are stake holders.  Voeten (2005) has written usefully about the 
function that the Permanent 5 serve in the UN Security Council, and a central lesson from the 
failure of the League of Nations was that the absence of major powers was a significant handicap 
to the successful functioning of organizations.  However, the organizations for which such 
arguments are made are those tasked with system-wide power maintenance functions, rather than 
the more narrowly humanitarian tasks assumed by the ICRC and others.  Still, another reason 




states may simply be better equipped than smaller powers to make meaningful contributions,  
financial and otherwise, to the organization.  The validity of this argument, however, may 
depend on the extent to which economic and political/military power co-vary.   
On the other hand, however, going to bed with powerful states may have detrimental 
consequences for humanitarianism.  Such states are not disinterested actors, if indeed such things 
exist, and they may use their financial contributions – particularly if significant – as a means by 
which to exert leverage on the organization.  As a result, ostensibly humanitarian activities may 
increasingly be marked by the tinge of donor state political ambitions.  Importantly, it may be 
difficult to pinpoint concrete instances in which a donor state shaped organization policy – such 
influence is apt to be more subtle, agenda-setting power, which may make it all the more 
insidious.  
What, then, does one find in the post-1950 financial history of the ICRC that might speak to 
the possibility of pernicious real politick influences on humanitarian policy?  The place to start, it 
seems, is with the donation patterns of the contending powers at various stages of their 
predominance.  Most political scientists are familiar with the general power distribution that 
characterized the post-World War II international system.  Given the devastation of the European 
powers, there was a power vacuum on the European continent.  The United States and the Soviet 
Union, then, emerged as the major great power contenders, and tensions soon developed between 
the erstwhile allies (Walker 1995).  Was this power distribution reflected in the patterns of ICRC 
financing in the early post-war period?  Interestingly, the answer is no.  
In the early 1950s, in the immediate post-war years, the major state donors to the ICRC were, 




contributing 500,000 CHF of the 800,000 CHF total granted by state governments.
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Interestingly, the United States as such did not make any contribution, while the United States’ 
national Red Cross society offered a major contribution of approximately 107,000 CHF, 
representing one fourth of the total donations the organization received from national Red Cross 
societies.  Perhaps already indicative of Cold War divisions, the USSR was contributing very 
little – like the U.S., it did not make any direct governmental contributions, while, unlike the 
U.S., its indirect national society donations were also paltry at about 16,000 CHF.  Of course, it’s 
possible that this relatively small contribution has more to do with the extent to which Soviet 
Red Cross funds were needed at home than with geopolitical considerations.  
 A few milestones in the ICRC financial history are worth highlighting.  1966 is the first 
year that the United States made an official governmental contribution to the permanent structure 
of the ICRC (though in previous years, it had made donations of gifts in cash or kind in response 
to emergency needs).  This first contribution was 216,000 CHF.  At this time, the U.S. surpassed 
all donors other than Switzerland
87
 to become the second largest single contributor to the 
organization.  U.S. donations continued apace until 1974, when the U.S. and the ICRC made an 
agreement that, beginning the following year (1975), the U.S. would make an annual 
contribution to the permanent structure of the ICRC of U.S. 500,000.
88
  In actuality, U.S. 
donations in the 1970s exceeded this agreed amount, as the U.S. began to make substantial 
donations to ICRC special operations happening in specific parts of the world.  For instance, in 
1978, in addition to contributing approximately CHF 1 million to the ICRC permanent structure, 
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 At the time Switzerland was donating 1 million CHF per year; in 1968 this would increase to 2.5 million CHF.  
 
88
 Note that this is a highly significant increase from the CHF 200,000 that the U.S. had been donating, considering 




the U.S. also contributed roughly CHF 7 million to ICRC special operations, mostly in Africa 
and Lebanon.  It is in 1976 that U.S. donations to the permanent infrastructure and special 
operations first exceed those of the Swiss government. With the exception of 1978, the U.S. 
would be the ICRC’s chief donor until 1987, and it would again assume this title consistently in 
the 1990s.   
This year – when the U.S. assumed its position as chief donor to a humanitarian organization 
tasked with neutrality – is a milestone of special significance in the history of the organization. 
One of the world’s primary geopolitical competitors – and one engaged in a vicious partisan 
struggle with its Soviet great power counterpart – was now primary financial contributor to an 
organization committed to remaining above the melee of international political struggles.  
Although the ICRC has always belied blanket characterizations as being simplistically or 
unambiguously “in the pocket” of power, this still must raise serious questions about the paradox 
of neutrality given the reality of financial dependence.  
This conundrum is not, of course, unique to the ICRC.  Scholars of human rights have 
investigated at length how the funding patterns of major international human rights organizations 
affect the details of their activism.  Though many human rights organizations, like Human Rights 
Watch or Amnesty International, explicitly refuse government funds, they nevertheless receive 
the vast majority of their funds from organizations and citizens in “Western” – that is wealthy 
and democratic – nations and thus are not entirely immune from the bias question.  Evidence 
suggests, however, that these organizations take great care to highlight the human rights 
inadequacies of Western states, even as the scale and nature of their atrocities often differ 




assuming straightforward bias on the part of a normatively-motivated organization because of its 
funding pattern may be misguided.  
There are several distinct ways in which a state's financial contributions might exert an 
influence on organizational policy.  We might characterize them as the obvious, the 
counterintuitive, and the subtle.  The obvious hypothesis suggests that financial influence from 
major political actors causes the organization to “go easy” on those actors that constitute 
significant donors.  The counterintuitive hypothesis suggests that, in contrast, the organization 
may “go hard” on these states precisely because it is aware of the potential for being perceived as 
“captured” by financial interests.  That is, the organization may over-compensate by being 
particularly tough on these actors.  Finally, the subtle (or chameleon) hypothesis suggests an 
effect somewhat in between these two extremes.  Rather than resulting in straightforward bias in 
readily observable outcomes, the influence of major financial donors may shape the priorities of 
the organization (the so-called agenda setting effect) in significant but less readily measurable 
ways.  Another challenge in assessing the significance of financial dependence is teasing apart 
the effects of funding from other aspects of the organization's relationship with a particular state.  
In the case of the United States, for instance, the question would be what aspects of its influence 
stem from its financial contribution as opposed to its general geopolitical position and its 
particular history with the ICRC.  
Another area in which ICRC financial history might be telling concerns Cold War dynamics. 
It is common knowledge that a great deal of internationalism – not least in the United Nations – 
was circumscribed by the Cold War stalemate.  To what extent did this affect the international 
humanitarianism attempted by the ICRC?  Not surprisingly, funding patterns were polarized 




as such, but, remember, neither did the United States.  However, the difference in funding 
patterns between the Eastern and Western blocs becomes apparent in the remarkably distinct 
levels of aid offered by the respective U.S. and U.S.S.R. national societies.  Throughout the 
1950s and ‘60s, the USSR national society consistently contributed about CHF 16,000 a year; in 
contrast, the U.S. national society contributed about CHF 106,000.  In 1966, this difference 
becomes even more significant, as the U.S., but not the USSR, begins to make direct 
governmental donations.  Interestingly, the first year of a direct governmental donation from the 
USSR was 1988, a year of significant moves towards liberalization on the part of the USSR. The 
USSR contribution at that time was CHF 130,000; by comparison, in that year the U.S. 
contributed CHF 41 million.  The USSR repeated this CHF 130,000 donation in 1989.  In 1990, 
with the dissolution of the USSR, small donations from the national societies of the former 
Soviet republics emerge, but Russia does not begin to contribute until 1995.   
Data Collection and Analysis  
In order to evaluate the hypotheses discussed above via case studies, primary documents 
from the ICRC were reviewed as comprehensively as possible for one decade of the general time 
period under investigation in this project (the post-1950 period).  The time period of 1995 - 2005 
was chosen for a number of reasons.  First, taking place after the internet revolution, it permits 
the use of large amounts of data available online.  During this time period the organization was 
posting its news releases online as a matter of standard practice.  This provides a degree of 
empirical detail that is not readily available for the earlier years, given the forty year delay before 
archival material is made publicly available.  Thus, case studies can be selected with greater 
attention to the larger context in which they occur, so that potentially pernicious selection effects 




study will be able to give a window into political dynamics that are likely to still be relevant and 
illuminating.  Still, though, this choice of time period is conservative in that it stops short of 
considering the very recent past, within the past five years, when there may remain a great deal 
of uncertainty about a number of variables of interest.   
In thinking about this post-Cold War sample, it is worth considering ways in which the 
political strategies of the ICRC might have been impacted by the end of the Cold War.  In some 
obvious respects the end of the Cold War freed the organization from one potential source of 
politicization.  The organization was no longer in as much danger of appearing to take sides in a 
highly polarized geopolitical context.  Thus, in much the same way that the end of the Cold War 
opened up the potential for the United Nations to take action that had been heretofore blocked by 
the gridlock between the superpowers, this new geopolitical context freed the organization from 
one particularly difficult constraint.  On the other hand, as realists have noted, it was an uncertain 
new environment in which, in the absence of bipolar stability, it was unclear what if anything 
would be the new organizing principle.  The wave of conflicts in the former Soviet territories 
was a clear sign that the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of acute security problems. 
The time period of 1995-2005 is also interesting in that it straddles the game-changing 
September 11, 2001 attacks that heralded significant changes in the security strategy of the 
system's most powerful actor.   
In order to determine a list of the occasions in which the ICRC "went public," the 
organization's online search engine was utilized.  The following search terms were utilized for 
the time period 1995 - 2005: compliance, violation(s), (gravely) (deeply) concerned, condemn(s), 
deplore(s), and denounce(s).  These particular terms were chosen after perusing the 




For the time period 2000 - 2005, there were 38 news releases using the word "violations," 56 
using the term "compliance," 19 using the term "condemns," 9 using the term "deplores," 2 using 
"denounces," 11 using "gravely concerned," and 202 using the more generic "concerned."   For 
the time period 1995 - 1999, there were 30 new releases using "violations," 24 using 
"compliance," 14 using "condemns," 17 using "deplores", 30 using "gravely/deeply concerned" 
and 172 using "concerned."  These news releases were then read, with those selected that 
appeared to criticize a country or a conflict (the later more likely, given the organization's 
reluctance to single-out countries for criticism) however vaguely for either noncompliance or 
limited access.  All of the selected news releases are listed in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.
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 A 3-point scale was then used to rate the degree to which these releases indicated 
publicity on the part of the ICRC.  To adequately capture the essence of publicity, these scores 
were determined from the content of the news release's title alone, though statements that 
employed a statement of criticism in the text were also included in the table with note made of 
this more subtle form of publicity.  A score of 1 was assigned to those statements that indicated 
the most direct and obvious form of publicity, with language akin to "condemns" or "deplores" 
utilized.  An example of such a headline is "ICRC condemns deliberate targeting of civilians in 
Jerusalem," news release number 95/41.  A score of 2 was assigned when the headline mentioned 
an act or activity that implied some concern or criticism on the part of the organization but 
without such concern being explicitly vocalized.  For instance, "Bosnian Serbs evacuate 
members of Croat and Muslim minorities," news release 95/40, earned such a score.  The score 
of 3 was assigned when the organization vocalized a generic reminder or appeal for compliance 
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on the part of the warring parties.  The headline, "Ecuador/Peru: ICRC calls for compliance with 
Geneva conventions," news release number 95/21, received such a score.  
 This scale captures only imperfectly the significance of the statement at hand as an 
instance of rare ICRC publicity.  Consider, for instance, the example listed above as level 2 
publicity, in which the ICRC states that the Bosnian Serbs are evacuating ethnic minorities 
within their territory.  When the ICRC announces the completion of an action that is obviously a 
violation of humanitarian law, it is unclear that the absence of the explicit language of 
condemnation is so significant.  That is, the ICRC stating that it believes a violation to have 
occurred should perhaps be considered an instance of "going public" even if the language of 
violation and the explicit normative condemnation of that violation are absent.  Another example 
illustrating such ambiguity is the statement, "Escalation of indiscriminate shelling in Kabul," 
made in news release 95/5.  Is it really qualitatively different from the statement "ICRC strongly 
condemns shelling of civilians in Tuzla," made in news release 95/18 and which was coded as 1 
on this scale?  The scale was designed to capture variation in the nature and intensity of the 
language used by the organization, but it is not always so clear what should be made of this 
variation.  However, because the hypotheses of these chapter are being investigated qualitatively, 
it is not necessary that any one indication of publicity be considered the most important.  This 
measure of the extent of publicity will be used in conjunction with other variables qualitatively 
assessed from the reviewed news releases.   
 Accordingly, data from the news releases was gathered on several other dimensions as 
well.  First, note was made of whether or not a particular actor was identified as the source of a 
law of war or access violation.  This variable sought to distinguish between reports in which the 




violations of the 4th Geneva Conventions for policies it adopted in the occupied territories, and 
reports in which no actor was clearly identified.  Second, a variable coded whether or not any 
criticism of an actor was asymmetrical, that is was made in a context that singled out one actor in 
a warring dyad for misconduct but not the other actor.  This is quite distinctive from news 
releases in which both parties in a warring dyad (or none) are named.  Third, note was made 
about whether a state or non-state actor was the primary target of the statement.  Fourth, as will 
be detailed further below, the topic of the news release - particularly whether it concerned 
access, IHL violation, humanitarian neutrality, or humanitarian assistance - was coded.  Finally, 
in cases in which significant statements about violation or access were mentioned in the text that 
were not apparent from the headline, these were recorded in the notes section.   
 A potential objection to my conceptualization of publicity in this chapter is that I have 
classified a range of distinct actions as instances of publicity, including instances in which the 
ICRC voices displeasure about commonly known IHL violations and does not necessarily make 
use of restricted information to which it is privy.  Though it is correct that I include different 
levels of publicity in this study, I argue that this is an acceptable analytic strategy for several 
reasons.  Though it is certainly the case that certain types of "going public" are more aversive to 
states and thus more damaging to ICRC professions of neutrality and discretion than are others, it 
is my contention that all of the instances of critique examined here are departures from ICRC 
business as usual, are in tension with the identity the organization attempts to cultivate vis-à-vis 
states, and are thus somewhat risky actions worthy of exploration.  Though in theory it is highly 
plausible that states respond more severely when the ICRC reveals information that it alone 
possesses, in practice it is quite difficult to determine which ICRC statements make use of 




not.  That is, one would need an unrealistic amount of information -about actual state action, the 
knowledge possessed by the ICRC, and the knowledge possessed by other international actors  - 
in order to make judgments about this in more than an ad hoc manner.  Moreover, in this chapter 
I attempt to distinguish among different types of publicity employed by the organization using a 
3-point severity scale and other indicators of the qualitative nature of publicity.  Though 
admittedly the severity scale does not capture the degree of "private information" possessed by 
the organization - a variable that, for reasons discussed above, it is extremely hard to 
systematically code - it does usefully capture other dimensions of "publicity," such as 
identification of the violating state, tenor of criticism, etc. The variable of asymmetric criticism 
is likewise informative in this regard. Thus, while there are certainly limits to the way publicity 
is conceptualized here, it is my contention that the variation captured here illustrates something 
powerful about the strategic decisions of the ICRC. 
Surveying the Empirical Terrain 
The completed tables, 4.3. and 4.4, reveal several interesting facts about the 
circumstances in which the ICRC resorts to publicity.  First, though admittedly a quite generous 
definition of publicity has been employed here, it should be obvious that the organization is in 
fact quite prolific in the rendering of news releases about circumstances of violent conflict.  It is 
not nearly as silent as the organization's commitment to confidentiality might lead one to predict. 
Second, there is quite significant variation in the tone of the organization's pronouncements, with 
humble, conservative language being somewhat more common than more definitive 
condemnatory language, though the latter is certainly present.  Further, consistent with the 
changing parameters of war in the post-World War II era, far more news releases addressed 




criteria for publicity articulated above; of these, only five concerned inter-state wars.  Similarly, 
of the 139 news releases of the period 2000 - 2005, only 28 concerned interstate wars.  
     Variation and the Dogs that Don't Bark  
One might object to the method of investigation employed here insofar as it appears to 
fall prey to the cardinal social science sin of selecting on the dependent variable.  Never fear, as 
redemption is at hand. First, within this table of news releases, substantial variation already 
exists across the dimensions discussed above.  Variation exists in regard to the intensity of 
publicity (as measured by the 3-pt scale developed earlier), whether or not a particular actor is 
identified, whether the publicity is symmetrical or asymmetrical, and whether the publicity 
concerns violation, access, or humanitarian neutrality.  Further, particular conflicts vary in the 
number of releases to which they are subject.  See Table 4.5 for a summary of the conflicts that 
received the highest number of releases in the time period under study here.   
Though each of these variables reveal potentially enlightening information about the 
circumstances of ICRC publicity, in this chapter I make particular use of the variable of 
asymmetrical criticism.  I code a news release as reflecting asymmetrical criticism when it 
exclusively or overwhelmingly criticizes the behavior of one actor in a warring dyad, failing to 
mention or only briefly mentioning any equally illegal activity on the part of its enemy.  Thus, a 
news release issued April 12, 2002 with the headline "Movement expresses deep concern about 
humanitarian situation on the West Bank" is coded as an asymmetrical criticism because it 
enumerates in twelve separate paragraphs the violations committed by Israel, even though in one 
(two sentence) paragraph at the end suicide bomb attacks against civilians are also condemned. 
Note that a news release granting attention to violations committed by both sides was only coded 




one party.  In most of these cases, as in this one, the headline also makes clear which party is the 
target of the organization's criticism.  I submit that asymmetrical criticism is a particularly 
informative variable as it entails the risk of perceived or actual departure from neutrality.  
Though it is not the only relevant type of publicity employed by the organization, it is the form 
that is most costly to targeted states.  Thus, there are good reasons to focus on asymmetrical 
criticism as a particularly informative and significant form of ICRC publicity.  
Still, this data is limited insofar as it only tells us about the news releases that were 
issued.  To really understand the factors shaping the organization's publicity decisions, we must 
consider also the conflicts for which such news statements were not issued, the so-called "dogs 
that don't bark."  A list of all conflicts meeting Correlates of War (COW) criteria for interstate or 
intrastate wars in the time period 1995 - 2005 was collected.  This gives us a sense of the total 
universe of cases in regard to which the organization might have employed the strategy of 
publicity.  Comparing this list to the list of news releases, we can construct a list of cases in 
which the organization did not employ the publicity strategy.  See this list in Table 4.6a.  
Because many scholars use the UCDP (Gleditsch et al, 2002) dataset  - with its lower battle death 
threshold of 25 - for intrastate wars, a list of low-intensity intrastate wars (i.e. wars meeting 
UCDP criteria, but not COW) in which there was no ICRC publicity is included for reference as 
Table 4.6b.  However, the work that follows focuses on the higher intensity conflicts (the list in 
Table 4.6a).   
One thing that becomes apparent here is that it's not the case that publicity is occurring 
equally across conflicts.  Nor is it the case that publicity maps neatly onto the deadliest conflicts 
or the conflicts in which violations of international humanitarian law are most severe.  For 




the Palestinians, which don't even meet the Correlates of War annual battle deaths criterion 
during the time period studied here, constitute the single greatest subject of publicity.  Similarly, 
a number of conflicts known for their significant violations of IHL, such as the Algerian civil 
war of the mid 1990s, are barely mentioned until several years after the conclusion of the civil 
war.  This provides further indication that the organization's pronouncements are not explained 
neatly by empirical reality but instead are the product of more complex factors that need to be 
articulated. 
Sudan is an astonishing case in point here. Though the Sudanese government, embroiled 
in a war with domestic opposition starting in 2003, soon become responsible for a host of 
atrocities against civilians, primarily through its support of the Janjaweed militias, the ICRC was 
far less critical (in terms of public publicity) of this regime than it was the Israeli.  The same 
month the conflict began, in February of 2003, the organization issued a news release praising 
the government's announcement of a national commission on IHL (ICRC, News Release 03/21).  
In fact, this news release came only two days after the date that several commentators cite as the 
official start of the conflict, February 26.  Clearly, the organization was unaware at this time of 
the extent of violations that would ensue, but this rare act of praise on the part of the ICRC is 
striking given what would come after.  Once the atrocities became widely known, the ICRC 
released only one clear critique of the government, mentioning "serious violations of IHL" that 
had taken place "under the responsibility of the government" in an announcement of ICRC 
President Jacob Kellenberger's visit to Sudan in November of 2004 (ICRC, News Release 
04/71).  To be fair, several other press releases, though lacking specific criticism, did contain the 




below). Again, though, this is astonishing given the 15 asymmetrical criticisms of Israel made 
during the same time.   
Evaluating the Hypotheses 
Pro-state bias 
Recall that Hypothesis 1 predicted a general pro-state bias on the part of the ICRC 
because of the source of the organization's funding. This hypothesis is somewhat difficult to 
assess because of the possible pro-state bias of international humanitarian law itself, the body of 
law that the ICRC is charged with monitoring.  Because IHL was the creation of states acting to 
advance their interests, it should come as no surprise that states are granted a privileged status in 
this legal landscape.  This privileged status is evident, for instance, in the definition of war as a 
legal condition that exists between two or more internationally-recognized states.  It is further 
reflected in the criteria militias must meet - carrying arms openly, wearing a uniform or insignia 
-  in order to be eligible for privileges like prisoner of war status to which only lawful 
combatants are eligible.
90
  This pro-status quo character of IHL complicates the assessment of 
the ICRC's own strategic imperatives insofar as it makes it difficult to tease apart whether the 
organization itself has a bias or whether instead the body of law it is tasked with enforcing 
carries this bias.   
We will explore this hypothesis first by examining the relative frequency with which the 
ICRC engages in asymmetrical criticism against non-state actors as compared to states.  Recall 
the variable asymmetrical criticism mentioned above.  Of the 35 news releases coded as 
asymmetrical criticisms during the time period 1990 - 1995, 25 of these (71%) were aimed at 
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non-state actors, most often terrorist organizations that committed acts of violence directed at 
civilians.  This trend is less stark for the time period 2000 - 2005, but, as will be discussed 
below, this is largely due to the many asymmetrical critiques the organization made against one 
state, Israel.  Though only 49% of the asymmetrical statements were made against non-state 
actors, once one removes the 15 (!) statements made against Israel, the proportion of critiques 
directed against non-state actors rises to 73%.  
It is not self evident, however, how these statistics should be interpreted, given the 
general pro-state bias of international humanitarian law discussed above.  It may be that the 
organization appears to criticize non-state actors more frequently than it criticizes states because 
non-state actors are more often gross violators of the law.  Though the empirical evidence that 
would be needed to assess fully this claim is not yet available, there is certainly ample evidence 
that states violate IHL with alarming frequency (Downes 2006, Valentino, Huth, and Croco, 
2006).  However, it's possible that wars between states and non-state actors, in which the 
asymmetry of capability is often extremely large, create distinct incentives that have implications 
for law of war monitoring.  Such asymmetry may create military incentives in which 
unambiguous violation - for instance through anti-civilian acts of terror - is viewed as the most 
likely route to efficacy for the weaker party.
91
  Conversely, states, in a superior military position, 
may be more able to comply in the most overt ways, for instance, through avoiding the direct 
targeting of civilians, creating a situation in which non-state actors' noncompliance is more overt 
and unambiguous than that of states.  Consider the difference between the bombing of a market 
and a state's attack on a military target that might have resulted in avoidable civilian casualties. 
To the extent that the organization's publicity tends to spotlight the former rather than the latter, 
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it might be said, like international humanitarian law more broadly, to demonstrate a pro-state 
bias.  
Of course, arguments can also be made in the opposing direction.  As Jo and Thomson 
(2013) have documented, in civil war contexts the organization often attempts to develop a 
working relation with rebel groups so that it may, for instance, visit detainees held by rebels.  
Insofar as such an act bestows a form of recognition on these actors, it is often welcomed by 
them and denounced or begrudgingly accepted by states. 
Overall, though questions remain about how this pattern should properly be interpreted, 
there is evidence that publicity is more often directed against non-state actors than states.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the ICRC would treat more gingerly states that provided a 
significant source of its funding.  As mentioned earlier, the United States is the ICRC's number 
one state supporter for the entire decade evaluated here.  Though it is difficult to assess the 
counterfactual, that is the level of publicity that would be expected were the United States not the 
organization's chief donor, it is clear that the organization's indebtedness to the United States 
does not prevent it from occasionally using publicity against it.  From 1995-1999 there were no 
asymmetric criticisms of the United States, though during the intervention in Kosovo one ICRC 
press release noted with concern an increase in the number of civilian casualties caused by 
NATO attacks (ICRC, Press Release 99/15).  Unsurprisingly, the number of asymmetric 
criticisms increased markedly after 2001 when U.S. international behavior became much more 
contentious with the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the IHL concerns that accompanied 
the war on terror more broadly.  Three press releases during this time were considered 
asymmetric criticisms of the U.S., though this may somewhat underestimate the attention granted 




statements that, while not exclusively critical of the U.S., did explicitly challenge aspects of U.S. 
policy.  Moreover, if one compares the number of news releases issued about American wars to 
the number issued in regard to other interstate wars (see Table 4.7), it is clear that the ICRC is 
much more prolific in its publicity when the United States is involved.  Fourteen statements were 
issued about the conflict in Iraq and eight about the conflict in Afghanistan, compared to only 
two about the conflicts with the next highest level of publicity, the Eritrea-Ethiopia border war 
and the NATO-Serbian war (in which, of course, the United States was involved).  Thus, the 
ICRC appears willing to challenge its chief governmental donor.  What about the organization's 
other top contributors? To take one year, 2002, the top governmental contributors were, in order, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, and 
Canada.  Quite obviously, the U.S. aside, this list does not include states that tend to be actively 
involved in military conflicts, though all except Switzerland and Japan are members of NATO 
and thus were involved in the Kosovo intervention in some form.  Thus, with the significant 
exception of the United States, the states that constitute the organization's greatest contributors 
tend not to be involved in wars and thus not at great risk of ICRC publicity.  
Thus, while some evidence appears to exist for a state-centric bias on the part of the 
ICRC, no clear evidence exists that the organization is biased towards the specific sources of its 
funding.  Again, the caveat remains that it is impossible to definitively state that greater publicity 
wouldn't take place were the U.S. less financially significant to the organization.  If we accept, 
however, that at least U.S. funding doesn't fully motivate the ICRC to stay quiet, there is still a 
question of how to interpret this state of affairs.  It may be that the ICRC doesn't find it likely 
that the U.S. will withdraw its funding and so doesn't fear this particular consequence, or it may 




predicted.  Despite the general evidence that the ICRC isn't fully silenced by the U.S.'s financial 
contributions, in a later section I consider one case in which it appears that U.S. power and 
financial contributions, while not completely silencing the organization, may have reduced the 
degree of publicity wielded by the organization.    
Access vs. Publicity 
Recall, from above, the hypothesis that the ICRC would be more likely to "go public" 
about refusal to grant access than about persistent violations, as access is the main avenue by 
which the organization expects to exert influence on state behavior.  Here evidence pointed in the 
contrary direction, with the ICRC being more likely to "go public" about violation than about 
access.  Thus, the initial hypothesis was rejected in favor of its opposite.  First, consider the 
numerical patterns of ICRC new releases.  Return again to Tables 4.2. and 4.3.  News releases 
were classified according to the relevant subject(s) which they addressed. Releases that 
mentioned IHL violations or warned about the danger of possible violations were coded with a 
"V," while those that addressed the state or warring group's provision of access to the ICRC or 
other humanitarian organizations were coded with an "A."  Review of the empirical material also 
suggested two other topics that had not been considered in the preliminary hypotheses.  Releases 
that addressed potential violations of humanitarian neutrality, for instance attacks on vehicles 
bearing the Red Cross emblem, were coded as "HN."  Those that focused exclusively or 
primarily on the provision of humanitarian relief or assistance were coded as "Hum."  Releases 
that addressed more than one of these elements were assigned all of the applicable designations.  
Table 4.8 displays the number of news releases that received each designation.  The vast 
majority concerned issues of violation, while significantly fewer addressed issues of access or 




the relative frequency of these phenomena in the empirical world.  That is, if states are more 
likely to commit egregious violations than they are to deny the ICRC access, then the more 
frequent statements of publicity in regard to violation may say relatively little about the strategic 
decisions made by the organization.  Yet, given the significant number of states that deny the 
organization access, especially in civil war contexts, it is unlikely this is the case.  Further 
support for this hypothesis is found in proportions - of the five conflicts examined here in which 
the state demonstrates low access, the ICRC "went public" about only one (20%) of them.  This 
case, the first Russia-Chechnya conflict, will be discussed in more detail later.  It is something of 
an outlier because, though Russia granted no access early in the conflict, rebel groups granted 
partial access, which may have changed the strategic calculations faced by the ICRC.  In 
contrast, of the high access conflicts, publicity was used in 6 out of 16 conflicts (37.5%).  It is 
not altogether clear how this difference should be interpreted, especially given the possibility that 
the high access conflicts differ from the low access conflicts in significant ways.  However, as 
will be discussed below, one main way in which these conflicts differ, by the average number of 
battle deaths suffered within, does not appear to exert a significant influence on publicity 
decisions.  The primary potential confounding variable is the culturalist variable related to Islam, 
which will be discussed further below.  Still, thus far the evidence supports the contention that 
the ICRC is more likely to respond to lack of access with silence than with publicity, contra my 
earlier prediction that publicity should be particularly likely in response to a state's denial of 
access.  
What led the initial hypothesis astray? While the recognition of the centrality of access to 
the organization's humanitarian philosophy was clearly correct, what was incorrect was the 




access.  Instead, it appears that, particularly for states that are reluctant to grant access, it may be 
especially important for the ICRC to demonstrate its commitment to confidentiality and 
discretion.  
It is also worth highlighting here the significant percentage of news releases that concern 
violations of humanitarian neutrality, for instance attacks on Red Cross employees or violations 
of the Red Cross emblem.  Though publicity in regard to violations of humanitarian neutrality 
was not part of the original hypotheses, such violations appear to be one circumstance in which 
the organization is particularly likely to "go public." 16% - 17% of the news releases issued 
during the time period studied here concern such violations.  Somewhat unsurprisingly, the 
organization is likely to respond to such acts with particularly strong language, using such terms 
as "shocked," "appalled" and "deplored" far more frequently than is the case for other occasions. 
Though the original hypotheses highlighted access and violations, echoing the justifications for 
"going public" identified by the ICRC, the organization's emphasis on violations of humanitarian 
neutrality, which might be thought of as one particular breed of violation, seems highly sensible 
in light of the organization's priorities.  This is because violations of humanitarian neutrality 
threaten the ability of the organization to do its work to a greater extent than do other types of 
violations.  This is particularly the case when such violations are extensive enough that they 
jeopardize the ability of the organization to responsibly stay in the field at acceptable cost to the 
security of its staff and resources.  It is not uncommon for the organization to announce its horror 
at the death of a member of its staff (or even the staff of another humanitarian organization) and 
announce a withdrawal from the geographic area in which this event took place.  For instance, 
the ICRC withdrew from East Timor in 2000 after the killing of several members of the staff of 




such acts can hinder not only the ICRC's IHL monitoring activities but also its substantial relief 
activities.  Such violations of humanitarian neutrality are also intriguing because they often 
present particular conundrums for the attribution of responsibility.  On the one hand, in cases of 
intrastate conflict, the perpetrators of violence against protected humanitarians is most often - 
though certainly not always - committed by non-state actors.  However, the state is not 
completely off the hook in such cases because of the expectation that the state provide security 
guarantees for humanitarians operating in its territory.  To the extent that the state is unable to 
provide this, it is not quite fulfilling its stately duties.  Of course, it is little surprise if in cases of 
civil war the state is only imperfectly able to provide such guarantees.  
 A related context in which the organization appears highly likely to issue a press 
statement concerns state misuse of ICRC documents or information.  For instance, the ICRC 
publicly criticized Eritrea in the spring of 1999 for attempting to use the ICRC to buttress its 
claim that a prisoner of war held by Ethiopia had died partly because of the mistreatment he 
received at the hands of the Ethiopian authorities.  The ICRC stated that it "deplored" this misuse 
of its information, as it had visited this prisoner and was in a position to state that the "allegations 
as to the death causes are unfounded" (ICRC, News Release 99/12). The organization has long 
reserved the right to release its confidential reports if a state erroneously cites ICRC reports or 
quotes from documents in a misleading or politicized manner.  Such an action is another type of 
threat to the organization's humanitarian neutrality, and this is a violation to which the 
organization again tends to respond strongly.  In the empirical world this violation of 
humanitarian neutrality appears to be less frequent than attacks on humanitarian staff, most likely 
because this is an action much more amenable to centralized control.  In most cases a state or 




violence against humanitarian staff or property is easily committed by individual actors absent 
the sanction of the state or rebel group.
92
  
Another type of news release frequently issued by the ICRC warrants further examination 
here.  There are numerous examples in the list of news releases collected here of the ICRC 
issuing rather generic reminders to the belligerents of their obligations under IHL.  To some 
extent, these reminders might be viewed as indications of violations, though they typically avoid 
the politically contentious task of identifying particular parties as violators.  Still, it seems that 
the ICRC is particularly likely to issue these pleas for compliance when there is evidence of 
intense fighting and likely IHL violations.  If it's unclear to what extent "naming and shaming" is 
an efficacious strategy for improving compliance, it is even harder to imagine that these general 
exhortations toward IHL compliance are effective.  Perhaps they are intended to remind states 
that someone is watching and that there will be repercussions for noncompliance.  Yet, it's 
unlikely that these soft reminders would exert an effect if the more tough-minded statements of 
the "naming and shaming" organizations do not.  There are two other possible explanations for 
this behavior.  One focuses on the particular psychology (or organizational culture, depending on 
the unit of analysis) of the organization as an explanation for action; the other focuses on the 
larger audiences for the activities of the organization.  On the one hand, it is obvious that the 
leadership of the ICRC is normatively committed to facilitating compliance with IHL and is 
pained by its violation.  Thus, it may be quite difficult to do nothing in situations in which 
violation occurs, even if the strategic milieu does not justify "going public" in a more direct way.  
Thus, these somewhat vague reminders may be a way for the members of the organization to do 
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something in situations that are obviously problematic.  On the other hand, it may be that the 
organization is less motivated by its own psychological needs and more concerned by the 
conclusions key audiences will draw from the organization's silence in the face of known 
violations.  
Algeria: A Case of Silence in the Absence of Access  
To further illuminate the relationship between access and publicity, an illustrative case of 
ICRC silence in the face of persistent state refusal to grant access is discussed.  Table 4.9. sorts 
cases on two dimensions: the level of access the state grants to the ICRC (high or low) and the 
degree of ICRC publicity employed in the conflict (high or low).  Note that, for simplicity's sake, 
cases displaying a mixed level of state access - sometimes high and sometimes low - are 
excluded from this table, though these cases are sometimes considered below as additional 
sources of information.  The access data was obtained from the Jo and Thomson (2013) civil war 
dataset, which codes the level of access granted by states and rebel groups to ICRC prisoner of 
war monitoring.
93
  As Table 4.9 demonstrates, there are four low access/low publicity cases: the 
Second Turkish Kurds War, the Algerian Civil War, the First Congo Brazaaville War, and the 
Tajikistan Civil War.
94
  Of the four cases, the First Congo Brazaaville War involved far fewer 
combatant deaths than did the other three and is thus not a good choice for an illustrative case 
analysis.  I choose here to consider the Algerian case because, like the Tajikistan war, it was a 
major war for control of the state and displayed a high number of IHL violations.  Importantly, 
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Note that, with 3 news releases issued in regard to the civil war in Tajikistan, it is not entirely clear that it should 
be considered a low publicity case.  However, two of these statements bemoan attacks on UN staff members and the 
taking hostage of two ICRC employees. As noted above, publicity in regard to such violations of humanitarian 
neutrality operates according to a somewhat distinct logic from the organization's general publicity decisions.  Thus, 
I continue to classify Tajikistan as a low publicity case.  Still, the existence of some ambiguity over this 




sufficient information is available about the evolving relationship between the ICRC and the 
Algerian state during this conflict.   
Algeria is an excellent example of a case in which, in the midst of significant and 
horrifying humanitarian violations, the ICRC was granted little to no access to the warring 
parties, but largely stayed mum about it.  Here it is important to make a distinction among types 
of publicity.  In this chapter, publicity has been defined as the organization's active recourse to 
media outlets via the particular medium of the news release.  Recall that the previous chapter 
focused, not on publicity per se, but on access as measured by the organization's statements in its 
annual reports.  In that chapter I grappled with the paradox of writing about a confidential 
organization while making use of publicly available materials.  Here that paradox returns 
although in a somewhat distinct manner.  Though what is written in the annual reports is 
certainly a public statement of sorts and should be viewed as such, it is nevertheless different 
from the types of sustained publicity campaigns that organizations that employ a "naming and 
shaming" logic commonly utilize.  I also contend here that these reports are qualitatively 
different from the ICRC's own news releases, made in an ad hoc manner and in a way that draws 
singular attention to the state or conflict at hand.  The annual reports are generally designed to 
serve a purpose distinct from naming and shaming.  They provide publicity, not to particular 
governments, but to the organization as a whole, often providing impressive figures about the 
nature and extent of the organization's operations.  The reports may also serve some - albeit soft - 
accountability mechanisms, as disclosure of the sources of the organization's funding and 
detailed breakdowns of that year's expenditures are also regular features of these reports.  These 
reports are likely also used in quite different ways by journalists in comparison to the news 




For example, the 2012 report is over 550 pages.  Even with the division of the document by 
geographic region, a journalist would have to be motivated to wade through a large amount of 
text in hopes of stumbling upon a good story.  The news releases, in contrast, are often just a few 
hundred words and are often released as part of press conferences obviously designed by their 
nature to attract publicity.  Thus, there is good reason not to think of the content of the annual 
reports as akin to the content of the news releases defined here as indicators of a "going public" 
strategy.  
This distinction is important for evaluating the hypothesis made above about the 
organization's tendency to "go public" about access versus violation.  Algeria in the midst of its 
brutal civil war is a good contender for both types of publicity.  The widespread violations of 
IHL made by both the regime and the opposition have been well-documented (Kaylvas 1999, 
Stora 2001, Hafez 2004), and for many years the regime refused to grant the ICRC access.  Why, 
then, in such a context, did the organization remain silent?  It is consistent with the organization's 
belief that access is paramount that it treat tentatively states already reluctant to grant access. 
There may be an expectation ( a reasonable one, at that) that "shaming" states about their refusal 
to grant access is unlikely to persuade them that granting access is in their interest.  At stake here 
is the credibility of the organization's commitment to confidential operations, which is its 
primary source of leverage when attempting to persuade states to grant access within the delicate 
arena of security.  How can one convince the state that the organization will treat the results of 
its monitoring missions confidentially except in extremely exigent circumstances if one is 
already shouting from the mountain about the state's refusal to grant access?  Note that, absent 
statements made by the organization in regard to this question, I am left to make inferences about 




however, by the organization's apparent reluctance to "go public" in regard to blatant refusal to 
grant access.      
In 1992 the ICRC's monitoring work in Algeria was halted at the request of the Algerian 
authorities after a series of disagreements between the state and the organization over the terms 
of its visits to detainees.  The organization maintains a set of standards for its detention visits that 
includes the ability to speak with detainees privately without witnesses, visit the entire detention 
facility, and make repeat visits to the same facility (ICRC News Release 98/28).  These criteria 
were objectionable to the Algerian authorities, as they dramatically reduced the state's ability to 
control the information obtained via monitoring.  After the Algerian request to halt its operations, 
the ICRC ceased maintaining a permanent presence in country, but continued to advocate 
bilaterally for the resumption of detention visits.  Algeria agreed in principle to the resumption of 
detention visits in 1998; the first round of renewed visits took place in November and December  
of 1999.  In the interim years the ICRC did not issue press releases about the Algerian situation, 
but chose instead to maintain its quiet diplomacy.  The one exception to this came in the form of 
fairly guarded statements made in the annual reports.  For instance, in the 1996 annual report, the 
ICRC acknowledged the "serious violence" that was taking place in country and mentioned its 
dialogue with the authorities over detention visits, reporting that "only very limited progress was 
achieved" (ICRC Annual Report 1996).  Once the regime agreed in principle to the resumption 
of visits, a statement was made to this effect.     
Though a potential rationale for the organization's discretion in this case is obvious, also 
obvious are the potential unintended consequences of such a policy.  The Algerian state in effect 
kicked out the ICRC at the height of its civil war and invited it back in once it had virtually 




back in, an outcome that the organization then celebrated.  It is this dynamic that leads critics to 
worry that the policy of discretion employed by the ICRC allows it to be captured by powerful 
states.  In such cases, rather than incentivizing greater compliance with IHL, the ICRC may 
instead find itself granting a rubber stamp of approval to a regime in the aftermath of widespread 
and pernicious violations.  On the other hand, it may be that there is little monitors can do to halt 
violation when military strategic incentives for it are so high.  In such a situation, perhaps the 
best the ICRC can do is wait until the incentives for violation are lower and seek to improve state 
behavior on the margins in this more benign context.  Of course, this is certainly not the agenda 
the organization would wish to endorse.  Also, one wonders if sustained publicity to demand 
access - something the organization seems reluctant to do - might sometimes be efficacious.  
The Empowering Effect of Consistent Access 
There is another side to the access story.  Though the organization is particularly quiet 
with states that do not grant it access, it is on the other hand quite loquacious in regard to states 
with a firm history of granting access.  In the time period studied here, there are two states that 
stand out as being particularly likely to be targets of ICRC publicity.  As noted above, in the 
small sample of interstate wars addressed during this time period, wars involving the United 
States are subject to far more publicity than are other wars.  In the domain of intrastate wars, as 
will be discussed in far more detail below, Israel is the clear outlier.  Both of these states are 
robust democracies with a long history of granting access to the organization.  Though it is 
certainly not the case that these states always grant perfect access, it is perhaps quite unlikely 
that either state will retaliate against ICRC criticism by completing withdrawing its access.  This 
awareness in turn emboldens the organization vis-à-vis these states.  Note that I have highlighted 




democracy, and the state's particular history of contact with the organization.  This raises the 
question of which of these two variables is most significant.  As will be discussed further below, 
there is no evidence that democracy itself predicts either state access or ICRC publicity 
decisions.  Some states consistently coded as democracies, such as India, demonstrate low or 
intermittent access.  Consistent with the logic articulated above, the ICRC tends to remain 
relatively quiet about such states.  It's less clear whether consistent access in the absence of 
democracy produces any particular effect.  Among the nondemocratic countries granting the 
ICRC a high level of access  - Iraq, Rwanda, and Liberia, among others - there are examples of 
both high and low publicity, with these outcomes being more or less equally likely.  Thus, the 
evidence so far is most consistent with the argument that it is the combination of democracy and 
access, rather than either of these variables alone, that results in increased publicity on the part of 
the ICRC.  
Another source of evidence on the relationship between access and publicity can be 
found in recurring conflicts that allow us to observe how ICRC publicity decisions might change 
over a period of consistent interaction with a state.  As Table 4.10 indicates, there are eight 
examples during the time period examined here of conflicts that end and then recur at a later 
date, such as the First and Second Sierra Leone War or the Second and Third Aceh War.  Given 
the degree to which the ICRC values contact and employs a logic of humanitarian change in 
which interaction leads to improvements in humanitarian outcomes, these instances in which the 
relationship between the state and the ICRC unfolds across several periods of conflict are 




publicity to hold constant across iterations of conflict.
95
  However, there are several instances in 
which the ICRC increases its level of publicity in subsequent iterations of a conflict, often in 
parallel with increasing access on the part of the warring state.  This pattern is demonstrated, for 
instance, across the two Sierra Leone wars and three Liberian wars included in this sample. 
Notably, there are no examples of the reverse pattern, that is of the organization employing less 
publicity in subsequent iterations of conflict.  While this evidence is somewhat ambiguous, it 
suggests that a dynamic of increasing access and publicity can sometimes unfold between states 
and the ICRC over time.  In such instances, continued access makes the ICRC more, not less, 
prone to use publicity.  This is consistent with the earlier arguments I've made about the 
consequences of access and the lack thereof.     
Neutrality, Islam, and the ICRC 
Hypotheses 7 and 8 predicted particular restraint on the part of the ICRC in conflicts in 
which a politicized strand of Islam constituted a salient dimension.  Here I evaluate the evidence 
for this hypothesis in the context of the main competing hypotheses.   
Review Table 4.9, which sorts cases according to level of state access and level of ICRC 
publicity.  Tables 4.11 through 4.15 display relevant statistics for cases in each quadrant.  What 
is most striking here is how difficult it is to find any pattern that explains publicity versus 
silence.  The obvious contenders - number of casualties, level of democracy, extent of 
compliance with the law of war - fall short.  Table 4.11 lists those conflicts alongside 
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and character of the warring parties - particularly the opposition - to change significantly over time.  The use of this 
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However, that Correlates of War has chosen to name the conflicts sequentially is indication of some common thread 
across these conflicts that has consequences for the relationship that the ICRC develops with the warring parties, 




information about the number of battle deaths suffered in each conflict.
96
  As is consistent with 
the results from the previous chapter, it appears that access is less likely in conflicts with larger 
numbers of battle deaths.  The average number of battle deaths in the low access conflicts was 
slightly over 13,000, compared to an average of about 2,600 in the high access conflicts.  
However, this variable doesn't appear to have a dramatic effect on publicity decisions.  On 
average, the low publicity conflicts evidence higher numbers of battle deaths, though the 
difference is sufficiently small (about 1,200 casualties) that it's difficult to know if it would be 
significant were the data subjected to statistical analysis.  Interestingly, the apparent relationship 
between lower battle deaths and publicity is largely driven by the low access conflicts, as the 
high access, high publicity conflicts actually have on average more battle deaths than the high 
access but low publicity conflicts.  That is, the way in which low access dampens publicity 
appears again to be evident here.  
Democracy similarly falls short in distinguishing cases of access versus publicity, and 
here there is not even evidence for an effect of the variable on access.  As Table 4.12 
demonstrates, states across the range from highly autocratic to highly democratic are present in 
each of the quadrants, with the exception of the sparsely attended (only 1 case) low access/high 
publicity quadrant, and the mean polity level in each cell, again with that one exception, 
approaches equivalence at around -2.   One pattern that does manifest here is that a much larger 
number of high access cases receive a standardized authority score from Polity.  These scores are 
assigned for one of three conditions: control over the state apparatus is usurped by foreign 
influence, state authority has collapsed into anarchy, or a regime transition is underway that 
makes classifying the government type impossible (Marshall and Jaggers 2007).  The assignation 
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of these codes may be viewed as indication of higher conflict severity insofar as they indicate 
that the state has been radically transformed and, at least in the former two cases, is no longer 
able to fulfill the essential functions of statehood.  That a measure of higher conflict intensity 
would predict higher access is something of a surprise and consistent with the argument made in 
the previous chapter that states may sometimes have incentive to use access insincerely to obtain 
political benefit.  However, again, though the variable appears to be associated with access, it 
doesn't appear to explain publicity versus silence.  In the high access/low publicity quadrant, 
there are three cases that received standardized authority codes, in this case all the interregnum 
score indicative of complete collapse of authority.  In the high access/high publicity quadrant, 
there are also three cases receiving an interregnum score but in addition two cases receiving a 
transition score.  There is thus a slightly higher number of cases receiving a standardized coding 
when publicity is employed compared to when it isn't, though it is difficult to judge in this case 
the significance of this fact.  Interestingly, when one includes the conflicts in which states 
engaged in mixed access, sometimes high and sometimes low, during the course of the conflict, 
one again finds this pattern in which higher proportions of the "publicity" cases have received a 
standardized coding from Polity.  This may provide some evidence that this particular measure 
of the severity of conflict - unlike a proxy like number of battle deaths - is correlated with ICRC 
publicity decisions. 
Nor does it appear that a straightforward measure of compliance explains the  patterns of 
access and publicity evident here.  While data on civil war compliance as thorough and well-
documented as that provided by Morrow and Jo for interstate war is not yet available, some 
useful data fortunately exists.  First, the CIRI (Cignranelli, Richard, and Clay 2013) physical 






  Additionally, details about the extent of anti-civilian strategies employed by 
governments and rebel groups were gleaned from Jessica Stanton's dissertation on civil wars 
(2008).  As the treatment of civilians is an important law of war issue area having significant 
substantive impact on the quality and quantity of human life, focus on this aspect of the law of 
war is justifiable even though it is obviously only part of the broader domain of the law.
98
  As 
Table 4.13 indicates, these measures of law of war compliance do not explain patterns of access 
or publicity on the part of the ICRC.  A number of wars in each quadrant employ the anti-civilian 
strategies of coercion and cleansing, and average CIRI scores for high publicity, low publicity, 
high access, and low access conflicts, respectively, all hover near 1 (indicative, unsurprisingly of 
a very low level of respect for physical integrity rights), with a range of 1.04 to 1.39.    
Drawing on the recent and intriguing work of Jo and Thomson (2013), the possible 
effects of rebel group access on state and publicity access decisions were also considered, with 
relevant data displayed in Table 4.14.  Consistent with an expectation of reciprocity, rebel access 
appears to be more likely when the state itself grants a high level of access.
99
  It's important to 
note, however, that this could be an artifact of the circumstances in which the ICRC itself 
attempts to secure access from rebel groups, as there is significant variation in this regard and the 
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compliance rather than specifically law of war compliance. However, in the absence of more specific data this 
measure does provide some clue about the state's propensity toward extrajudicial use of violence.  In some contexts, 
as when the opposition is a significant cross-section of the citizenry, the CIRI measure and law of war compliance 
will be very closely related; in all civil war contexts violations of the law on civilian targeting should be reflected in 
the CIRI score.    
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 Note that only some of the conflicts considered here were classified in the Stanton dissertation.  Where her 
classifications are available, they are included in the table. What is noteworthy here is that there are several 
examples of anti-civilian strategies (coercion, cleansing, and restrained coercion) in each of the quadrants.  
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 However, it is not altogether clear that reciprocity is the expectation in civil wars, as there is a fundamental legal 
and political inequality between the contending parties that might render implausible some of the institutionalist 
predictions that are relevant for interstate wars. For instance, given rebel groups' interest under certain conditions in 
accruing legitimacy points by adopting some of the behaviors expected of states, there may sometimes especially be 




"none" category here elides both cases in which access was sought but not received and cases in 
which access was not sought.  That is, it is possible that the ICRC is more likely to seek access 
from rebel groups when some minimum level of access from the state has already been secured.  
However, it is worth noting that in two conflicts in which states consistently denied access - the 
Turkish-Kurds War and the Algerian Civil War - some partial access from rebel groups was 
obtained.  In comparing the patterns of rebel access across ICRC publicity decisions, there is 
modest evidence that higher levels of rebel access may be associated with greater organization 
publicity.  The primary piece of evidence in this regard is the comparatively higher percentage of 
high publicity conflicts (approximately 43%) in which rebel groups consistently grant full access 
compared to the percentage of low publicity conflicts (approximately 21%) in which such a 
pattern is evident.  This finding is consistent with the argument made earlier about the way in 
which access can be empowering to the ICRC.  Once full state access and rebel access are 
secured, it stands to reason that one source of restraint in regard to publicity - remaining quiet so 
that the organization's promise of confidential operation is credible - is removed.  
Though battle deaths, democracy, and law of war compliance all prove unable to explain 
patterns of access versus compliance, the salience of politicized Islam does appear to exert a 
significant effect on both access and publicity.
100
  First, note the way in which Islam appears 
relevant to state access decisions.  Four of the five cases of low access (80%) are cases in which 
Islam is culturally relevant, either because the state is a Muslim majority state (in the case of 
Turkey), because politicized Islam is a central dimension of the conflict (in the case of 
Chechnya), or because both of these conditions hold (in the case of Algeria and Tajikistan).  In 
comparison, only 40% of the high access states meet these conditions.  This suggests that the 
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ICRC may indeed face a credibility problem in the Muslim world.  Moreover, this variable, 
unlike the battle deaths variable, not only exerts an effect on access but also exerts an effect on 
publicity.  57% of the low publicity conflicts meet the criteria stated above, while only a third of 
the high publicity conflicts do.  This may actually underestimate the effect of politicized Islam 
on publicity insofar as several of the high publicity cases took place in Muslim majority 
countries engaged in conflicts in which a politicized variant of Islam was not salient.  I employed 
the Muslim majority criterion for reasons of consistency and to mitigate post-hoc bias, to which a 
variable like salience of politicized Islam is highly vulnerable.  Yet, it is really the salience of a 
strand of politicized Islam in a conflict that I expect to be most relevant to the ICRC's decisions, 
not such objective characteristics as the proportion of a state's population that identifies with a 
particular religious affiliation.  Such an objective fact, however, may be useful as a quick proxy 
for the conflicts in which a particular cultural or ideological conflict is more likely to be 
activated.  
Why is the salience of politicized Islam in a conflict relevant to ICRC publicity 
decisions?  The origins of the ICRC in European civil society pose a certain liability and a 
potential obstacle to the acceptance of its claims of neutrality.
101
  This liability, ever potentially 
present, may nevertheless pose greater challenges in some contexts compared to others.  
Conflicts in which some of the contenders employ - either sincerely or strategically - broad 
critiques of "Western" imperialism, secularism, and decadence may create particular dilemmas 
for the organization.  This dilemma may be especially salient in wars that pit Western powers 
against Islamists.  In contexts in which at least some belligerents reject any Western influence as 
imperialist, the organization is hard pressed to demonstrate its independence from Western 
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powers such as the United States and Israel.  Thus, given the likelihood that these robustly 
democratic Western states are unlikely to abruptly discontinue relations with the ICRC, 
incentives shift towards using publicity as a way of demonstrating that the organization is not 
decidedly in the pocket of the Western powers.  This highlights the important point that the 
ICRC's much-touted and highly valued neutrality, if in fact it can be said to exist, is not a natural 
state of affairs but instead a hard-won and continually imperiled achievement.   
Let me be clear here lest I be read as endorsing Huntington's controversial "clash of 
civilizations" argument (1996).  I do not agree that there are essential and fundamental 
differences among the groups that Huntington classifies as "civilizations," nor do I agree that 
differences among such groups will necessarily be central sources of conflict in the near future.  
However, I do believe that at least some of the actors involved in salient recent conflicts, such as 
the U.S.' war in Iraq, either believe or wish to be seen as believing that the conflict is partially or 
largely a conflict between the forces of the West and the forces of Islam.  This makes this 
dimension of conflict salient to at least some of the important actors in the conflict and also puts 
the ICRC in the position of needing to demonstrate its independence from the Western pole if it 
wishes to be able to work productively in this context.     
Moreover, I do not claim that there is any "natural" tension between the humanitarian 
work of the ICRC and Islam.  The red crescent as an alternative to the red cross was first used in 
the 1877 conflict between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, and there is a long history of 
cooperation between the ICRC and the Muslim world.  Rather than being an inevitable conflict, 
the salience of the organization as a representative of the "West" is largely the result of particular 
political contexts in which some insurgent groups adopt an ideology that views actors like the 




increased salience of such views is indicated in the increase in the number of humanitarian 
workers that have been killed in recent decades, often as the result of intentional targeting 
strategies (see, for instance, the Aid Worker Security Report 2012).  
Evidence exists that the ICRC is itself concerned about its perception in the Muslim 
world. In a 2005 essay in the International Review of the Red Cross, Andreas Wigger, ICRC 
Deputy Director of Operations, addressed the obstacles to effective humanitarian operations that 
exist in political contexts in which many organizations - the ICRC included - associated with the 
West are inherently suspect.  He notes that, "depending on the context [international 
organizations] may be suspected of proselytizing, acting as agents for western governments or 
promoting secularism and selective human rights (p. 365)."  Unsurprisingly, Wigger notes that 
these problems were exacerbated by the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.  He also 
identifies the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the war in Chechnya, and the conflict over Kashmir - 
several of the conflicts highlighted in this chapter  - as particularly polarizing contexts that create 
acute dilemmas for the ICRC.  Of course, Wigger doesn't suggest that these obstacles are 
insurmountable for the organization but rather argues that the organization must work especially 
hard to prove its neutrality in such contexts.  I argue here that one way in which it may do so is 
via astute decisions about the use of publicity.   
Still, the general prediction made above of less publicity in conflicts in which Islam is 
politically salient overlooks the potential for the ICRC to strategically use publicity in these 
contexts in order to accrue capital with Muslim audiences.  For instance, in contexts such as 
Algeria in which the state faces Islamist opposition, the assumption that the ICRC is concerned 
with Muslim audiences might lead to a prediction of publicity directed against the government, 




the exception of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (see below), is somewhat puzzling.  There are 
several possible answers to this puzzle.  First, given the organization's general preference for 
silence over publicity, silence may be a less risky means of avoiding charges of either anti-
Muslim bias or its opposite.  Moreover, given that being vocal in a particular direction is apt to 
come with the risk of alienating other key audiences and compromising perceptions of one's 
neutrality, such a move may only appear worthwhile in conflicts with a high degree of salience 
internationally.  This is a key part of the explanation for the organization's unusually high degree 
of publicity vis-à-vis Israel, discussed further below.
102
  
The ICRC and Israel 
The extent to which the organization has openly criticized Israel is something of a 
surprise.  As noted above, in the 2000 - 2005 period, the number of "asymmetrical criticisms" 
welded against Israel far surpasses the number directed against any other state.  In that period, 
33% of all "asymmetrical criticisms" and 65% of asymmetrical criticisms directed against states 
(which, per the discussion above, are generally rarer than are asymmetrical criticisms of non-
state actors) were directed against Israel.  This is the case though the violence occurring there 
was far below the COW threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.  It's also worth noting 
that the extent of the organization's publicity against Israel greatly increased from the 1995-1999 
period, when there was only one asymmetric criticism directed against them. 
Indeed, ICRC publicity in the late 1990s looks quite different from coverage after about 
the year 2000.  As the hypothesis above about a state-centric bias would lead one to expect, what 
is most common in the late '90s is the occasional criticism of attacks on civilians committed by 
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non-state actors against Israel.  Two such criticisms were made in 1995 and 1996 (ICRC News 
Releases 95/41 and 96/8), though also in 1996 one statement criticized Israel for shelling in 
Lebanon, taking issue with Israel's warning that an entire region should be evacuated to avoid 
civilian casualties (ICRC News Release 96/14).  An additional statement released that year rather 
even-handedly criticized both the launching of rockets into Israel and Israeli retaliation in 
Lebanon (International Review of the Red Cross No. 312).  1997 witnesses one sole Israeli-
centered press release, again a criticism of deaths caused by attacks committed by non-state 
actors in Israel (ICRC News Release 97/22).  
However, the tenor of coverage changed markedly after the year 2000, with the ICRC 
targeting Israel in an increasingly heavy-handed manner.  Notably, this increased tenacity against 
Israel coincided with the start of the second Intifida, or Palestinian uprising, in September of 
2000 (Pressman 2003; Schweitzer 2010). Though two statements issued in 2000 continue the 
even-handed policies characteristic of the 1990s, a statement released in October of 2000 is 
representative of a definitive shift in the tone of the ICRC vis-à-vis Israel.  This statement, 
ostensibly an operational update, praises the work of the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) 
for "working tirelessly to alleviate suffering and to save lives, despite dramatically depleting 
means (ICRC News Release 00/01)."  The same release criticizes Israel, though not by name, for 
preventing the PRCS from entering certain areas or travelling between cities and mentions, 
though again without identifying a perpetrator, that a number of PRCS ambulances were hit by 
rubber bullets as well as by live ammunition.  During the next fifteen months, an intriguing 
controversy plays out in ICRC headlines around the PRCS, though throughout it the ICRC 
retains a remarkable degree of consistency in its support for the humanitarian work conducted by 




of neutral humanitarianism.  Just a few weeks after releasing this statement of praise, the ICRC 
publicly acknowledges claims made by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) that the PRCS had been 
involved in shooting incidents and expresses its "grave concern" about these accusations.  Still, 
in this brief press release, the organization acknowledges the accusation but also notes the PRCS' 
denial of any such involvement, mentioning also that only one week previous the PRCS had been 
the first to treat two Israeli soldiers injured in an accident (ICRC News Release 01-11-2000). 
Though no later public statements ever offered any resolution to these disputes, another cycle of 
similar accusations and acknowledgements took place the following year when this time an 
ICRC delegate was there to witness the confiscation of explosive material from a PRCS 
ambulance.  The ICRC statement that it was "shocked and dismayed" by this development came 
just weeks after several statements reporting the deaths of PRCS workers and criticizing Israel in 
no uncertain terms for the actions that had led to these deaths (ICRC News Release 27-03-2002).  
Moreover, just a day after registering its shock about this development, the organization issued a 
statement detailing the "disastrous" effect of the Israeli-imposed closure of Der Ibzi'e (ICRC 
News Release 02/13).  Issuing a statement critical of Israeli policy one day after a damning 
accusation is made against the PRCS constitutes curious timing to say the least.  Moreover, just a 
week later, in a statement regretting injuries of medical personnel on both sides, the organization 
again registered its "alarm" at the conditions imposed by the IDF on the PRCS as well as on the 
ICRC itself.  By April 12, the ICRC returned its focus decidedly to Israeli violations of 
humanitarian neutrality, condemning "the humiliations imposed" on the PRCS medical staff by 
the Israeli forces and charging Israeli soldiers with use of PRCS staff as human shields (ICRC 
News Release 12-04-2002).  Thus, in a situation in which serious and credible charges of 




acknowledging these accusations, continues to highlight the successes of that organization and to 
direct its criticism primarily to Israeli activities.  While this does not amount to unambiguous 
evidence that the ICRC is "biased," it does point to particular strategic choices made by the 
ICRC.  Given the circumstances, some might argue that Israeli restrictions on ambulances 
constitute a reasonable security precaution.  Thus, for the ICRC to be so vocal in this controversy 
and so consistent in its support for the PRCS and its criticism of Israeli security measures is 
noteworthy.  
Another indication of the tone of ICRC coverage in regard to Israel at this time is the 
frequency with which the organization criticizes Israeli state policies as violations of IHL.  As 
discussed above, it is rare for the organization to entertain these types of policy critiques.  Yet, in 
the Israeli case, the ICRC increasingly vocalizes its displeasure with security measures taken by 
Israel in the Occupied and Autonomous Territories.  The Israeli policies criticized by the ICRC 
are numerous: closure and curfews imposed upon Palestinian villages (04/12/2002), 
mistreatment of medical personnel and ambulances, detention of Palestinians outside occupied 
territory (08/15/2002), targeted killings (09/10/2003), the erection of the West Bank barrier 
(02/2004), and widespread destruction of homes (05/2004).  The ICRC is not shy about labeling 
these actions as violations of IHL and goes so far as to attribute the general collapse of the 
Palestinian economy to illegal Israeli policies in the occupied territories (06/2003).  Additionally, 
the tone of several of these statements departs from the understated objectivity that is 
characteristic of ICRC news releases, as the ICRC begins to employ the journalistic tools of 
personalization and narrative to emphasize the plight of the Palestinians.  For instance, in 
October of 2003, the ICRC reported on a wedding celebrated under relief tents for several 




03/134).  In another statement issued around the same time, the organization quotes at length a 
61-year-old man who lost the home in which he had been living with fourteen members of his 
family (ICRC News Release 03/129).  Thus, ICRC publicity in regard to Israel is atypical 
according to both quantitative and qualitative criteria.  Such an outlier clearly demands an 
explanation.  
Importantly, the ICRC was certainly not compensating for the reluctance of other 
organizations to "name and shame" Israel.  Alongside the United States, Israel consistently tops 
the list of states targeted by the naming and shaming efforts of human rights organizations (Ron 
et al. 2005).  This makes the ICRC's actions even more puzzling.  Why jeopardize access by 
violating its confidentiality policy when other organizations are clearly performing this function? 
Why bandwagon in this way?   
One possible explanation is that the organization is motivated to demonstrate to important 
audiences that it is not captured by this powerful state.  In this case, in a conflict polarized along 
what Huntington (1996) would call civilizational lines, the goal may be to avoid charges of bias 
against the "Arab-Islamist" community.  As mentioned above, it is also possible that the 
organization targets Israel to such a degree because it knows that such behavior will not result in 
Israel's refusal to continue granting access.  However, though this might explain why the ICRC is 
not sufficiently deterred from going public against Israel, it still doesn't explain what positive end 
it hopes to gain in so doing, especially considering the organization's general skepticism about 
the efficacy of publicity.  What's more, there remains the question of why the organization would 
risk compromising access in other parts of the world by demonstrating all too much willingness 
to resort to publicity in this particular case.  It is possible that particular aspects of the conflict in 




conclusions about the organization's general policy from its particular behavior in that context.  
Perhaps just as during the Cold War it was imperative that the ICRC signal that it was not 
captured by the West, so too given the most salient dimensions of conflict today the ICRC 
believes it imperative to demonstrate a lack of bias against Muslims or in favor of powerful 
"Western" states such as Israel and the United States. 
Comparing ICRC Publicity in Israel and Turkey          
In evaluating the intensity of the organization's criticism of Israel, it is useful to compare 
the organization's criticism here to its degree of publicity against another state engaged in a 
domestic conflict with some parallels to the Israeli situation.  Turkey has faced armed resistance 
from Kurdish separatist militants since 1984.
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  Like Israel, it has faced competing demands 
between the incentives for anti-civilian strategies created by its separatist opponents and the 
constraints imposed on its domestic military operations by both its own democratic institutions 
and the watchful eye of key international actors.  Indeed, in her thoughtful analysis of the 
circumstances under which both states and rebel groups engage in anti-civilian strategies or, 
alternately, strategies of restraint, Stanton (2008) classifies Turkey and Israel similarly as 
democratic states that have used restrained strategies of coercion against civilians.  This 
somewhat paradoxical notion of "restrained coercion" describes government destruction of 
homes and villages of the separatists' co-ethnics, on the one hand, alongside attempts to prevent 
mass civilian casualties on the other.  For instance, the Turkish government would arrive at a 
Kurdish village, force the civilians to flee, and then burn the village to the ground, sometimes 
sparing one solitary home (Amnesty International, 30 June 1993).  How similar are the two 
conflicts in terms of the intensity of the security challenged faced?  Though Turkey has suffered 
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more casualties than Israel since 1990, the Israeli casualties constitute a greater percentage of 
Israel's total population.  Still, there is no indication that these conflicts are radically different in 
terms of level of military intensity or strategic threat.  
Despite significant similarities between the nature of the military challenge faced by the 
two states and the means with which they have attempted to respond to this challenge, the ICRC 
has responded to the two states with dramatically different degrees of publicity.  As noted above, 
the ICRC has directed an unusual amount of publicity against Israel, particularly after year 2000. 
In contrast, during the ten year period surveyed here (1995-2005), the ICRC released only one 
news release about the situation in Turkey, in March of 1995. The headline of the release was a 
generic "call for compliance," and the text was equally gentle, with the exception of reiterating 
the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention in occupied Iraqi territory and the general 
applicability of common Article 3, which applies to non-international armed conflicts (ICRC 
News Release 1797).
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What explains the dramatically different ways in which these two conflicts were 
addressed by the ICRC?  I argue that two distinctions between these cases explain this 
difference, though in practice it may be hard to disentangle these two factors and determine 
which is causally more significant.  First, Turkey is a case in which the occupying state possesses 
a Muslim majority, in stark contrast to the Israeli case in which the separatists hold this identity.  
Second, in contrast to Israel, which has a history of consistently granting some degree of access 
to the ICRC, Turkey did not at any time during the duration of the conflict grant the organization 
access.  This is consistent with the argument I made earlier that the ICRC is likely to be gentler 
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with countries that deny it access so that its bilateral negotiations with the state might be more 
efficacious in improving access.   
This is not to say that the ICRC is never willing to criticize Muslim-majority countries.  
Rather, it appears that a key motivation for its scathing criticism of Israel - gaining credibility in 
the Arab/Muslim
105
 world as an actor willing and able to criticize the humanitarian violations of 
"Western" countries - was absent from Turkey's conflict with its own separatists.   
Of course, there are other differences between these two warring states that could account 
for the ICRC's divergent behavior in regard to publicity.  Obviously, the geopolitical locations of 
these two states is vastly different.  While facing a daunting military environment, Israel benefits 
from a unique relationship with the United States.  Turkey, one of Huntington's "torn countries," 
is poised precariously between the Middle East and Europe.  Its attempts to seek recognition and 
acceptance (and the concrete material benefits attached to those things) from Europe create 
additional incentives for restraint (Inter Press Service, 26 April, 1995).  Thus, another possible 
explanation for the ICRC's disparate publicity strategies in this case is that the ICRC was 
influenced by its awareness that Israel lacked geo-political sources of restraint, which Turkey 
possessed in spades.  I find this explanation less compelling than the explanation I have proffered 
for several reasons.  First, as elaborated above, the humanitarian philosophy of the ICRC is 
skeptical of the utility of publicity as an instrument of change.  Thus, it is unlikely to expect that 
its publicity alone can compare to the institutional pressure exerted, for instance, by the Council 
of Europe on Turkey.  Second, though Israel may indeed occupy a privileged geopolitical 
position in some respects (though not necessarily an enviable one given its security challenges), 
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there is surely no shortage of criticism against Israel from the more vocal humanitarian 
organizations.  Again, this bandwagoning on the part of the ICRC is particularly puzzling given 
its commitment to discretion.  Because of this I think that this behavior on the part of the 
organization is best viewed as the hard work of demonstrating one's neutrality in a context in 
which the very idea of neutrality is challenged.  
To appreciate what might have been driving ICRC decision making here one must 
recognize the unique, polarizing salience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in much of the Arab 
world.  For reasons not altogether clear, the conflict has assumed a symbolic significance far 
beyond the contested territory.
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  This means that the organization stands to gain a great deal 
from the efforts it takes in this context to demonstrate its distance from Israel, a state that, again 
for complex reasons, has become closely associated with the United States and the "West" more 
broadly.  Though, as mentioned above, the ICRC must weigh the possible benefits of publicity 
against its potential costs.    
Comparing ICRC Publicity between Israel and the United States 
The time period studied here features major military conflicts on the part of just two 
stable democracies with a history of granting the ICRC access. This includes Israel, discussed 
above, and the United States, involved in major conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Table 4.7 
reviews the few interstate wars taking place during the time period studied here.  Obviously, if 
just measured by the number of news releases, it is obvious that the ICRC is particularly 
loquacious in regard to the United States.  However, while the ICRC is quite chatty in regard to 
both the United States and Israel, it is far harder on Israel.  In comparison to the 15 asymmetrical 
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criticisms made against Israel, it made only three against the United States.  If one counts all 
critical statements (whether or not they asymmetrically focus on one party in the conflict), the 
United States is criticized in two statements in regard to the invasion of Afghanistan and three in 
regard to Iraq and the larger War on Terror.  The number of criticisms increases if one includes 
the six statements made in the course of the Iraqi invasion to the effect that the ICRC was 
concerned about the plight of civilians.  In comparison, eighteen such statements are made 
against Israel. What's more, the tenor of the statements is quite distinct, with the emotional 
narrative language (discussed above) evident in the criticism of Israel largely absent from the 
criticisms of the U.S., which are generally rather gentle.  
What might explain why the ICRC would be harder on Israel compared to the United 
States?  Here the most compelling explanation concerns power. We must return to the important 
fact that the United States contributes annually a significant percentage of the ICRC's entire 
budget. Thus, its geopolitical power is not just an abstract consideration but a fact directly 
manifest in the ICRC's pragmatic material reality.  Thus, one highly plausible explanation for the 
disparate treatment of these two states concerns the greater potential cost of challenging the 
United States.  Throughout this chapter, I have suggested that it may not be credible for certain 
actors with a long history of cooperation with the ICRC to withdraw support from the 
organization.  In regard to the significant funding the organization receives from the U.S., it is 
worth noting that, in response to the ICRC's criticism of U.S. practices in Guantanamo in 1995, 
the Senate Republican Policy Committee released a report calling for the U.S. to desist 
contributing funds to the organization (Pierce 2005).  Though the suggestion was not acted upon, 
that it was made at all is indication that such an action is not unthinkable and that there is some 




the organization has run amok and is no longer worthy of continued U.S. financial support.
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Though the public response of ICRC President Kellenberger was to accuse the senators of 
misrepresenting the organization, one wonders how this threat might influence ICRC decision-
making over the medium to long term.  In sum, it may yet be too early to assert that there is no 
threat of the U.S. withdrawing support from the organization.  However, doing so would likely 
be a costly move and so not a high probability outcome.
108
    
Another question in regard to the distinction between the Israeli and U.S. case is how the 
organization's treatment of the U.S. affects audiences' perceptions of its neutrality.  I have argued 
above that the likely cause of the ICRC's intense public criticism of Israel is its attempt to defend 
itself against accusations of bias, particularly in wars in which radical Islam is a salient 
mobilization device.  Obviously, such a motivation would also apply to the two conflicts in 
which the U.S. was involved during this time period.  In addition, the more generic motivation of 
illustrating that it is not captured by the world's most powerful state may come into play, 
particularly as being so captured is one of the primary risks of the organization's humanitarian 
philosophy.  Though it is not possible to answer this question definitively with the data available, 
my suggestion is not that these considerations do not matter to the ICRC but that they are 
balanced against certain political realities.  I suggest that the ICRC is striving to maintain a very 
delicate balance in regard to the U.S.  On the one hand, it wishes to use publicity when its 
preferred methods don't work, not least to show to other states and international audiences that it 
is able to fight for compliance even against a goliath like the U.S.  On the other hand, it wishes to 
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avoid antagonizing an actor that can in a very concrete way - materially - either facilitate or 
impede its work.  In this regard, it is possible that one of the reasons for the intensity of its 
criticism of Israel is that it is a way to demonstrate its capacity for neutrality while targeting an 
actor that is much less politically central to the organization's mission.     
Another variable that might explain the difference between these two conflicts relates to 
the duration of the relevant conflicts.  Recall that the ICRC employs a strategy in which it works 
bilaterally with the state to improve compliance over time.  Because the organization hopes to 
induce change through its confidential representations to the state, inevitably some time must 
pass before it can conclude that its representations aren't working and that it must resort to 
publicity.  That the conflict in Israel has been underway, in some form, for decades and that the 
ICRC has been present there continuously since 1967 presumably makes it clearer in what 
circumstances private reproaches are apt to be efficacious and in what circumstances they are 
not.  Thus, another explanation for the organization's greater publicity in regard to Israel is the 
relatively shorter duration of the conflicts engaged in by the United States, which would 
presumably increase the organization's willingness to continue attempting to secure 
improvements via its confidential bilateral mechanism.   
Exploring an Outlier - the Case of Chechnya  
The case of the Russia/Chechnya conflict - about which the ICRC was quite prone to 
publicity - is an outlier in two respects.  As Table 4.9 demonstrates, it is the one example of high 
publicity in the absence of access from the state.  Additionally, it is a case in which - to various 
degrees and in various manifestations - politicized Islam is relevant, again making the ICRC's 




outlier, our focus is primarily on ICRC publicity directed against the Russian state and not on 
publicity directed against the Chechen rebels.  
How might this outlier case be explained? First, it is worth remembering that most 
hypotheses in the social sciences are probabilistic rather than deterministic, with the result that it 
is not altogether surprising if a hypothesis doesn't appear to hold in a specific case.  Still, 
examining such outlier cases can often shed some light on the strengths and limitations of the 
prevailing hypothesis.  One potential explanation for the ICRC's high degree of publicity in this 
case lies in the degree of attention that Russia received from the international community in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union.  As Ron et al. note, Russia was at this time, like 
the United States and Israel, consistently at the top of lists of states targeted by human rights 
organizations.  Thus, the ICRC's use of publicity in this case might be yet another example of a 
tendency to bandwagon with the larger humanitarian community in certain circumstances. 
Additionally, it is possible that the transitional status of the government, along with the needs for 
legitimacy that often accompany such status, made it appear as a potentially receptive target to 
the organization's public ministrations.  As noted above, another relevant factor might have been 
the intermittent access that was granted to the ICRC by the Chechen opposition at the same time 
that the Russian state was denying such access.  Perhaps the existence of some access from the 
opposition created some additional pressure on the state to grant comparable access, such that 
publicity in the absence of state access was less risky than it might otherwise be.  Though it 
certainly stands to reason that asymmetrical access from the opposition would change the 
strategic calculations made by the state and the ICRC, I'm somewhat skeptical of the ultimate 




access without comparable levels of ICRC publicity, namely the cases of Tajikistan and Turkey 
(recall Table 4.14). 
In regard to the cultural variable of Islamism, several aspects of the Chechen case are 
relevant.  First, it is important to remember that variables such as the salience of politicized Islam 
in a conflict are not static features but rather are dynamic and prone to evolution over the course 
of a conflict.  Indeed, there is evidence that the significance of radical Islam to Chechen 
separatism increased in the late 1990s as a result of, among other things, the intense hardships 
caused by the First Chechen War and the utility of Islamism as a mobilizing device for the 
Chechen opposition (Hughes 2007; Lapidus 2002).  Thus, though Chechen separatists and their 
civilian population were overwhelmingly Muslim, it was not always the case that political Islam 
was a significant force in the conflict.  Second, there is the issue of the connection of Chechen 
separatism to the larger international jihadi movement and the salience of the Chechen conflict to 
important international audiences.  In discussing the publicity granted by the ICRC to Israel, I 
emphasized the particular salience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in much of the Muslim 
world.  The Chechen conflict lacks comparable câché.  This may be because the non-Arab 
identity of the Chechens alienates them from the Arab Muslim community that is perhaps a more 
politically significant international audience.  Another factor may be that Russia is a less 
historically polarizing enemy than is Israel.  Whatever the reason, the implication is that it may 
be less important for the ICRC to demonstrate its "neutrality" vis-à-vis Muslims in this context 
than in the Israeli conflict.               
Aside from its outlier status, the Russia/Chechnya example is further interesting because 
it evidences a degree of change in organizational strategy over time that lends itself nicely to 




Israel, the organization is far tougher on the Russian state in the 1995-1999 period than it is in 
the 2000-2005 period.  In March of 1996 the ICRC issued a news release with the exasperated 
headline, "Enough is Enough (ICRC News Release 96/10)." Though this statement is critical of 
all warring parties it is particularly hard on Russia, describing the Russian authorities as having 
"remained deaf" to the organization's humanitarian pleas and unwilling to grant access to places 
of detention.  In August of that year the organization again "went public" to request that the 
Russian government extend the amount of time given for the civilian population of Grozny to 
flee before increased fighting would occur (ICRC News Release 96/27).  After the year 2000, 
however, the tenor of the ICRC's pronouncements change markedly, with statements issued 
praising the Russians' commitment to cooperating with the ICRC.  One headline celebrated "Ten 
years of ICRC presence in the Northern Caucasus," while another praised the newly-elected 
Putin for his commitment to facilitating the work of the organization (ICRC News Releases 
00/04; 03/84). At the same time, asymmetrical criticisms of non-state actors, namely the 
Chechen rebels, increased markedly, though in true ICRC fashion these critiques often did not 
directly identify the IHL violator.  Instead, they identified acts, like the bombing of a 
marketplace, for which the Chechen rebels later claimed responsibility (ICRC News Release 
02/18).  
What accounts for this apparent change in the approach to publicity taken by the ICRC 
vis-à-vis the Russian state? Three salient changes occurred at this time that might account for 
this shift. First, changes in the Russian regime were underway in the direction of increased 
democracy.  While Russia earned a Polity score of 3 in the late 1990s, by 2000 it was coded as a 
6, reaching the score that scholars have come to use (somewhat arbitrarily, as the Polity authors 




This change reflects the alternation in power that took place as Yeltsin stepped down in 1999 and 
Putin, having served as acting president for three months after the resignation, was elected in 
2000.  This change in regime was accompanied by a change in approach on the part of the 
Russian leadership towards the ICRC.  While Russia had been reluctant to grant the organization 
access in the 1990s, earning a public expression of the organization's exasperation at this 
situation, Putin committed himself early in his presidency to cooperation with the ICRC, a 
commitment with which he soon followed through in the form of the granting of access to state 
detainees. These two variables may be related, with a more democratic government more 
inclined towards a policy of openness. 
However, a third variable also changed at this time, further complicating the 
interpretation of the sources of change in ICRC publicity policy.  As Abrahms (2006) has 
documented, 1999 was a watershed year for the military policy of the Chechen rebels. Whereas 
they had previously been exclusively attacking military targets, in September of 1999 they 
ushered in an anti-civilian strategy with a series of bombings on civilian apartments.  Thus, at the 
same time that the Russian government was acting in a means likely to be viewed more 
favorably by the ICRC, its Chechen opposition was resorting to methods of war more directly in 
conflict with the imperatives of IHL.  This suggests the possible relevance of an additional factor 
in ICRC publicity decisions, the direction of change in the levels of compliance and access 
offered by the various parties in the conflict, particularly whether the relevant actors might be 
viewed as making progress, remaining stagnant, or regressing on these dimensions from the 
perspective of the ICRC.  To the extent that the state was acting in increasingly favorable ways 
and the opposition in increasingly objectionable ways, it is not surprising that the ICRC's public 




However, it is important to distinguish between the ways in which the behavior of the 
Russian government was improving and the ways in which it was not.  The Russian government 
demonstrated more willingness to grant access to the ICRC in the Second Chechen War 
compared to the first, though even in the Second War this access was not without limits.  As was 
noted above, at this time also there appeared to be improvements in the direction of greater 
democracy of the regime as a whole.  However, importantly, there were not dramatic changes in 
Russia's compliance with the law of war in this period, as Russia continued in the Second 
Chechen War the anti-civilian strategies - primarily indiscriminate bombardments of villages 
thought to be sympathetic to Chechen separatism -  that it had used in the First (Stanton 2008).  
As Stanton notes, what the regime did better in this conflict compared to the previous was 
control media access so that there were significantly fewer reports of violations of IHL in the 
domestic media, something that had implications for public support for the anti-Chechen war 
effort.  It is significant, then, that Russia's decision to grant greater access to the ICRC, combined 
perhaps with positive changes in domestic governance, resulted in less negative publicity and 
more positive publicity from the ICRC, even as the regime continued military tactics that were 
earning significant condemnation from mainstream human rights organizations.    
Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter has subjected to systematic examination one particular decision of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, the choice to maintain its policy of confidentiality or 
instead break from this policy and "go public."  It has probed the sometimes opaque operations 
of the organization on the assumption that such inner workings reveal decisions of political 




breaks this silence offer insight into the contestation that is taking place between states and this 
organization.        
Further, though not a direct test of the efficacy of the philosophy of humanitarian change 
employed by the organization, this chapter does offer insight into the practical manifestations of 
this philosophy in a way that provides clues about potential strengths and weaknesses of this 
approach.  The evidence collected here demonstrates the primacy of access to the humanitarian 
philosophy employed by the ICRC.  This is logical insofar as access to states is the organization's 
comparative advantage in the field of law of war monitoring organizations and the mechanism by 
which the organization expects to have influence.  Yet, this primacy of access may also pose 
certain vulnerabilities to the organization, particularly opportunities to be "captured" by states.   
One scenario in which the ICRC is at particular risk of being "captured" by insincere 
states is represented by Algeria, an IHL-violating state that refuses the organization access.  In 
such cases, the risk is that the organization remains silent to increase the likelihood that it will 
secure access at a later date, thereby staying quiet in the face of massive IHL violations only to 
happily embrace the state after it has routed its opposition by any possible means.  In such a case 
its silence may resign the organization to irrelevance in a context in which its monitoring 
services would be most needed.   
Another potential humanitarian dilemma illustrated in this chapter concerns the 
organization's credibility problem with certain audiences and the compensatory behavior this 
problem may incentivize.  This chapter has provided evidence that the organization's claim of 
neutrality may be particularly suspect in certain contexts, namely contexts in which a politicized 
strand of Islam challenges elements - secularism, democracy, liberalism, and the like - associated 




- 2005 Muslim majority states and states involved in conflicts featuring politicized Islam as a 
salient dimension were particularly unlikely to grant the ICRC access.  Moreover, when access 
was granted by such states, the ICRC was particularly unlikely to employ publicity.  However, 
one notable exception that proved the rule was the ICRC's voracious criticism of Israel for its 
policies in its conflict with the Palestinian insurgency.  Here an almost unprecedented level of 
publicity on the part of the ICRC was explicable by the particular salience of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in the Muslim world and the unlikelihood that Israel would withdraw access from the 
organization.  
What is the significance of this state of affairs for the ICRC's IHL monitoring?  On the 
one hand, it simply provides evidence that maintaining the appearance of neutrality is work and 
not something that the organization can take for granted.  In this light, it's not surprising if certain 
contexts constitute more challenge to the presumption of neutrality than others. The more 
interesting question is whether and to what extent the organization's efforts to increase its 
credibility in these contexts may sometimes compromise its work.  By being so critical of Israel, 
for instance, has the ICRC foregone an opportunity to utilize its influence to further improve the 
compliance of the Palestinian opposition?  It is difficult to evaluate the net impact of such a 
policy on the humanitarian outcomes of concern to the ICRC.  The ICRC  has likely chosen such 
a policy because it expects that being critical of Israel in this particular context may result in 
increased credibility and therefore increased access in other conflicts in the Muslim world. 
Though there is not yet sufficient evidence to know if the calculations ultimately work in the 
organization's favor, there is at least a potential for actors like the Palestinian opposition to 
exploit the organization's attempts to secure credibility with audiences that may be skeptical of 




How do these findings speak to the debate about humanitarian politics discussed above?  
There has been relatively little direct support in this chapter for the narrowly materialist 
organizational considerations emphasized by such scholars as Clifford Bob and Alexander 
Cooley.  Though there is some tentative evidence of a pro-state "bias" on the part of the ICRC, it 
is impossible to call this a true organizational bias as opposed to the product of a more general 
pro-status quo bias on the part of international humanitarian law itself.  The more interesting 
question is whether the dynamics observed here are better considered akin to the organizational 
dysfunction highlighted by Barnett or instead as tactical tradeoffs made in the service of the 
larger humanitarian objective, as in Kelley's election monitoring example.  That is, are these 
decisions ultimately destructive or constructive from the perspective of the ICRC's self-defined 
humanitarian objectives?  Though it is impossible to give a definitive answer to this question 
based on the empirical work offered here, I will venture some thoughts.  First, as the Algeria 
example illustrates, it is the maintenance of silence in the face of repeated violation and non-
access that is the most likely to set back the humanitarian objective.   The privileging of access 
as humanitarian tool may well be justified, but it leaves the organization impotent in the face of 
widespread violation committed by those states who have succeeded in keeping the organization 
out.  While evidence of what we might paradoxically call bias in the service of neutrality may be 
more damaging in the eyes of potential audiences, it seems to me less damaging to the overall 
humanitarian enterprise.  Why?  First, this "bias" is a response to a realistic expectation of bias in 
the opposite direction given the historical affinity between the organization and certain sets of 
states, particularly the Western European states.  Because of this, demonstrating its willingness 
to go after its friends may be an important source of organizational credibility.  Second, because 




engaged in conflict, they are appropriate targets of the organization's less restrained action.  
Though it certainly warrants further investigation, the claim that earning credibility with 
skeptical states and skeptical audiences ultimately serves the cause of humanitarianism is highly 
plausible.    
There are, of course, methodological limitations to the research described here.  This 
chapter presented what can be thought of as early empirical work, systematically collecting data 
across a specific time period in an empirical area that has been relatively little studied.  Though 
positivist logic is employed in evaluating this data, it is simply not possible to replicate certain 
features of statistical analysis, particularly its ability to control so effectively for other variables.  
However, this limitation notwithstanding, this work has carefully evaluated potential 
relationships among key variables and has found sufficient evidence of intriguing relationships to 
justify at a later date more comprehensive empirical work that will permit quantitative analysis.  
Based on the work here, I propose that data be collected on ICRC publicity decisions for the full 
time period of 1950 - 2005.  This broader historical focus will, of course, necessitate moving 
beyond online sources to consider forms of publicity prior to the internet age.  The argument 
made in this chapter justifies particular examination of the patterns of publicity in regard to 
access and violation across this historical period, as well as the patterns of behavior relevant to 
the work that the ICRC must undertake in regard to neutrality.  A particularly intriguing question 
to investigate concerns the parallels and differences between the ICRC's approach to the Eastern 





CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusion 
 This dissertation has systematically examined the ways in which states and humanitarian 
monitors respond to the empirical terrain created by international humanitarian law.  As Chapter 
Two makes clear, monitoring in this regime is more decentralized than many other monitoring 
regimes in international politics, with monitoring conducted primarily by a non-state actor, the 
ICRC, which receives access from states on an ad hoc basis.  Moreover, in adopting a general 
policy of confidentiality the ICRC forgoes one tool for inducing greater state compliance in 
exchange for another, that of occasional and conditional access.  Yet, that IHL monitoring is 
decentralized does not render it unimportant as a political phenomenon.  Indeed, this dissertation 
has found evidence that states and the ICRC alike are engaged in a great deal of contestation 
over the terms of access, indication that such access has political significance. 
 For their part, states benefit from the ad hoc monitoring system that they have clearly 
chosen over more centralized alternatives. There is some evidence that states offer access when 
its price is cheapest, for instance when the intensity of conflict as measured by number of battle 
deaths is low or when states seek moderate as opposed to absolutist war goals.  Interestingly, 
though, there is also counter evidence that some indicators of military-strategic threat - attrition 
or counter-insurgency strategies, for instance - increase states' willingness to offer access, 
especially intermediate access.  I have argued that this pattern suggests that states perceive some 
political or ideological advantage from granting monitors access, though further research is 
needed to verify that this is in fact the mechanism at play.  Yet, even here it is telling that such 
incentives, if they do exist, do not tend to motivate states to offer full access but are limited to 
incentivizing moderate access over low.   Indeed, there is evidence that offering an intermediate 




low cost.  As a result, there may be a moral hazard here, with states insincerely committed to 
IHL compliance possessing incentive to grant partial but incomplete access.  
     This dissertation has also taken seriously the strategic decisions made by the ICRC 
itself, thus making an assumption that such organizations are political actors worthy of study in 
their own right.  The unique humanitarian philosophy employed by the organization highlights 
the potential for access and instruction to induce change in state behavior.  However, such a 
philosophy entails a certain risk of "capture."  In particular, this dissertation has offered evidence 
that the priority the ICRC places on access can sometimes be a liability, as it renders the 
organization powerless in the face of violating states that refuse to grant it access.  Here, because 
its primary claim to access is its promise of confidentiality, the best the organization can do is 
engage in gentle bilateral diplomacy in the hopes that its presence in country will eventually be 
permitted.   Conversely, the organization is often toughest on those states from whom some 
degree of access is virtually guaranteed.  
 Another access problem faced by the ICRC occurs in contexts in which its professed 
neutrality is particularly suspect.  In recent international political life the organization's 
association with "Western" democracy is a particular liability in conflicts in which central actors 
employ politicized Islam against the forces of modernism, secularism and democracy, forces 
with which the ICRC easily appears allied.  I have offered evidence that the ICRC faces a 
credibility problem in the Muslim (particularly, but not exclusively, the Arab Muslim) world and  
that the organization partly employs its publicity decisions in an attempt to ameliorate this 
credibility problem.  Thus, the organization generally holds its tongue in such conflicts but is 




unusually critical of Israel due to, I argue, the unique salience of this conflict in the Arab world 
and the credibility problem discussed above.  This is another potential arena, then, in which the 
organization is vulnerable to capture, though it's difficult to assess the long-term effects of this 
situation on IHL compliance, especially if, as the organization appears to think, such a move 
increases the number of actors in the Arab world willing to grant the ICRC access and 
cooperation.          
 What are the implications of this dissertation for debate among the competing paradigms 
in international relations? First, as should be obvious, there is no easy victory for any one 
paradigm. Though realism gets a great deal right in highlighting the strategic context, it 
underestimates the way in which signaling one's commitment to compliance can have 
instrumental value for states.  This can only be because some important audiences value the 
appearance of commitment to IHL.  
 This dissertation also continues to find that regime type plays an important but complex 
role in state access decisions. On the one hand, democracy is consistently associated with higher 
access, as the ample literature on democracy and international law compliance would predict.  
On the other hand, democracy displays a complicated interaction effect with strategic variables 
such that democracy is much less influential when the relevant strategic variables - battle deaths, 
counterinsurgency - are at their most intense.  This finding in particular is consistent with 
Downes' work on democracy and civilian targeting, though here democracy never exerts a 
negative effect on access but only a less significant positive effect in certain strategic contexts. 
This chapter also provides evidence that the field would be wise to continue exploring more 




and type of autocracy exert a statistically significant effect on access.  In addition to regime type, 
this chapter provides some modest evidence for the significance of two institutionalist variables - 
the level of access granted by one's enemy and one's own level of compliance.  
 Chapters Three and Four each employ a decision theoretic approach to consider the 
decisions made by key actors in the game of IHL monitoring.  This leaves open the question of 
strategic interaction - how do the choices of states influence the choices of the ICRC and vice 
versa?  Though I will not attempt here a full strategic model, I will consider briefly the 
implications of the evidence found here for strategic interaction between states and the ICRC.  
The ICRC is surely not unaware of the incentives states possess to offer partial but incomplete 
access.  Given this awareness, the organization faces a dilemma.  On the one hand, it could raise 
the cost of intermediate access, for instance by applying more intense public pressure to attempt 
to persuade the state to increase the level of access offered.   However, such a course of action 
risks increasing the number of states that offer no access to the organization and may not be 
effective at increasing the number of states that offer full access.   The ICRC's other option is to 
continue its bilateral approaches to the state in the hope that access will develop over time as the 
state becomes further convinced of the credibility of the organization.  However, as noted above, 
the danger here is that neither the state's level of access nor its compliance with IHL approves 
over time.  Thus far, evidence suggests that the ICRC tends to take the second course of action 
rather than the first, as access is the only means by which the organization can hope to exert an 
effect.        
 What are the implications for states of the evidence found here about ICRC resort to 




access will tend to find this an effective strategy.  On the flip side, states with the most consistent 
history of granting the organization access should expect the organization to be willing and able 
to employ publicity,  sometimes voraciously.  Further, the cultural variable discussed above 
suggests that actors in the Muslim world, particularly the Palestinian separatists, may be able to 
use in their favor the organization's efforts to demonstrate its "neutrality" in polarized contexts.     
 Though this project was not designed to answer the question of the general efficacy of 
IHL monitoring, the evidence found here does have implications for this important question.  In 
general, much of the evidence found here may be disheartening to an activist who wished to see 
state compliance with IHL improve.  For one, monitors in this decentralized system possess only 
limited means by which they can hope to facilitate improved compliance. The limited tools at the 
disposal of the ICRC are the educative impact it hopes to have through its bilateral relationship 
with states and the (limited) threat of publicity it can employ if a state is not sufficiently 
responsive to its educational attempts.  Moreover, there is ample indication that states respond to 
this monitoring terrain adeptly, employing access in ways that minimize the state's loss of policy 
discretion.  There is also evidence that the ICRC is sometimes doomed to impotence in the wake 
of massive violation (as in the Algerian civil war) or driven to act to protect its credibility with 
important audiences at the expense of other policy considerations.   
 Yet, there is also another side to this story. There is strong evidence that democracy 
increases access.  More surprisingly, there is evidence that states facing dire military-strategic 
contexts sometimes have incentive to offer the ICRC at least a modest degree of access. If, as I 
have conjectured, this is because offering access is associated with a political or ideological 




very least, it seems that states would prefer to be thought of as compliant.  While this is certainly 
not the same as true commitment to compliance, it is perhaps one weapon that actors that are 
normatively committed to the law can wield to their advantage.  Of course, the ICRC may not be 
the actor best placed to utilize this weapon. The reason for this may lie in the two roles that the 
organization has adopted since the beginning: relief for victims on the one hand, monitoring 
activities on the other.  In prioritizing access above all else, the organization is able to provide 
direct assistance to millions of victims every year.  Yet, this also places definite limits on the 
terms under which the organization can interact with states.  However, given doubts about the 
ultimate efficacy of a "naming and shaming" strategy, it is not altogether clear that the 
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Table 2.2. Post-1945 Declarations of War and Use of the Protecting Power  
 Protecting Power Employed 
Declaration of war             Yes No 
Yes - India, 1971  
(India-Pakistan) 
- Pakistan, 1971  
(India-Pakistan) 
- India, 1962 
 (Sino-Indian) 
No - France, UK, Egypt, 
1956 (Suez Conflict; 
nonrecognition of Israel)  
- Indian-Portuguese 
Conflict (Goa), 1961 
- Bizerte conflict, 
1961 (France, 
Tunisia)  
- Argentina (Brazil) 
and the UK 
(Switzerland) in the 
Falklands War, 1982 
   
- Majority of post-
1945 conflicts 






Table 2.3. Comparing Political Costs of the Protecting Power vs. the ICRC 
Protecting Power ICRC 
States as Monitoring Body Neutral humanitarian 
organization as monitoring body 
State chosen on an ad hoc basis, 
subject to approval of opposing 
state 
Standing body, with terms of 
access negotiated on an ad hoc 
basis 
Traditional political functions as 
well as humanitarian ones 
Exclusively humanitarian 
functions 
Legally applicable only in 
international armed conflicts 
Legally applicable in a range of 






Table 3.1. Measuring the Dependent Variable - Access 
Access Score  Meaning  
0   Full breach in relations; Organization not 
permitted to work within state borders.  
1   Organization permitted in state, but severe 
constraints on activities – e.g. no detainee 
visits permitted.  
2  Regional restrictions on access; Partial 
access to detainees  
3  Full access after significant temporal 
delay  
4  Full access granted  
 
Table 3.2. Proportion of Access Scores across Dataset 
Access Score Number in Total Dataset 
N = 440 
Number in Interstate Only 
Dataset 
0 36 (8.18%) 13 (6.02%) 
1 122 (27.73%) 53 (24.54%) 
2 102 (23.18%) 44 (20.37%) 
3 87 (19.77%) 41 (18.98%) 







Table 3.3. Access Scores by Year 
                                         Access Score                        
 
     Year  |         0          1          2          3          4 |     Total 
      1950 |         2          1          0          3          0 |         6  
      1951 |         2          1          2          1          0 |         6  
      1952 |         3          0          2          1          0 |         6  
      1953 |         2          0          6          2          0 |        10  
      1954 |         0          0          0          2          0 |         2  
      1955 |         0          2          1          0          2 |         5  
      1956 |         2          4          1          2          1 |        10  
      1957 |         1          0          1          1          4 |         7  
      1958 |         2          0          6          0          0 |         8  
      1959 |         0          0          2          1          1 |         4  
      1960 |         1          1          1          0          0 |         3  
      1961 |         1          3          0          2          2 |         8  
      1962 |         1          3          1          0          5 |        10  
      1963 |         0          3          3          0          2 |         8  
      1964 |         0          2          0          3          2 |         7  
      1965 |         0          3          2          3          3 |        11  
      1966 |         0          4          1          4          4 |        13  
      1967 |         0          5          2          1          6 |        14  




      1969 |         3          3          0          4          2 |        12  
      1970 |         2          6          5          5          0 |        18  
      1971 |         2          2          7          3          4 |        18  
      1972 |         0          6          5          7          4 |        22  
      1973 |         2          5          5          3          3 |        18  
      1974 |         0          2          2          3          1 |         8  
      1975 |         0          2          0          2          0 |         4  
      1976 |         1          0          0          0          2 |         3  
      1977 |         0          1          1          2          1 |         5  
      1978 |         1          2          2          1          1 |         7  
      1979 |         1          8          0          2          1 |        12  
      1980 |         0          1          1          3          2 |         7  
      1981 |         1          5          1          0          1 |         8  
      1982 |         0          2          3          0          3 |         8  
      1983 |         0          1          4          0          2 |         7  
      1984 |         0          4          2          0          3 |         9  
      1985 |         2          2          1          1          2 |         8  
      1986 |         1          2          2          4          2 |        11  
      1987 |         0          6          3          2          0 |        11  
      1988 |         0          7          4          0          2 |        13  
      1989 |         0          2          1          0          6 |         9  
      1990 |         0          2          3          1          2 |         8  




      1992 |         1          1          4          3          0 |         9  
      1993 |         0          1          4          2          1 |         8  
      1994 |         0          1          0          2          1 |         4  
      1995 |         0          0          2          1          2 |         5  
      1996 |         0          1          2          2          1 |         6  
      1997 |         0          1          3          1          0 |         5  
      1998 |         0          1          0          1          4 |         6  
      1999 |         0          0          0          3          2 |         5  
      2000 |         0          1          0          1          2 |         4  





Table 3.4. Reduced Access Measure 
Access Score  Meaning  
0  Major  or Total Constraints on ICRC 
Activities within State 
1  Significant Access with Minor 
Restrictions 
2   Full Access 
 
Table 3.5. Proportion of Access Scores (Reduced) Across Dataset 
Access Score Number in Total Dataset Number in Interstate Only 
Dataset 
0 158 (35.91.%)  66 (30.56%) 
1 189 (42.95%)  85 (39.35%) 






Table 3.6. Descriptive Statistics, Variables in Full Version of the Dataset 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min  Max 
Battle Deaths 
Annual 
708 49306.06     143051.4           0 763002 
Battle Deaths 
Monadic 
694 63754.72     178977.7           0 750000 
Polity Score 577 -1.494047     7.624804         -10 10 
Durability 590 26.81906     36.32744           0 191 
Auto Regime 
Change 
710 -.1028169     .8787528 -13 0 
Presidential 538 .0501859     .2185315           0 1 
Parliamentary 538 .2527881      .435015 0 1 
Mixed 538 .0241636     .1536997 0 1 
Military Dictator 538 .204461 .4036825           0 1 
Royal Dictator 538 .0539033      .226037 0 1 
Civil Dictator  538 .4144981     .4930937           0 1 
Enemy Access 440 .8522727     .7415396           0 2 
Capability 
Symmetry 
468 .4348345     .2999449 .0040921 .9998167 
Polity-Parl Interact 533 2.249531     3.938868           0 10 
Polity-Battle 
Deaths Interact 






Table 3.7. Distribution of Reciprocity Scores, Full Version Dataset 
Reciprocity Score Number  Percent 
0 2 .55 
1 46 12.64 
2 88 24.8 
3 96 26.37 
4 132 36.26 
 
Table 3.8. Distribution of Reduced Reciprocity Measure, Full Version Dataset 
Reciprocity Score Number  Percent 
0 48 13.19 
1 184 50.55 






Table 3.9. Proportion of Polity Scores Across Dataset 
Regime Type Score Number Percent 
-10 5 .87% 
-9 93 16.12% 
-8 41 7.11% 
-7 146 25.30 
-6 32 5.55 
-5 8 1.39 
-4 7 1.21 
-3 17 2.95 
-2 3 .52 
-1 4 .69 
0 18 3.12 
1 6 1.04 
2 3 .52 
3 4 .69 
4 10 1.73 
5 11 1.91 
6 0 0 
7 9 1.56 
8 19 3.29 
9 46 7.97 
10 95* 16.48 





Table 3.10 Proportion of Regime Type Scores Across Dataset 
Regime Type Freq Percent 
Parliamentary 136 25.28 
Presidential 27 5.02 
Mixed (Semi-presidential) 13 2.42 
Civil Dictatorship 223 41.45 
Military Dictatorship 110 20.45 






Table 3.11 Generalized Ordered Logit Results 
Variable    Odds Ratio 
mleq1             
 Battle Deaths Annual   .9999969**    
    (1.39e-06)     
  
 Battle Deaths Monadic    .9999974**    
    (8.66e-07)     
 
 Polity Score       1.38***    
    (.08)    
   
 Durability       1.040***    
    (.01)      
 
 Auto Regime Change      .0001294***    
    (.0000875)    
 
Presidential      677545.4***    
    (694083.1)  
    
 Parliamentary       7.10e-18***    
    (1.19e-17)    
 
 Mixed Regime       2.32e+07***  
    ( 1.74e+07)    
  
Royal Dictator     4.04e+08***   
    (3.38e+08)     
 
Military Dictator       1.66    
    (.70)     
  
Enemy Access      1.74*    
    (.50) 
      
Polity-Parl Interact      398.00***    
    (99.20)     
 
Polity-Battle Deaths Interact     .9999997    
    (2.16e-07)     
 
 Capability Symmetry   14.82***    
    (11.49)      
 
 Constant   1.28    
    (.54)      
mleq2                   
Battle Deaths Annual       .999916*   
    (.0000347) 




Battle Deaths Monadic    .9999974**    
    (8.66e-07)     
 
Polity Score      1.38***   
    ( .08)      
 
Durability     1.04***    
    (.01)      
 
Auto Regime Change    1.11    
    (.12)      
 
Presidential    .29    
    (.35)     
 
Parliamentary     5.46  
    (20.74)      
 
Mixed Regime    .06***    
    (.04)     
 
Royal Dictator     5.83***    
    (2.23)      
 
Military Dictator    1.66 
    (.70)      
 
Enemy Access     3.14***     
    (.75)      
 
Polity-Parl Interact  .54 
    (.24)     
 
Polity-Battle Deaths Interact   .9999915*   
     (3.75e-06)     
 
Capability Symmetry  2.19    
    (1.5)      
 
 Constant     .26***    
    (.11)    
 
N    251 





Table 3.12. Predicted Probabilities of Access Scores Holding Variables at their Means 
 Predicted Probability 95% Conf. Interval 
Pr(access=0) 0.1062 0.0410             0.1714 
Pr(access=1) 0.8718 0.7617             0.9819 
Pr(access=2) 0.0220 -0.0451            0.0891 
 
Battle deaths Annual= 62,611.47 (mean); Battle deaths  monadic = 89,611.22; Polity = -2*; Durable = 29.14; Auto 
Regime Change = 0*; Presidential = 0*; Parliament = 0*; Mixed Regime = 0; Royal dictator = 0*; Military dictator 
= 0; Enemy Access = 1*; Capability Symmetry = .45; Polity-parliament interact = 0; Polity-battle death interact = -
125,222.94.  * Because the variable is ordinal and not continuous, a meaningful unit closest to the mean has been 





Table 3.13. Predicted Probabilities of Access Variable Given Various Levels of the Independent 
Variables 
Variable and Value Access=0 Access = 1 Access = 2 
Battle Deaths  
= Min (Annual = 0; ; Monadic  




[ 0.0207,    0.1281] 
 
0.2713  
[ 0.1481,    0.3946] 
 
0.6543  
[ 0.4902,    0.8177] 
Annual = 100; Monadic = 100 
(Interact = -200) 
0.0744    
[ 0.0207,    0.1281] 
0.2729    
[ 0.1500,    0.3958] 
0.6527    
[ 0.4896,    0.8158] 
Annual = 31,305.74; Monadic 
= 44,805.61; Interact = -
62,611.47 
0.0890 
[ 0.0298,    0.1483] 
0.7399   
[ 0.5144,    0.9653] 
0.1711    
[ -0.0346,    0.3769] 
=  Mean  




[ 0.0410,    0.1714] 
0.8718   
[ 0.7617,    0.9819] 
0.0220    
[-0.0451,    0.0891] 
Annual = 412,806.74; 
Monadic= 419,805.61; 
Interact = -825,613.48 
0.4024 
[0.2167,      0.5881]  
0.5976  
[0.4419,    0.7833] 
0.0000  
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
= Max 
(Annual = 763,002; Monadic = 
750,000; Interact = -
1,526,004) 
0.7923    
[0.5646,    1.0200] 
0.2077    
[ -0.0200,    0.4354] 
0.0000  
  [-0.0000,    0.0000] 
    
Polity    
= -9 (Interact = -563,503.23)   0.4886    
[ 0.3289,    0.6483] 
0.4207  
[ 0.2185,    0.6230] 
0.0907    
[ 0.0011,    0.1802] 
 




[ 0.0410,    0.1714] [ 0.7617,    0.9819] [-0.0451,    0.0891] 
    
= 0 (Interact = 0) 0.0615    
[0.0137,    0.1092] 
0.9240    
[ 0.8392,    1.0089] 
0.0145    
[-0.0421,    0.0711] 
    
= 10 (Interact = 626,110.47) 0.0033    
[-0.0025,    0.0091] 
0.9949   
[ 0.9784,    1.0114] 
0.0018    
[-0.0128,    0.0163] 
    
Durable    
= 0 0.2707    
[ 0.1666,    0.3747] 
0.7222    
[ 0.6076,    0.8368] 
0.0072   
 [-0.0156,    0.0299] 
    
= 29.1 0.1062    
[ 0.0410,    0.1714] 
0.8718    
[ 0.7617,    0.9819] 
0.0220    
[-0.0451,    0.0891] 
    
=80.875 0.0155    
[-0.0091,    0.0401] 
0.8391    
[ 0.4388,    1.2394] 
0.1455  
 [-0.2571,    0.5480] 
    
= 135.94 0.0018    
[-0.0031,    0.0068] 
0.4039    
[-0.4914,    1.2992] 
0.5943  
 [ -0.3033,    1.4919] 
    
= 191 0.0002    
[-0.0006,    0.0010] 
0.0733   
[-0.2294,    0.3760] 
0.9265    
[0.6232,    1.2298] 
    




= 0  0.1062    
[ 0.0410,    0.1714] 
0.8718    
[ 0.7617,    0.9819] 
0.0220    
[-0.0451,    0.0891] 
    
= -7 0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
0.9896    
[ 0.9492,    1.0300] 
0.0104    
[-0.0300,    0.0508] 
    
=- 13 0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0508] 
0.9945    
[ 0.9681,    1.0210] 
0.0055    
[-0.0210,    0.0319] 
Parliament    
= 0  0.1062 
[ 0.0410,    0.1714] 
0.8718 
[ 0.7617,    0.9819] 
0.0220 
[-0.0451,    0.0891] 
    
= 1  
  (Polityparlinteract=-2)* 
1.0000    
 [ 1.0000,    1.0000] 
-0.2938       
 [-2.1019,    1.5142] 
0.2938     
 [-1.5142,    2.1019] 
    
Presidentialism    
= 0  0.1062 
[ 0.0410,    0.1714] 
0.8718 
[ 0.7617,    0.9819] 
0.0220 
[-0.0451,    0.0891] 
    
= 1 0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
0.9936 
[ 0.9779,    1.0094] 
0.0064   
[-0.0094,    0.0221] 
    
Royal dictator     
= 0  0.1062 
[ 0.0410,    0.1714] 
0.8718 
[ 0.7617,    0.9819] 
0.0220 




    
=1 0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
0.8840    
[ 0.5329,    1.2350] 
0.1160    
[-0.2350,    0.4671] 
    
Enemy Access     
= 0  0.1717 
[ 0.0816,    0.2617] 
0.8212 
[ 0.7221,    0.9203] 
0.0071 
[-0.0153,    0.0295] 
    
= 1 0.1062 
[ 0.0410,    0.1714] 
0.8718 
[ 0.7617,    0.9819] 
0.0220 
[-0.0451,    0.0891] 
    
= 2 0.0638    
[-0.0007,    0.1282] 
0.8701   
[ 0.6534,    1.0868] 
0.0661    
[-0.1271,    0.2594] 
    
Capability Symmetry     
= .009328 (Min) 0.2804    
[0.1314,    0.4295] 
0.7039    
[ 0.5508,    0.8569] 
0.0157    
[-0.0353,    0.0667] 
    
= 0.453 (Mean) 0.1062 
[ 0.0410,    0.1714] 
0.8718 
[ 0.7617,    0.9819] 
0.0220 
[-0.0451,    0.0891] 
    
= .98100215 (Max) 0.0276  
[-0.0061,    0.0613] 
0.9394    
[ 0.8247,    1.0540] 
0.0330    
[-0.0638,    0.1298] 
*This pairing never occurs in the dataset. Parliamentary systems in the dataset have a minimum polity score 
of 2.  






























Figure 3.1. Predicted Probabilities of Access Scores 






Table 3.14. Hypotheses and Results  
Variable Direction Predicted Full Version Interstate  
Wars of Attrition Less access NA Increased access 
Counterinsurgency Wars Less access NA Increased probability of 
moderate access;  
Decreased probability of 
high access.  
Battle Deaths Less access Less access Insignificant  
Capability Symmetry Less access More access More access 
Democracy  More access More access More access 
Democracy -Strategy 
Interaction  
Less access Less access Increased probability of 
moderate access;  
Decreased probability of 
high access. 
Eastern bloc Less access NA Insignificant  
Inter-Bloc Conflict (Cold 
War) 
Less access NA Insignificant  




Military regime More access in 
interstate 
Insignificant Insignificant 
Royal regime  More access Increased access Increased moderate 
access 
Regime stability (Durability) More access More access Insignificant 
Autocratic Regime Change Less access More access Insignificant 










































Figure 3.2. Predicted Probability of Access Level 





































Figure 3.3. Capability Symmetry vs. 
 Pr(Access = 0) 































Figure 3.4. Capability Symmetry vs.  
Pr(Access = 1) 





























Figure 3.5. Capability Symmetry vs.  
Pr(Access = 2) 
































Figure 3.6. Enemy Access vs. Pr(Access = 0) 






























Figure 3.7. Enemy Access vs. Pr(Access = 1) 
































Figure 3.8. Enemy Access vs. Pr(Access = 2) 



































Figure 3.9. Durability vs. Pr(Access = 0) 




































Figure 3.10. Durability vs. Pr(Access = 1) 





































Figure 3.11. Durability vs. Pr(Access = 2) 































Auto Regime Score 
Figure 3.12. Adverse Regime Change vs. 
Pr(Access = 0) 






























Auto Regime Score 
Figure 3.13. Adverse Regime Change vs. Pr(Access 
= 1) 
































Auto Regime Score 
Figure 3.14. Adverse Regime Change vs. 
Pr(Access = 2) 




Table 3.15. Effects of parliamentarism at various levels of polity 
Change in probability when going from not parliamentary to parliamentary 
Variable and Value Access=0 Access = 1 Access = 2 
Polity = 2 0.9652   
 [0.9318,   0.9986] 
-0.9710   
[-1.0629,  -0.8790] 
0.0058   
[-0.0767,   0.0882] 
    
Polity = 5 0.9807   
[ 0.9616,   0.9997] 
-0.9769  
 [-1.0100,  -0.9438] 
-0.0037   
[-0.0281,   0.0207] 
    
Polity = 8 -0.0060   
[-0.0153,   0.0033] 
0.0086   
[-0.0140,   0.0312] 
-0.0026   
[-0.0216,   0.0165] 
    
Polity = 10 -0.0033   
[-0.0091,   0.0025] 
0.0051   
[-0.0113,   0.0214] 
-0.0017   
[-0.0161,   0.0126] 
    
 Table 3.16. Effects of polity at various levels of parliamentarism  
Change in probability when moving from polity =2 to polity = 10      
Variable and Value Access=0 Access = 1 Access = 2 
Parliamentary = 0  -0.0315   
[-0.0594,  -0.0037] 
0.0393   
[-0.0081,   0.0867] 
-0.0078   
[-0.0388,   0.0232] 
    
Parliamentary = 1 -1.0000   
[-1.0000,  -1.0000] 
1.0153   
[ 0.9209,   1.1097] 
-0.0153   
[-0.1097,   0.0791] 





Battle Deaths/ Polity Interaction  
Table 3.17. Effects of Battle Deaths Variable at Various Levels of Polity  
   Change in Probabilities when going from Min to Max Battle Deaths 
Variable and Value Access=0 Access = 1 Access = 2 
    
Polity = Min (-10) 0.3540   
[ 0.0572,   0.6507] 
-0.2649   
[-1.0831,   0.5533] 
-0.0891   
[-0.7171,   0.5390] 
    
Polity = Mean (-2) 0.7180   
[ 0.4753,   0.9607] 
-0.0637   
[-0.3265,   0.1992] 
-0.6543   
[-0.8177,  -0.4909] 
    
Polity = Max (10) 0.6452   
[-0.1879,   1.4782] 
0.3435   
[-0.4814,   1.1683] 
-0.9886   
[-1.0105,  -0.9668] 
Table 3.18. Effects of Polity Variable at Various Levels of Battle Deaths Score 
   Change in probability when going from min polity score to max 
Variable and Value Access=0 Access = 1 Access = 2 
Battle Deaths = Min -0.5058   
[-0.6759,  -0.3358] 
-0.3542   
[-0.4647,  -0.2438] 
0.8601   
[ 0.7668,   0.9534] 
    
Battle Deaths = Mean -0.5594   
[-0.7330,  -0.3858] 
0.6674   
[ 0.4441,   0.8907] 
-0.1080   
[-0.2352,   0.0192] 
    
Battle Deaths = Max -0.2146   
[-1.2497,   0.8204] 
0.2541   
[-1.2234,   1.7317] 
-0.0395   





































Figure 3. 15. Effects of Battle Deaths Variable at 
Various Levels of Polity : Change in Probabilities 









Table 3.19 ICRC Selection by Year 
 
            |      icrcselect 
      year |         0  (Not selected)          1  (Selected)       Total 
      1950 |        10              6    |       16  
      1951 |         8              6     |        14  
      1952 |        10              6    |        16  
      1953 |         8             10    |        18  
      1954 |        12              2    |        14  
      1955 |         0             10    |        10  
      1956 |         6             12    |        18  
      1957 |        10              8    |        18  
      1958 |         6             10    |        16  
      1959 |         6              6    |        12  
      1960 |         6              4    |        10  
      1961 |         0             10    |        10  
      1962 |         4             12    |        16  
      1963 |         6             10    |        16  
      1964 |        14              8    |        22  
      1965 |         6             12    |        18  
      1966 |         2             20    |        22  
      1967 |         8             14    |        22  
      1968 |         2             18    |        20  
      1969 |         8             14    |        22  




      1971 |         4             20    |        24  
      1972 |         4             24    |        28  
      1973 |         6             18    |        24  
      1974 |         6             10    |        16  
      1975 |         6              4    |        10  
      1976 |         2              4    |         6  
      1977 |         4              6    |        10  
      1978 |         8              8    |        16  
      1979 |         0             14    |        14  
      1980 |         2              8    |        10  
      1981 |         0             10    |        10  
      1982 |         0              8    |         8  
      1983 |         4              8    |        12  
      1984 |         2             10    |        12  
      1985 |         0             10    |        10  
      1986 |         2             12    |        14  
      1987 |         4             14    |        18  
      1988 |         0             14    |        14  
      1989 |         2             12    |        14  
      1990 |         2             12    |        14  
      1991 |         0             10    |        10  
      1992 |         0             10    |        10  
      1993 |         0             10    |        10  
      1994 |         0              6    |         6  




      1996 |         0              8    |         8  
      1997 |         0              6    |         6  
      1998 |         0              8    |         8  
      1999 |         0              6    |         6  
      2000 |         0              4    |         4  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 






Table 3.20 Heckman Selection Results  
Heckman selection model                            Number of obs      =       445 
(regression model with sample selection)          Censored obs       =        194 
                                                    Uncensored obs     =     251 
 
                                                    Wald chi2(12)      =    134.71 
Log likelihood = -421.1753                         Prob > chi2        =    0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
                     |      Coef.    Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
Access    | 
Battle Deaths Annual |  -8.40e-07**    2.94e-07    -2.86   0.004    -1.42e-06   -2.65e-07 
Battle Deaths Monadic  |  -7.85e-07**   2.59e-07    -3.03   0.002    -1.29e-06   -2.77e-07 
Polity Score  |   .0465567*** .0110627     4.21   0.000     .0248742    .0682392 
Durability   |   .0046345**   .0014637     3.17   0.002     .0017656    .0075033 
Auto Regime Change  |  -.0091717    .0307813    -0.30   0.766    -.0695019    .0511584 
Presidential   |   -.478128*    .2350704    -2.03   0.042    -.9388576   -.0173984 
Parliamentary   |  -.3151442    .1871651    -1.68   0.092     -.681981    .0516926 
Mixed Regime   |  -.1381045    .2124867    -0.65   0.516    -.5545708    .2783619 
Royal Dictator   |    .562813*    .2281086     2.47   0.014     .1157284    1.009898 
Military Dictator  |   .0535398    .1030388     0.52   0.603    -.1484126    .2554921 
Enemy Access   |   .2741465*** .0527757     5.19   0.000      .170708     .377585 
Capability Symmetry  |   .5095476**   .1542652     3.30   0.001     .2071935    .8119018 





ICRC Selection      | 
Intensity   |   1.678773***.1572869    10.67   0.000     1.370496    1.987049 
Interstate conflict |   1.438375*** .1701889     8.45   0.000      1.10481    1.771939 
 Territorial conflict  |  -.7657789**   .2210669    -3.46   0.001    -1.199062   -.3324957 
 Constant  |  -.6489327*** .1949397    -3.33   0.001    -1.031007    -.266858 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 /athrho   |  -.1686952   .1577764    -1.07   0.285    -.4779313    .1405409 
 /lnsigma   |  -.5126335   .0454719   -11.27   0.000    -.6017568   -.4235102 
-------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
               rho   |   -.167113   .1533702                     -.4445854    .1396228 
             sigma   |   .5989163   .0272339                      .5478483    .6547445 
            lambda   |  -.1000867  .0928589                     -.2820869    .0819135 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 







Descriptive Statistics, Interstate Only Version of the Dataset 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min  Max 
Access Measure 247 .931 .770 0 2 
Battle Deaths 
Monadic 
336 126,698.5 241,902.3           0 750000 
Polity Score 330 -1.818     7.439         -10 10 
Centered Polity 
Score 
330 -1.21e-07 7.439 -8.18 11.818 
Presidential 306 .072     .259         0 1 
Parliamentary 306 .225     .419 0 1 
Mixed 306 .009     .099 0 1 
Military Dictator 306 .222 .416           0 1 
Royal Dictator 306 .059      .236 0 1 
Civil Dictator  306 .412     .493           0 1 
Enemy Access 247 1.93     .770           1 3 
Capability 
Symmetry 
340 .417     .297 .004 .994 
Eastern Bloc  278 .734 .842 0 2 
Eastern Bloc Binary  278 .478 .500 0 1 
POW Violation 240 6.608 4.413 1 16 
Attrition 217 38.065 40.161 0 100 
Counterinsurgency 217 8.664 23.874 0 80 
War Goals 210 .319 .467 0 1 





Table 3.22. Interstate only Results, Regime Variables Excluded  
Variable    Odds Ratio 
mleq1                 
Battle Deaths     -2.86e-06     
    (1.84e-06) 
     
Polity Score     .09***   
     (.02) 
      
Enemy Access     .74*     
    (.32) 
      
POW Violation     -.14*     
    (.06) 
     
Capability Symmetry   2.33*     
    (.91)  
     
Attrition     .03**     
    (.01) 
      
Counterinsurgency   .34***     
    (.02) 
     
War Goals     -2.75***     
    (.52)  
    
Polity-COIN Interact    .04***     
    (.004) 
      
 Constant    -.20 
       (.78)     
mleq2                 
Battle Deaths     -2.86e-06     
    (1.84e-06) 
     
Polity Score     .09***     
    (.02) 
    
Enemy Access     .74*     
    (.32) 
    
POW Violation     -.14*     




    
Capability Symmetry   2.33*      
    (.91) 
    
Attrition    .005      
    (.007) 
      
Counterinsurgency   -.20***  
      (.01) 
    
War Goals    -17.55***   
     (.63) 
    
Polity-COIN Interact   .0007 
       (.001) 
    
Constant    -2.57**     
    (.85) 
 
N       158 
*p  .05, **p  .01, ***p  .001  
Table 3.23 Predicted Probabilities of Access Scores Holding Variables at their Means, 
Interstate Only, with Regime Scale Variables Excluded 
 Predicted Probability 95% Conf. Interval 
Pr(access=0) 0.0300 0.0116           0.0484 
Pr(access=1) 0.9246 0.8875           0.9618 
Pr(access=2) 0.0454   0.0156           0.0751 
 
Battle Deaths = 243,442.4  Polity = -2*; Enemy Access = 2*; POWViolation= 7; Capability Symmetry = .47; 
Attrition = 41; Counterinsurgency= 7;Waraims  = 0*; Regime-Counterinsurgency Interaction = -14* 
* because the variable is ordinal and not continuous, a meaningful unit closest to the mean has been chosen in lieu 
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Figure 3.16. Predicted Probabilities of Access 
Scores Holding Variables at their Means, 






Table 3.24. Predicted Probabilities of Access Variable at Various Levels of the Independent 
Variables, Interstate only, with Regime Scale Data Excluded 
Variable and Value Access=0 Access = 1 Access = 2 
    
Polity    
= -9 (Interact = -63) 0.2608    
[ 0.0921,    0.4295] 
0.7149    
[ 0.5431,    0.8868] 
0.0243    
[ 0.0072,    0.0414] 
    
=-2 (Interact = -14) 0.0300    
[ 0.0116,    0.0484] 
0.9246    
[ 0.8875,    0.9618] 
0.0454    
[ 0.0156,    0.0751] 
    
= 4 (Interact = 28) 0.0038    
[ 0.0012,    0.0064] 
0.9197    
[ 0.8674,    0.9719] 
0.0765    
[ 0.0239,    0.1291] 
    
= 10 (Interact = 70) 0.0005   
 [ 0.0000,    0.0009] 
0.8733    
[ 0.7778,    0.9688] 
0.1262    
[ 0.0305,    0.2218] 
POW Violation     
    
= 1 (min in sample) 0.0133    
[ 0.0025,    0.0242] 
0.8885    
[ 0.8272,    0.9499] 
0.0982    
[ 0.0361,    0.1602] 
    
= 7 (mean) 0.0300    
[ 0.0116,    0.0484] 
0.9246    
[ 0.8875,    0.9618] 
0.0454    
[ 0.0156,    0.0751] 
    




[-0.0190,    0.2123] [ 0.7883,    0.9913] [-0.0063,    0.0334] 
Enemy Access     
= 1  0.0610    
[ 0.0213,    0.1007] 
0.9169    
[ 0.8737,    0.9600] 
0.0221    
[ 0.0075,    0.0367] 
    
= 2 0.0300    
[ 0.0116,    0.0484] 
0.9246    
[ 0.8875,    0.9618] 
0.0454    
[ 0.0156,    0.0751] 
    
= 3 0.0145    
[-0.0005,    0.0294] 
0.8946    
[ 0.8094,    0.9797] 
0.0910    
[-0.0020,    0.1839] 
    
Capability Symmetry     
= .009 (Min) 0.0413    
[-0.0184,    0.1009] 
0.9257    
[ 0.8900,    0.9614] 
0.0330    
[-0.0199,    0.0859] 
    
= .47 (Mean) 0.0300    
[ 0.0116,    0.0484] 
0.9246    
[ 0.8875,    0.9618] 
0.0454    
[ 0.0156,    0.0751] 
    
= .99 (Max) 0.0091    
[ 0.0005,    0.0177] 
0.8530    
[ 0.7604,    0.9455] 
0.1379   
 [ 0.0426,    0.2333] 
    
Attrition    
    




[ 0.0086,    0.1589] [ 0.8222,    0.9351] [-0.0020,    0.0772] 
    
= 41 0.0300    
[ 0.0116,    0.0484] 
0.9246    
[ 0.8875,    0.9618] 
0.0454    
[ 0.0156,    0.0751] 
    
= 100 0.0064    
[-0.0025,    0.0154] 
0.9342    
[ 0.8877,    0.9807] 
0.0594    
[ 0.0140,    0.1047] 
    
Counterinsurgency    
    
= 0 (Interaction = 0 0.1641    
[ 0.0759,    0.2522] 
0.6721    
[ 0.5302,    0.8140] 
0.1639   
[ 0.0661,    0.2616] 
    
= 7 (Interaction = -14) 0.0300    
[ 0.0116,    0.0484] 
0.9246    
[ 0.8875,    0.9618] 
0.0454    
[ 0.0156,    0.0751] 
    
= 80 (Interaction = -160) 0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
1.0000    
[ 1.0000,    1.0000] 
0.0000   
 [-0.0000,    0.0000] 
War Aims    
    
= 0  0.0300    
[ 0.0116,    0.0484] 
0.9246    
[ 0.8875,    0.9618] 
0.0454    
[ 0.0156,    0.0751] 
    



































Percent of conflict employing an attrition strategy 
Figure 3.17. Attrition vs. Predicted 
Probability of Access 
Pr(Access = 0) 
Pr(Access = 1) 






























Percentage of conflict employing a counterinsurgency strategy 
Figure 3.18. Counterinsurgency vs. 
Predicted Probability of Access 
Pr(Access = 0) 
Pr(Access = 1) 

































War Aims  
1 = Regime change or Conquest Goals 
0 = Other Goals   
Figure 3.19. War Aims vs. Predicted 
Probability of Access 
Pr(Access = 0) 
Pr(Access = 1) 




























Figure 3.20. Capability Symmetry vs. 
Predicted Probability of Access 
Pr(Access = 0) 
Pr(Access = 1) 
















Figure 3.21. Polity vs. Predicted Probability 
of Access 
Pr(Access = 0) 
Pr(Access = 1) 





























Figure 3.22. Enemy Access vs. Predicted 
Probability of Access 
Pr(Access = 0) 
Pr(Access = 1) 


































Figure 3.23. POW Violation vs. Predicted 
Probability of Access 
Pr(Access = 0) 
Pr(Access = 1) 




Table 3.25 Polity-Counterinsurgency Interaction Effect.  
Effects of Counterinsurgency at Various Levels of Polity Variable 
Variable and Value Access = 0  Access = 1 Access = 2 
Polity = -9 AND    
COIN = 0  0.2663    
[ 0.1141,    0.4186] 
0.6379    
[ 0.4760,    0.7998] 
0.0958    
[ 0.0338,    0.1578] 
    
COIN = 7 0.2608    
[ 0.0921,    0.4295] 
0.7149    
[ 0.5431,    0.8868] 
0.0243    
[ 0.0072,    0.0414] 
    
COIN = 24 0.2477    
[-0.0578,    0.5531] 
0.7516    
[ 0.4458,    1.0573] 
0.0007    
[-0.0001,    0.0016] 
    
COIN = 80 0.2077    
[-0.6050,    1.0203] 
0.7923    
[-0.0203,    1.6050] 
0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
    
Polity = -2 AND    
COIN = 0  0.1641    
[ 0.0759,    0.2522] 
0.6721    
[ 0.5302,    0.8140] 
0.1639    
[ 0.0661,    0.2616] 
    
COIN = 7 0.0300   
 [ 0.0116,    0.0484] 
0.9246    
[ 0.8875,    0.9618] 
0.0454    
[ 0.0156,    0.0751] 
    




[ 0.0001,    0.0006] [ 0.9968,    0.9995] [ 0.0003,    0.0028] 
    
COIN = 80 0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
1.0000    
[ 1.0000,    1.0000] 
 0.0000  
  [-0.0000,    0.0000] 
    
Polity = 10 AND    
COIN = 0  0.0640    
[ 0.0265,    0.1015] 
0.5760    
[ 0.3691,    0.7830] 
0.3600    
[ 0.1519,    0.5681] 
    
COIN = 7 0.0005    
[ 0.0000,    0.0009] 
0.8733    
[ 0.7778,    0.9688] 
0.1262    
[ 0.0305,    0.2218] 
    
COIN = 24 0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
0.9947    
[ 0.9896,    0.9998] 
0.0053    
[ 0.0002,    0.0104] 
    
COIN = 80 0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
1.0000   
 [ 1.0000,    1.0000] 
0.0000    






Table 3.26 Polity-Counterinsurgency Interaction Effects. Effects of Polity at Various Levels 
of Counterinsurgency  
Variable and Value Access = 0  Access = 1 Access = 2 
COIN = 0 AND    
Polity = -9 0.2663    
[ 0.1141,    0.4186] 
0.6379    
[ 0.4760,    0.7998] 
0.0958    
[ 0.0338,    0.1578] 
    
Polity = -2 0.1641    
[ 0.0759,    0.2522] 
0.6721    
[ 0.5302,    0.8140] 
0.1639    
[ 0.0661,    0.2616] 
    
Polity = 4 0.1038    
[ 0.0485,    0.1591] 
0.6469    
[ 0.4846,    0.8093] 
0.2493    
[ 0.1027,    0.3958] 
    
Polity = 10  0.0640    
[ 0.0265,    0.1015] 
0.5760    
[ 0.3691,    0.7830] 
0.3600    
[ 0.1519,    0.5681] 
    
COIN = 24 AND    
Polity = -9 0.2477    
[-0.0578,    0.5531] 
0.7516    
[ 0.4458,    1.0573] 
0.0007    
[-0.0001,    0.0016] 
    
Polity = -2 0.0003    
[ 0.0001,    0.0006] 
0.9981   
 [ 0.9968,    0.9995] 
0.0015    
[ 0.0003,    0.0028] 
    
Polity = 4 0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
0.9972    
[ 0.9950,    0.9993] 
0.0028    




    
Polity = 10  0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
0.9947    
[ 0.9896,    0.9998] 
0.0053    
[ 0.0002,    0.0104] 
    
COIN = 80 AND    
Polity = -9 0.2077    
[-0.6050,    1.0203] 
0.7923    
[-0.0203,    1.6050] 
0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
    
Polity = -2 0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
1.0000    
[ 1.0000,    1.0000] 
0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
    
Polity = 4 0.0000   
 [-0.0000,    0.0000] 
1.0000   
 [ 1.0000,    1.0000] 
0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
    
Polity = 10  0.0000    
[-0.0000,    0.0000] 
1.0000   
 [ 1.0000,    1.0000] 
0.0000    






Table 3.27.  Effects of polity at various levels of Counterinsurgency  
   Change in probability when moving from polity min to polity max  
Variable and Value Access=0 Access = 1 Access = 2 
COIN= 0  -0.2023   
[-0.3389,  -0.0657] 
-0.0619   
[-0.1882,   0.0645] 
0.2642   
[ 0.0896,   0.4388] 
    
COIN = 7 -0.2603   
[-0.4291,  -0.0916] 
0.1584   
[ 0.0174,   0.2994] 
0.1019   
[ 0.0145,   0.1893] 
    
COIN = 80 -0.2077 
[-1.0203,   0.6050] 
0.2077   
[-0.6050,   1.0203] 
0.0000   
[-0.0000,   0.0000] 
    
 
Table 3.28.  Effects of counterinsurgency at various level of polity  
 Change in probability when moving from counterinsurgency min to counterinsurgency max  
Variable and Value Access=0 Access = 1 Access = 2 
Polity = -9 -0.0587   
[-0.8673,   0.7500] 
0.1545   
[-0.6399,   0.9489] 
-0.0958   
[-0.1578,  -0.0338] 
    
Polity = -2 -0.1641 
[-0.2522,  -0.0759] 
0.3279   
[ 0.1860,   0.4698] 
-0.1639   
[-0.2616,  -0.0661] 
    
Polity = 10 -0.0640   
[-0.1015,  -0.0265] 
0.4240   
[ 0.2170,   0.6309] 
-0.3600   





Figures 3.24 - 3.29 Polity-Counterinsurgency Interaction Effects 




















Figure 3.24. Polity vs. Pr(Access = 0) 
Pr(Access = 0), COIN 
= 0 
Pr(Access = 0), COIN 
= 24 
























Figure 3.25. Polity vs. Pr(Access = 1) 
Pr(Access = 1), COIN 
= 0 
Pr(Access = 1), COIN 
= 24 



























Figure 3.26. Polity vs. Pr(Access = 2) 
Pr(Access = 2), COIN 
= 0 
Pr(Access = 2), COIN 
= 24 


























Figure 3.27. Counterinsurgency vs. Pr(Access = 0) 
Pr(Access = 0), Polity 
= -9 
Pr(Access = 0), Polity 
= -2 

























Figure 3.28. Counterinsurgency vs. Pr(Access = 1) 
Pr(Access = 1), Polity 
= -9 
Pr(Access = 1), Polity 
= -2 



























Figure 3.29. Counterinsurgency vs. Pr(Access = 2) 
Pr(Access = 2), Polity 
= -9 
Pr(Access = 2), Polity 
= -2 





Table 3.29. Interstate Only Statistical Results, with Regime Data Included 
Variable   Coefficient 
mleq1 
 
Battle Deaths Monadic   8.72e-08    
    (4.80e-06) 
 
Centered Polity Score   .34*    
    (.16) 
      
Parliamentary   11.97***    
    (2.31) 
      
Presidential     16.42***    
    (2.00) 
      
Mixed Regime   11.93***   
     1.78 
      
Royal Dictator   17.12***    
    (1.26) 
     
 Military Dictator    1.94 
    (1.05)      
 
 Enemy Access      .53    
    (.32) 
      
POW Violation    -.21**     
    (.08) 
     
 Capability Symmetry  2.43 
    ( 1.62) 
      
 Attrition    .03 
    (.01) 
      
Counterinsurgency  35.55***   
     4.35 
      
War Goals    -3.81*    
    (1.67)     
 
Polity-COIN Interact   -3.01***    
    (.369) 
     
 Constant      .71 





mleq2                   
 
Battle Deaths Monadic    8.72e-08    
    (4.80e-06) 
      
Centered Polity Score   .34*    
    (.16) 
      
Parliamentary    -4.39 
    (2.40) 
    
Presidential   -2.79    
    (1.84) 
     
Mixed Regime   -2.52    
    (1.86) 
     
Royal Dictator    .57    
     (.94) 
      
Military Dictator   .58 
    ( .96) 
      
Enemy Access    .53  
     ( .32) 
     
POW Violation    -.21**     
    (.08) 
     
Capability Symmetry  2.43 
    (1.62) 
      
Attrition    -.002    
    (.009)     
 
Counterinsurgency  6.19*    
    3.15 
      
War Goals     -17.84***   
    ( 1.45) 
    
Polity-COIN Interact   -.54*    
    (.27)     
 
 Constant   -.68 
    ( .91) 
     




Figure 3.30. Number of States Granting ICRC Low, Moderate, and 


















Figure 3.31. Number of States Granting ICRC Low, Moderate, and 







































































































Table 4.1. Possible ICRC Strategic Considerations   
Organization’s Beliefs about the Empirical World Organization’s Primary Audience/Concern 
Naming and Shaming Works Individual States being Monitored (Avoid 
breaking its confidentiality policy) 
 
Naming and Shaming Does Not Work International humanitarian community  
(Avoid appearing to be captured by states) 
 
Table 4.2. Implications of ICRC Strategic Considerations for “Going Public”  
 Decisions 
 N & S is Efficacious N & S Doesn’t Work 
Humanitarian Community as 
Audience (Don’t Appear to be 
Captured) 
Bandwagon. Go public when 
other organizations do.  
Bandwagon. Go public when 
other organizations do. 
Individual States as Audience 
(Avoid breaking policy) 
Last Resort. Go public when 
other organizations do not 
























Headline  Notes I.D. Topic 
Afghanistan  1995 2 0 1 NSA Afghanistan: Indiscriminate 






Afghanistan 1995 2 0 0 NSA Afghanistan: escalation of 
indiscriminate shelling in Kabul 
 
Appeals made to 
the belligerents ; 
artillery fire on 
city increased  
95/5 V 




of ihl claimed   
96/26 V 
Afghanistan 1997 1 1 0 Northern 
Coalition; 
Taliban 
Afghanistan: ICRC deeply 
concerned about failure to respect 




granted access to 
detainees (but 
the actor denying 
access not 
named) 
97/23 V; A 
Afghanistan 1997 3 0 0 All warring 
parties 
Afghanistan: ICRC calls on all 
parties to protect civilians 
 
 97/27 V 
Afghanistan 1998 2 0 0 No party 
identified 
Afghanistan - ICRC regrets NGO's 
departure from Kabul 
 
Hopes for a 
compromise 














followed up on 











1995 3 1 1 Bosnian 
serb forces 












1996 1 1 1 NSA -  
ABIH 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: release of 
prisoners, ICRC plan of action not 
yet signed by one of the three 
former warring parties 
 
 96/2 A 
Bosnia 
Herzegovina 
1995 2 0 1 Unclear - 
NSA 
Sarajevo market shelled again 
 
 95/42 V 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
1995 1 0 1 NSA Bosnia-Herzegovina: ICRC strongly 




















1996 2 0 0 States and  
non-state 
actors  
Bosnia-Herzegovina: and for 
prisoners still detained 
 
 96/05 Hum 







Burundi 1996 2 0 1 Unclear - 
NSA  
Three ICRC delegates killed in 
Burundi 
 
 96/20 HN 
Chechnya  1996 1 0 1 NSA ICRC in shock: six delegates 
assassinated in Chechnya 
 
ICRC withdraws 









Chechnya 1996 3 0 0 State and 
opposition  
Russian Federation / Northern 
Caucasus : ICRC appeals to the 
warring parties in Chechnya 
 
 96/23 V 
Colombia 1997 2 0 0 Unclear; 
NSA 








Colombia 1999 2 1 1 ELN 
hostages  
Colombia : ICRC forwards Red Cross 
messages for Avianca hostages 
 




1998 1 0 1 Non state 
most likely  
ICRC denounces killing of employee 
in Kinshasa 
 





1998 1 0 1 "Armed 
criminal 
elements" 
The ICRC condemns and deplores 
two serious security incidents 
 




1998 3 0 0 No party 
identified 
Democratic Republic of the Congo: 











1998 3 0 0 All parties 
concerned  
Democratic Republic of the Congo: 






East Timor 1999 3 0 0 Insurgents East Timor: ICRC deeply concerned 






99/50 V; HN 
East Timor 1999 3 0 0 No party 
identified 
East Timor: ICRC urges respect for 
civilians and aid workers 
 
 99/47 V; HN 












1999 3 0 0 States Eritrea/Ethiopia: ICRC urges respect 
for humanitarian rules 
 
 99/11 V 
Eritrea/ 
Ethiopia 
1999 1 1 1 State Eritrea/Ethiopia: ICRC deplores 







1995 2 1 1 State Bosnian Serbs evacuate members 
of croat and muslim minorities 






1995 3  1 0 State and 
opposition  
Former Yugoslavia: simultaneous 
release of prisoners: ICRC insists on 
fulfilment of agreements 
 
 4 V 
Former 
Yugoslavia  
1995 2 1 1 Bosnian 
Serb  
Army 
ICRC evacuates 88 wounded from 
Bratunac and Potocar 
 
Requests access 
to all detainees  
95/32 Hum; A 
Former 
Yugoslavia 
1995 3 1  Serb army;  
Croatian 
authorities  
Former Yugoslavia: assistance and 




large numbers of 
armed serb 
soldiers among 





95/32 Hum; V 
Former 
Yugoslavia  
1999 3 0 0 No party 
identified 
Yugoslavia crisis: statement by the 
International Committee of the Red 
Cross 
 
  Hum 
Indonesia 1996 2 1 1 NSA - OPM Irian Jaya: ICRC contacts OPM 
 










hostage issue  
Israel 1995 1 0 1 Perp non-
state actor 
ICRC condemns deliberate 
targeting of civilians in Jerusalem 
 95/41 V 
Israel 1996 1 0 1 Non-state Israel ICRC condemns killing of 
civilians 
 96/8 V 
Israel 1996 1 1 1 State - 
Israel 
ICRC condemns shelling of civilians 
in southern Lebanon 
 
 96/14 V 
Israel/Lebanon 1996 3 0 0 No party 
identified 
ICRC appeals for respect for civilian 






Israel/Lebanon  1996 3 1 0 No party 
identified 
ICRC appeals for respect for civilian 










The Balkan conflict and respect for 
International Humanitarian Law 
Civilian deaths 
from NATO 
strikes up; lack of 
access to u.s 
troops held by 
yugoslav forces; 
albanians driven 
from their homes 
99/15 V; A 
Liberia 1996 3 0 0 Unclear Liberia: work continues with 








hasn't improved  
96/39 V 
Liberia 1996 2 0 0 Unclear Liberia: ICRC compelled to 















1998 2 1 1 NSA 
(Polisario 
Front) 
Morocco/Western Sahara: ICRC 




long duration of 
captivity (15 yrs) 
 
98/50 V 
Peru 1998 2 1 1 NST - 
MRTA 
The Lima hostage crisis: some 












1997 3 0 0 State-rebel 
dyad 
Republic of Congo: ICRC urges 









1995 3 0 0 Unclear Chechnya: concern for the civilian 
population in the south 
 
 95/22 V 
Russia/ 
Chechnya 
1996 2 1 1 State - 
Russia 
Russian Federation/Chechnya: ICRC 
calls on federal authorities to 
extend ultimatum 
 
 96/27 V 
Russia/ 
Chechnya 









grant access to 
civilians; neither 
side giving access 





1999 3 0 0 All parties 
involved  
Russian Federation/Northern 
Caucasus: ICRC urges respect for 
civilians  
 
 99/58 V 




Rwanda : ICRC warns about 
possible human disaster in 
southern camps 
 








army id-ed.  
Sierra Leone 1995 2 1 0 RUF; gov't 
also named 





Sierra Leone: serious malnutrition 
in the rebel regions 
 
The need to 
allow in 
95/43 Hum; A 
Sierra Leone 1998  3 1 1 Non-state 
rebels 
Sierra Leone: ICRC calls on former 




violations of ihl  
 
98/22 V 




Sierra Leone: ICRC urges respect for 
civilians 
 
 98/06 V 
Sierra Leone 1999 1 0 0 All warring 
parties  
Sierra Leone: Grave concern about 




- red cross 
vehicles stolen  
99/01 V; HN 
Sierra Leone 1999 2 1 1 Sierra 
Leone gov't 




ICRC to withdraw  
99/02 A 
Somalia  1998 1 0 1 NSA Somalia: ICRC and International 
Federation extremely concerned by 






public curiosity  
98/16 V; HN 
Somalia  1998 2 0 1 NSA Somalia: Red Cross/Red Crescent 
hostage crisis enters second week 
 
 98/16 V; HN  
Sri Lanka 1995 2 1 1 Sri Lankan 
gov't 
Sri Lanka: displaced civilians killed 
in air strike 

















Sri Lanka: increase in military 
activity and humanitarian needs 
 
 95/27 Hum 















Tajikistan 1996 3  1 0 Gov't  
And  
Opp 










Two ICRC workers taken hostage in 
Tajikistan 
 97/02 HN 
Tajikistan  1998 1 0 1 NSA ICRC shocked by murder of four UN 
staff members in Tajikistan 
 
 98/29 HN 
Turkey/Northe
rn Iraq 
1995 3 1 1 1 ICRC calls for compliance with 
international law in Turkey and 
Northern Iraq 
 






1995 1  1 1 Zaire army Zaire / Rwanda / Burundi: ICRC 
voices acute anxiety 
 







Table 4.3b. ICRC News Releases, 2000 - 2005  
 









Target is State? Headline  Notes I.D.  
Afghanistan 2001 3 0 0 All warring 
parties 
Afghanistan: ICRC calls on 




Mention of public 
statements made by 
leaders (not identified) 
that no quarter would 
be taken.  
01/58 V 
Afghanistan 2001 3 0 0 All warring 
parties 
Developing situation in 




reports of summary 
executions of prisoners  
01/54 V 
Afghanistan 2001 3 0 0 Warring 
parties 
Afghanistan: Preparing to 
help the most vulnerable 
through the winter 
 
Concerned about lack 
of access to rural areas 
01/44 A 
Afghanistan  2001 3 0 0 All warring 




Afghanistan: ICRC calls on 
all parties to conflict to 
respect international 
humanitarian law 








Afghanistan 2001 3 0 0 No actor 
identified  
Afghanistan: Concern 
about growing mine 
threat 
 
 01/39 V 
Afghanistan 2001 2 1 0 State identified 
but also non-
state actor 
Bombing and occupation 
of ICRC facilities in 
Afghanistan 
 
U.S. criticized for 
dropping bomb on ICRC 
building (for second 
time) after having been 
notified of ICRC 
location. Armed men 
also looted another 
office.  
01/48 V; HN 
Afghanistan 2002 2 0 0 State and non-
state actor 
Afghan Conflict - Budget 




makes difficult to know 
who is responsible for 
civilians; in areas 
where Coalition forces 
are active impossible to 






Afghanistan 2003 1 0 0 No actor 
identified  
Red Cross / Red Crescent 
deplores killing of aid 
workers in Afghanistan 
 
 03/57 HN 
Algeria 2002 2 0 0 State Algeria: Sixth series of Wants to "step up 










ensure that detainees 
are protected "from 
the moment of arrest" 
Algeria 2002 2 1 0 State Algeria: Seventh series of 
ICRC visits to detainees 
 
Just statement of 
access to detainees. No 
criticism made.  
02/47 A 
Bolivia 2003 2 0 0 All warring 
parties 
Bolivia: ICRC response 
 





2005 2 1  
 
1 Bosnian Serb 
army 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ten 
years after fall of 
Srebrenica, families of 
missing persons continue 
to suffer 
 
Bemoans lack of 
knowledge about fate 
of missing; condemns 
Srebrenica massacre 
05/60 V 
Burundi 2002 2 0 0 No actor 
identified 
Burundi: tragic death of 
an ICRC staff member 
 
"Uncontrolled 
availability of light 
weaponry" identified 
as causal factor  
02/59 HN 
Burundi 2003 2 0 0 Gov't and 
opposition 
groups 














identified   refugee camp  
Central African 
Republic 
2003 2 0 0 State parties 
agreed  
Central African Republic: 
ICRC evacuates 25 
religious personnel 
 
Evacuated from Central 
African Republic to 
Chad 
3/04 Hum 
Colombia 2000 1 1 0 Two insurgent 
organizations 
Colombia: ICRC condemns 




evacuations of wounded 
combatants 
 
IDs two insurgent 
organizations that 
killed wounded being 
evacuated by ICRC 




Colombia 2002 2 0 0 State and 
insurgents 
Colombia: Monitoring the 
situation 
 
Reminding of IHL obs 
given breakdown of 
negotations bw 
Colombia and FARC  
02/09 V 
Colombia 2002 2 0 0 All parties  Colombia : Aid for people 
affected by fighting in the 
river Truandó area 
 
 02/43 Hum 




Mention of 504 
allegations of ihl 











 cases followed up  
Cote d'Ivoire 2002  3 0 0 All parties to 
conflict  
Côte d'Ivoire: ICRC 
appeals for humanitarian 






Cote d'Ivoire 2002 2 0 0 All belligerents  Côte d'Ivoire: ICRC 
concerned by growing 







Cote d'Ivoire 2002 2 0 1 Some implicit 
criticism of 
rebel access 
Côte d'Ivoire: Assistance 
for victims of insurrection 
 
Negotiating security 
guarantees to enter 
towns held by rebels 
02/39 A 
Cote d'Ivoire 2002 3  0 0 All arms 
bearers 
Côte d'Ivoire: ICRC urges 




prohibition of summary 




Cote d'Ivoire 2002 3   0 0 Warring 
parties  
Côte d'Ivoire: ICRC 
reiterates its appeal 
 
Mentions allegations of 
summary executions 
after mass graves 
found 
02/77 V 
Cote d'ivoire 2004 3 0 0 No actor Côte d’Ivoire: ICRC calls on 
armed forces to respect 







identified  international 
humanitarian law 
 
Cote d'Ivoire 2004 2 0 0 No party 
identified 











Cote D'Ivoire 2004 2 0 0 State Côte d'Ivoire: Distribution 
of emergency aid 
 
Authorities responsible 
for security of 





Cote d'Ivoire 2004 2 0 0 No actor 
identified 
Côte d'Ivoire: action to 
help victims of the 
demonstrations 
 
Very concerned by 
indiscriminate nature 
of violence  
04/45 V 
Cote d'Ivoire 2004 2 1 
 
1 NSA Côte d’Ivoire: What the 
Red Cross is doing 
 
Identification of two 
rebel groups that 










2000 3 0 0 States Democratic Republic of 
the Congo: Fighting in 
Kisangani - ICRC urges 
respect for civilians 
 












2 0 1 Unidentified 
assailants  
Six ICRC staff killed in 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
 
 01/14 HN 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 




Democratic Republic of 
the Congo: Urgent 
medical aid in Uvira 
 





Republic of the 
Congo 
2003 2 0 0 No actors 
identified  
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo: two Red Cross 
volunteers killed in Bunia 
 
Second time in the 




2000 3 0 0 States Eritrea/Ethiopia: ICRC 
urges respect for 
humanitarian law 
 
 00/14 V 
Ethiopia 2002 2 0 0 States Ethiopia: Release of last 
prisoners of war and 
civilian internees visited 
by the ICRC in connection 
with the conflict between 
Ethiopia and Eritrea 
Last detainees released 











2001 2 0 0 No actor 
named  
Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia: ICRC 




isolated civilians, esp 







2001 2 0 0 No actor 
identified 
Former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia: ICRC brings 
food to civilians in Lipkovo 
 
Concerned about 






2004 1 0 0 NSA ICRC appeals for 
immediate release of 
hostages in North Ossetia 
 
"is well acquainted 
with the suffering of 
the population there" 
but the taking of 
hostages, esp. children, 




2004 3 0 0 Warring 
parties 
ICRC calls for respect for 
international 




IHL reminders  04/47 V 
Haiti 2004 2  0 0 No actors id-ed Haiti: Situation alarming 
 
Concerned by armed 









Haiti 2005 2 0 0 Unidentified ICRC staff member 
abducted and found dead 
in Haiti 
 
 05/37 HN 
India- 
Pakistan 
2000 1 0 0 States; All 
weapons 
bearers 
ICRC deplores civilian 
deaths in Jammu and 
Kashmir 
 
 00/28 V 
Indonesia 2000 1 0 0 Unclear Indonesia: ICRC deeply 
shocked by killings of 
UNHCR staff in West 
Timor 
 
In response ICRC 
withdrew from East 
Timor.  
00/33 HN 
Indonesia 2002 2 0 1 Unidentified 
actor 
Indonesia: Red Cross 
response to Bali bombing 
 
Condemns act of 
terrorism  
02/42 V 
Indonesia 2005 2 0 0 No party 
identified 
Indonesia Bulletin No. 7 - 
26 May 2005 
 
Mention of prison visits 







Iraq 2000 2 0 0 No party 
identified 
Update 01 on ICRC 
activities in Iraq 
 













Iraq 2003 2 0 0 All warring 
parties 
Iraq: Water supply partly 




assurances to permit 
icrc to work  
03/21 Hum;  
A (+) 
Iraq 2003 1 1 0 Coalition 
forces and 
opposition  
Iraq: ICRC calls urgently 
for protection of the 
civilian population and 
services and of persons no 
longer fighting 
 
Critical of the Coalition 
Forces for not 
adequately controlling 
occupied territory; 
critical of opposition 
for not granting access 
to detainees  
03/28 V; A 
Iraq 2003 1 0 1 Unidentified 
actor  
Iraq: ICRC condemns 
attack 
 
 03/58 V 
Iraq 2003 2 0 0 Unidentified 
actor  
Iraq: Two ICRC employees 
killed in Baghdad bomb 
attack 
 
The org will be 
reassessing its working 
conditions in the region 
03/71 HN 
Iraq 2003 2 0 0 No actor 
identified 
ICRC support for hospitals 
in Najaf 
 
Appalled by increasing 
numbers of 
indiscriminate attacks  
03/61 Hum; 
V 
Iraq 2004 2 0 0 No actor 
identified  
Iraq: Emergency medical 
aid reaches Najaf 
 
Concern about civilians 









Iraq 2004 2 0 0 All warring 
parties 
Iraq: ICRC delivers 
emergency humanitarian 
aid to Samarra 
 
Expresses concern 




Iraq 2004 2 0 0 State and NSA Iraq : Emergency 
humanitarian assistance 
provided to the 








Iraq 2004 3 0 0 All belligerents Iraq: Civilians must be 
spared and the sick and 
wounded treated 
 
Concerned by reports 
that wounded cannot 
receive adequate 
medical care  
04/62 V 
Iraq 2004 3 0 0 All warring 
parties 
Iraq : ICRC calls for greater 






Iraq 2004 2 0 0 State Iraq: What the Geneva 
Conventions say about 
the future of persons 
deprived of their freedom 
 
Clarifying ICRC's 
position on this. 
Corrects media reports 
- ICRC doesn't think 
that all Iraqi POWs 
should be immediately 
released 
04/42 V 







parties plight of civilians in Iraq 
 
Iraq 2005 2 0 1 Unidentified 
actor  
Iraq: ICRC staff member 
killed 
 
 05/03 HN 
Israel 2003 2 1 1 State Gaza Strip: Group 
wedding celebrated under 
relief tents 
 
Wedding celebrated by 
those who had homes 






Israel 2001 3 1 1 State Conference of High 







applicability of 4th GC 
to territories occupied 
by Israel  
01/65 V 
Israel 2001 2 1 1 State Israel and the 
occupied/autonomous 
territories: The ICRC starts 
its "Closure Relief 
Programme" 
 
Views policy of 
isolating whole villages 













Israel 2002 1 1 0 Israel; 
palestinian 
actors 
ICRC: Civilians must not be 
attacked 
 
Critical of both sides 







Israel 2003 2 1 1 State - Israel Israel and West Bank: 
ICRC extends emergency 
relief 
 










2004 1 1 1 State Gaza Strip: ICRC deeply 
concerned over house 
destructions in Rafah 
 
Finds destruction of 
homes as a general 
security precaution to 







2000 3  0 0 States and NSA Lebanon and northern 
Israel: ICRC appeals for 
civilians to be spared and 







Israel/ 2000 2 1 1 State Update 00/01 on 
Activities of the 
Critical of Israel's role 
in blocking access of 







Palestine International Red Cross 






the PRCS to the 
injured. Labels this a 
violation of the GC. 











territories: Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Movement 
urges respect for civilians 
and for all medical 
personel 
 
 00/37 V 
Israel/ 
Palestine 
2000 3 0 0 Non-state  Israel/Occupied 
Territories/Autonomous 
Territories: Respect for 
medical personnel 
 
IDF reports of shooting 
from PRCS vehicle; 
PRCS denies. ICRC  
acknowledges history 






2000 3 1 1 Mainly state ICRC appeal to all involved 
in violence in the Near 
East 
 
Highly critical of Israeli 
policy in occupied 
territory, particularly 
Israeli settlements, 
curfew, and cordoning 










2001 2 1 0 Israel Palestine Red Crescent 
official killed 
 
Also mentioned Israelis 






2002 1 1 1  Israel Movement expresses 
deep concern about 




lack of access due to 







2002 2 1 1 State Israel and the 
occupied/autonomous 










2002 2 0 0 Abduction by 
NSA; PA role in 
release 
mentioned  
Gaza Strip : Abducted 
ICRC delegate released 
 
Thanks Palestinian 
Authority for its 
assistance in making 
this happy outcome 









Mention again of the 





Israel/ 2002 3  1 1 State Israel and the occupied 
and autonomous 
Very critical of Israel; 
responsible for deaths 







Palestine  territories:ICRC appeals 
for protection of medical 
staff 
 
of PRCS medics 
Israel/ 
Palestine 
2002 3 1 1 NSA - PRCS The ICRC calls for respect 
of the medical mission 
 
Explosive material 
found in PRCS 








2002 3 0 
 
0  All parties The ICRC urges respect for 
medical services 
 
Critical of restrictions 
put on PRCS and ICRC 








2002 1 0 0 All warring 
parties  
ICRC condemns bomb 
attacks on civilians 
 
Fairly balanced in 




2002 2 0 0 State and NSA Israel and the occupied 
and autonomous 
territories: Red Crescent 
ambulance driver saved 
by bullet-proof vest 
 
Details near-death of 
one ambulance driver 
and many other 
deaths. Mentions 
Israeli renewal of 
security guarantees.  




2002 2 0 0 No actors 
identified  
Israel, the occupied and 
the autonomous 
territories. Facts and 
figures on recent ICRC 
Upsurge of violence 














2002 2 0 0 Warring 
parties  







to authorities bw June 
and Sept. Israel placing 








2003  3 0 0 State and non-
state 
The medical mission must 
be respected and 
protected 
 








2003 1 1 0 State and NSA Israel and the occupied 
and autonomous 
Palestinian territories: 
Deliberate attacks on 
civilians must stop 
 
Condemn targeted 
killings by israel, as well 
as attacks on civilians 
by terrorist groups ; 
highlights applicability 




2003 2 1 1 State Gaza Strip: ICRC aids 
hundreds of families after 
homes destroyed 
 





2003 2 1 1 State Gaza Strip: Urgent 
distribution of food and 
Israeli operation sealed 
off Beit Hanoun; no 













2004 3 1 0  State and non-
state 
opposition  
Israel and the occupied / 
autonomous territories: 





applicability of the 4th 
gc in the occupied 
territories. But also 
makes general 
statements applicable 






2004 3 1 1 State Gaza Strip: civilians must 




Critical of israeli 
military ops resulting in 







2004 1 1 1 State Israel/Occupied and 
Autonomous Palestinian 
Territories: West Bank 
Barrier causes serious 
humanitarian and legal 
problems 
 
Highly critical of West 
Bank barrier; argues 
the barrier violates IHL 
 
04/12 V 
Israel/Lebanon 2004 2 0 0 State and NSA Israel / Lebanon: 













 Hezbollah  
Liberia 2003 3  0 0 Warring 
parties 




Mention of bombing in 
capital previous day  
03/44 V 
Liberia 2004 3 0 0 No actor 
identified  
Liberia: ICRC concerned 










2001 2 1 1 NSA (Polisario 
Front) 
Morocco/Western Sahara: 
ICRC once again visits 
Moroccan prisoners of 
Polisario Front 
 
Objects to long 
duration of detainees' 





2002 2 1 1 NSA Morocco / Western 
Sahara: ICRC visits 396 
families of Moroccan 
prisoners held by the 
Polisario Front 
 
Concerned about the 
length of these 





2002 2 1 1 NSA Morocco / Western 
Sahara - New visit to 
Moroccans held by 
Polisario Front 
Concerned about 
duration of captivity, 
















2 1 1 State and NSA Morocco/Western Sahara: 
101 Moroccan prisoners 
released and repatriated 
 
Concerned about 





2003 2 1 1 Polisario Front; 
NSA 
Morocco / Western 
Sahara: ICRC visits 
Moroccan prisoners in 
Polisario hands 
 
Calls for immediate 
release of detainees 
held for over 20 years  
03/56 V 
Nepal 2002 2 0 0 No actor 
identified 
Nepal: ICRC helps victims 
of conflict 
 
Bemoans lack of access 
to medical facilities for 
civilians and the ICRC 
02/16 A 
Nepal  2003 3 0 0 Unidentified 
actor 
Nepal: Red Cross emblem 
must be respected 
 
 03/65 HN 




Nepal: Red Cross helps 
victims of bus attack, 
urges respect for civilians 
 
Attack on civilian bus  
 
05/47 V 
Peru 2002 1 0 1 NSA - actor not 
yet identified  
ICRC condemns Lima 
attack 
Attack on civilian 











Philippines 2005 3 0 0 All warring 
parties 
Philippines: ICRC and 
Philippine National Red 
Cross remain concerned 
about plight of Sulu 
civilians 
 
 05/56 Hum 
Philippines 2005 3  0 0 State and NSA Philippines: ICRC urges 
respect for humanitarian 
law 
 
 05/10 V 
Republic of 
Congo 
2002 2 0 0 Armed men Republic of the Congo: 
ICRC calls for swift release 
of two abducted staff 
members 
 
 02/78 HN 
Republic of the 
Congo 
2002 2 0 0 Parties 
concerned  
Republic of the Congo: 
ICRC evacuates wounded 




from police authorities 
so able to complete 
work without 
hindrance; special 
mention of protection 
of women in ihl.  
02/35 V; A 
(+) 







Congo unidentified  two ICRC staff members 
abducted 
 
Russia 2000 2 0 0 State and NSA Russian Federation: 
President Putin meets 
ICRC President 
 
Mentions of Russia's 
commitment to 
providing ICRC security 
guarantees; mention of 
reports of IHL 
violations  
00/04 V; A 
(+) 
Russia  2002 2 0 0 No actor 
identified 
Russian Federation: After 
a bomb blast 
 
Providing aid after an 
attack on marketplace  
02/18 Hum 
Russia 2002 2  0 0 No actor 
identified  
Abduction of NGO 
representatives in 
northern Caucasus 
 02/43 HN 
Russia 2002 2 0 0 Hostage-taking 
done by NSA 
Russian Federation: ICRC 
staff evacuate eight 
children from Moscow 
theatre 
 
Clarifying that despite 
reports it is not 
involved in 
negotiations between 
gov't and rebels. 
02/61 Hum 
Russia 2002 2 0 1 Actor not 
identified  
Russian Federation: ICRC 
provides humanitarian aid 
for Moscow hostages 
 












2002 1 0 1 Unidentified 
actor  
Russian Federation / 
Chechnya: ICRC condemns 
killing of civilians, helps 
medics 
 
 02/85 V; 
Hum 
Russia 2003 2 0 0 Cooperation 
from local 
government 
Russian Federation: Ten 
years of ICRC presence in 
the Northern Caucasus 
 
Praise of high level of 
support from 
authorities in the 
region  
03/84 A (+) 
Russia 
 
2003 2 0 1 Unidentified 
actor 
Russian Federation / 
Chechnya: ICRC provides 
vital assistance in the 







2001 2 1 1 State (Russia) ICRC local employee 
wounded in Chechnya 
 
ICRC employee with 
red cross emblem shot 
by Russian authorities; 
suspending work in 







2003 2 0 0 Warring 
parties 
The North Caucasus and 


















2004 2 0 0  Unidentified 
armed 
individuals 
Russian Federation / 
Chechnya: Red Cross still 







Sierra Leone 2000 3 0 0 Non-state Sierra Leone: ICRC helps 
displaced amid concerns 
over child-soldiers 
 
 00/19 Hum 
Sri Lanka 2000  3 0 0 States and 
non-state 
opposition  
Sri Lanka: ICRC urges both 
parties to respect civilians 
 
 00/13 V 
Sudan 2001 2 0 0 Non state but 
not criticized 
Sudan: release of 21 
prisoners 
 
Rebel group releases 
prisoners. 
01/64 Hum 
Sudan 2001 2 0 0 Armed groups Sudan: ICRC resumes its 
flights 
 
Resumes flights after 
concludes that 




Sudan 2003 2 0 0 No party 
identified 
Sudan: Emergency aid for 
people displaced by 
fighting in Darfur 
 











Praise  03/21 V (+) 
Sudan 2004 2 0 0 No party 
identified 
Sudan: ICRC and SRCS 
strive to deploy 
meaningful action in 
Darfur 
 
In response to appeal 
of sudanese authorities 
to increase aid to 
civilian population; 
ICRC trying to increase 
presence in region  
04/32 Hum 
Sudan 2004 3 1 1 State Sudan: ICRC president 




Mention of "serious 
violations of IHL" 
occurring "under the 
responsibility of the 
government" of Sudan.  
04/71 V 
Sudan 2005 2 1 1 State and NSA ICRC and Sudan agree 
terms of detainee releases 
 
Gov't has signed 
agreement; waiting on 
SPLA to sign  
05/8 Hum; 
V 
Sudan 2005 2 0 0 All warring 
parties 
Sudan: food shortages 
and aid dependence set to 
continue in Darfur 
 
Dire economic 
situation the result of 
violations of IHL 
05/28 Hum; 
V 









U.S. and the 
War on Terror 
2004 2 1 1 State The ICRC's work at 
Guantanamo Bay 
 
Won't confirm or deny 







U.S. in Iraq 2004 2 1 0 State Report by the ICRC on the 
coalition forces’ 
treatment of persons held 
in Iraq 
 
Disturbed report was 




treatment of detainees  
04/35 V 
U.S. War on 
Terror 
2004 1 1 1 State United States: ICRC 




Bemoans lack of 
progress on indefinite 
detention issue in 
Guantanamo and 
elsewhere; says certain 
improvements in 
conditions not made 
04/03 V 
U.S. war on 
terror 
2004 2 0 0 State ICRC reactions to the 




part of U.S. of the ICRC 





Uganda  2005 2 0 0 No actor Uganda: ICRC distributes 
aid in fire-ravaged camp 
A possible pattern of 








identified  for the displaced 
 
camps  
Uganda 2005 2 0 0 Agreement 
signed with 
Ugandan state 
Uganda: ICRC operations, 
resumed in 2004, set to 
grow in 2005 
 
Resumed ops in 2004 
after death of six ICRC 








2002 2 1 1 State Uzbekistan: Joint ICRC-






for meeting needs of  
populace  
02/10 Hum 
Uzbekistan 2002 2 1 1 State Uzbekistan: ICRC 
encounters difficulties in 
visiting places of 
detention 
 
Conditions of detention 
visits unfulfilled; visits 
suspended by ICRC.   
02/25  A 




Yugoslavia: ICRC responds 
to the crisis in detention 
places in Serbia 
 
Response to mutinies 
in 3 serbian prisons  
00/45 V 
Yugoslavia 2001 2 0 0 No party 
identified 
Yugoslavia / Kosovo: 
Second edition of the 
Reiterates rights of 
families to know fate of 














Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics on Publicity Data 
 Going Public Severity 
(1 - 3) 
Perpetrator Identified (0 
- 1) 
Asymmetrical Criticism (0 
- 1) 
Mean  2.11 0.34 0.38 
Standard Deviation 0.67 0.47 0.49 
Median 2.00 0 0 
Mode 2.00 0 0 






Table 4.5. Civil Conflicts Receiving the Most ICRC Publicity, 1995 - 2005 
Conflict Number of News Releases 
Bosnian Serb Rebellion of 1992 - 1995 4 
Second Burundi War of 1993-1998 3 
First Chechnya War of 1994-1996   5 
Croatia-Krajina War of 1995   4 
Second Sierra Leone War of 1998-2000 4 
Africa's World War of 1998-2002 4 (all directed at D.R. of Congo) 
Second Chechnya War of 1999 - 2003 12 
First Nepal Maoist Insurgency of 2001-2003 3 
Invasion of Afghanistan, 2002 8 
Cote d'Ivoire Military War of 2002-2004 10 
Darfur War of 2003-2006 6 
Invasion of Iraq, 2003  14 










Kargil War of 1999  
Algerian Islamic Front War of 1992-1999 
Second Liberia War of 1992 - 1995 
Second Cambodian Civil War of 1993-1997 
Iraqi Kurd Internecine of 1994-1995   
Sixth Iraqi Kurds War of 1996 
Fifth DRC War of 1996-1997 
Third Rwanda War of 1997-1998 
Guinea-Bissau Military War of 1998-1999 
Fourth Chad (Togoimi Revolt) War of 1998 - 2000   
Third Angolan War of 1998 - 2002 
Second Congo (Brazaaville) War of 1998 - 1999 
First Nigeria Christian-Muslim War of 1999-2000 
The Oromo Liberation War of 1999 (Ethiopia) 
Second Philippine-Moro War of 2000 - 2001   
Third Aceh War of 2003-2004 
Waziristan War of 2004-2006 (Pakistan) 
Second Nigeria Christian-Muslim War of 2004 
First Yemeni Cleric War of 2004-2005 




Table 4.6b. Low-Intensity Civil Wars Lacking ICRC Publicity, 1995 - 2005 
Bangladesh  Chittagong Hills  1975 - 1997 
Burma   Karens/KNU  1948 - ongoing 
Burma   Shan/SSA   1959 - ongoing 
Central African Republic Military factions  1996 - 1997 
China   Xinjiang   1991 - ongoing 
Egypt   al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya 1993 - 1998 
Guatemala   URNG   1966 - 1995 
Mali   Tuaregs   1990 - 1995 
Pakistan   MQM   1990 - 1996  
Papa New Guinea BRA   1989 - 1998 
Senegal   Casamance/MFDC 1990 - 2003 







Table 4. 7. News Releases Issued in Interstate Wars, 1995 - 2005 
War Combatants Number of News Releases 
Cenepa Valley War of 1995 Ecuador, Peru 1 
Badme Border War of 1998-2000 Eritrea, Ethiopia  2 
War for Kosovo of 1999 Serbia, NATO  2 
Kargil War of 1999 India, Pakistan 0 
Invasion of Afghanistan of 2001 Afghanistan, United States 8 
Invasion of Iraq of 2003 Iraq, United States and Allies 14 
   
Table 4.8. ICRC News Releases by Topic, 1995 - 2005 
Topic Number of Releases,  
1995 - 1999  
Number of Releases, 
2000 - 2005 
Access 10 23 
Violation 46 86 
Humanitarian Neutrality 11 24 






Table 4.9. State Access and ICRC Publicity Decisions  
 Low access  High access  
     
Low publicity  Second Turkish Kurds 
War  
 Second Liberia   
 Algerian Civil War   Sixth Iraqi Kurds   
 First Congo 
Brazaaville   
 Fifth DRC War   
 Tajikistan Civil War    Third Rwanda War 
 
 
   Kosovo 
Independence  
 
   Guinea Bissau 
Military War  
 
   Second Philippine 
Moro War  
 
   Fourth Rwanda   
   Third Aceh War   
   Fifth Chad War   
     
High publicity     
 First Chechnya War   Croatia-Krajina War   
   Third Liberia War 
 
 




   Africa's World War 
 
 
   Third Burundi War 
 
 








Table 4.10. Access and Publicity Patterns in Recurring Wars 
War Access Level Publicity Level Publicity Pattern 
First Sierra Leone 
 









    


















    
Second Burundi 
 





















    
First Nepal Maoist 
 









    
Second Aceh War 
 









    
First Congo Brazaaville 
 









    

















Table 4. 11. Access and Publicity Data with Number of Battle Deaths   
 Low access  High access Avg 
     
Low publicity  Second Turkish Kurds 
War 
Turkey: 3,500 
Kurds: 13, 300 
Total:  16,800 
 
 Second Liberia War 
 (.) 
Low publicity  
Average:  
5,785.46 
 Algerian Civil War: 
15, 016 
 Sixth Iraqi Kurds 
Combatant deaths:  
2,500 
 




 Fifth DRC War:  
4,000 
 
 Tajikistan Civil War:  
20,000 
 Third Rwanda War 
3,300 
 














   Fourth Rwanda: 
1,045 
 
   Third Aceh War 
GAM: 1,400 
Indonesia: 150 
Total: 1,550  
 





 Cell Average: 13,954  Cell Average: 2,155   
High publicity     
 First Chechnya War 
Chechnya: 6,000 
Russia: 4,000 











   Second Sierra 
Leone War 3568 
 
   Africa's World War 
7036 
 
   Cote D'Ivoire 
Military War 
Rebels: 2500 
Cote d'ivoire: 200 
Total: 2700 
 
 Cell Avg: 10,000  Cell Avg: 3,432.40  
     
Average:  Low Access Average: 
13,163.2 












Table 4.12 Access and Publicity Data with Democracy Score 
 Low access  High access  
     
Low publicity  Second Turkish Kurds 
War : 7.78 
 Second Liberia War: 
-77, polity2 = 0 
Low publicity 
Avg: -1.87 
 Algerian Civil War: 
-4.5 
 Sixth Iraqi Kurds: -9  
 First Congo 
Brazaaville :  -6 
 Fifth DRC War: -77; 
polity2= 0 
 
 Tajikistan Civil War : 
 -5.83 
 Third Rwanda War: 
-6 
 
   Kosovo 
Independence: -6 
 
   Guinea Bissau 
Military War: -77, 
 -88; polity 2 =1.5, 
 
   Second Philippine 
Moro War: 8 
 
   Fourth Rwanda: -4  
   Third Aceh War:  7   
   Fifth Chad War: -2  
     
 Cell Avg: -2.14  Cell avg excl 
standardized codings:  
-1.71  
 
   -77 scores: 3  
   -88 scores: 1  
 Range -7:9  Range: -9:8  
     
High publicity     
     
 First Chechnya War: 
3 
 Croatia-Krajina War: 
 -5 
High publicity 
Avg = -.11 




   Second Sierra Leone 
War 
-77; polity2 = 0 
 
   Africa's World War 
-77, polity2=0 
 
   Third Burundi War: 
-88; polity2 = 1.67 
 
   Cote D'Ivoire Military 





 Cell Avg: 3  Cell Avg: -1.67  
   -77 scores: 3  






Table 4.13. Access and Publicity Data, with Compliance Information   
 Low access  High access  
     
Low publicity  Second Turkish Kurds 
War: .8 
Restrained Coercion   
 Second Liberia : . Low publicity 
average:  
1.29 
 Algerian Civil War: 
1.4 
High Coercion  
 Sixth Iraqi Kurds : 0  
 First Congo 
Brazaaville: 1   
Cleansing  
 Fifth DRC War: .   
 Tajikistan Civil War:  
0   
 Third Rwanda War: 1 
 
 
   Kosovo 
Independence : . 
 
   Guinea Bissau 
Military War: 3  
 
   Second Philippine 
Moro War: 1 
 
   Fourth Rwanda : 3  
   Third Aceh War: 1 




   Fifth Chad War: 2  
Cleansing 
 
 Cell Average: .8  Cell Average: 1.58  
     
High publicity     
 First Chechnya War: 
2 
Coercion   




Average:  1.28 
   Third Liberia War: 0 
 
 
 Cell Average: 2  Second Sierra Leone 
War: .  
Restrained coercion  
 
 
   Africa's World War: 1 
(. from 1998 - 2000) 
 
 







   Cote D'Ivoire Military 
War: 2.33  
 
   Cell Average: 1.13  
 Low Access Average:  
1.04 








Table 4.14. Access and Publicity Data, with Level of Rebel Access 
 Low access  High access  
     
Low publicity  Second Turkish Kurds 
War (Mixed - partial, 
null, full) 





 Algerian Civil War 
(None)  
 Sixth Iraqi Kurds (Full)   Low publicity 
percentage 
partial: 7.14% 
 First Congo 
Brazaaville  (None) 
 Fifth DRC War 






 Tajikistan Civil War 
(Partial)   






   Kosovo 
Independence 
(Mixed: Full, Missing)  
 
   Guinea Bissau 
Military War (Full) 
 
   Second Philippine 
Moro War (None) 
 
   Fourth Rwanda 
(None)  
 
   Third Aceh War 
(None)  
 
   Fifth Chad War 
(None) 
 
     
 Cell Percentage 
None: 50% 
 




 Cell Percentage 
Partial: 25% 




 Cell Percentage 
Mixed, Sometimes 
Full: 25% 




   Cell Percentage Full: 
30% 
 
High publicity     
 First Chechnya War 
(Mixed: Full, partial)  




























   Third Burundi War = 
(None) 
 
   Cote D'Ivoire Military 
War =  (None) 
 
     
 Cell Percentage 
None:  
0% 




 Cell Percentage 
Partial: 0% 




 Cell Percentage 
Mixed, Sometimes 
Full: 100% 




   Cell Percentage Full: 
50 % 
 
     
 Low access 
percentage None: 
40% 




 Low access 
percentage partial: 
20% 




 Low access 
percentage mixed, 
sometimes full: 40%  
 High access 
percentage mixed, 
sometimes full: 12.5%  
 
 Low access 
percentage full: 0% 










Table 4.15. Access and Publicity Data, with Cultural Variable (Salience of Politicized Islam) 
 Low access  High access  
     




 Second Liberia 
War.  
 




 Algerian Civil War 
(Muslim majority, 
Islamist opposition) 
 Sixth Iraqi Kurds 
(Muslim majority 
country; some role 
for politicized 
Islam in conflict, 
but  not primary.  
 
 First Congo 
Brazaaville 
 Fifth DRC War  
 Tajikistan Civil War 
(Muslim majority;  
Islamist opposition) 
 Third Rwanda War  





Islam didn't play 








not majority; Islam 
doesn't play role 
in war) 
 
   Second Philippine 




   Fourth Rwanda  
   Third Aceh War 
(Muslim Majority 
Country, Some 
Role of Disputes 
over 
Interpretations of 
















 Cell Percentage: 75%  Cell Percentage: 
50% 
 
     
High publicity     




Islam not Salient) 









   Second Sierra 
Leone War  
(Muslim majority 
country; Islam not 
salient in conflict)  
 









 Cell Percentage: 
100% 
 Cell Percentage:  
20% 
 














Table 4.16 Summary of Hypotheses and Results  
Variable Direction Predicted Results 
H1 Pro-State Bias Publicity more often 
against non-state 
actors 
Tentative support  
H2 Major Funder Bias Publicity less 
frequent against 
major donors 
No support  
H3 Democratic States with 




Support; Evidence for 
the Combination of 
these two Factors 
H4 Lack of access vs. 
Violation 
Publicity more likely 
about lack of access 
than about violation  
No support; Evidence in 
tentative support of 
opposite pattern.  
H5 Duration of Access  Increases publicity  Tentative support 
H6 Bandwagoning when 
International Audiences 
Key 
Increases publicity Not tested; Perhaps 
illustrated in Israel 
example 
H7 Political Islam  Publicity less likely in 
such conflicts 
Tentative support 
H8 Muslim-majority states  Publicity less likely 
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Appendix A. Robustness Checks on Statistical Regressions 
I. Robustness Checks, Full Version Data 
A. Including Lagged Version of Dependent Variable  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Generalized Ordered Logit Estimates                Number of obs   =  213 
                                                     Wald chi2(22)   =    8499.07 
                                                     Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood = -166.86792                  Pseudo R2       =     0.2591 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       |               Robust 
  Access Measure  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
mleq1                  | 
Lagged Access Measure |  -.1642486   .3024195    -0.54   0.587    -.7569799    .4284826 
Battle Deaths Annual  |  -2.63e-06   1.74e-06    -1.51   0.130    -6.04e-06    7.75e-07 
Battle Deaths Monadic |  -2.86e-06   1.04e-06    -2.75   0.006    -4.89e-06   -8.24e-07 
Polity Score  |   .1682712   .0786132     2.14   0.032     .0141921    .3223503 
Durability   |   .0219003   .0103037     2.13   0.034     .0017054    .0420952 
Auto Regime Change |  -12.80389   .7559154   -16.94   0.000    -14.28546   -11.32232 
Presidential  |   17.04919   1.051798    16.21   0.000     14.98771    19.11068 
Parliamentary   |  -39.56466   1.383953   -28.59   0.000    -42.27716   -36.85216 
Mixed Regime  |   16.60581   .8071376    20.57   0.000     15.02385    18.18778 
Royal Dictator   |   18.39278   .7778544    23.65   0.000     16.86822    19.91735 
Military Dictator |  -.0966064   .4792705    -0.20   0.840    -1.035959    .8427466 




Capability Symmetry |   1.672635   .6830165     2.45   0.014     .3339468    3.011322 
Polity-Parl Interact  |   6.138386   .2247754    27.31   0.000     5.697834    6.578938 
Polity-B. Deaths Interact|  -3.29e-07   2.34e-07    -1.40   0.160    -7.88e-07    1.30e-07 
 Constant  |   .3479307   .4577552     0.76   0.447     -.549253    1.245114 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
mleq2                  | 
Lagged Access Measure |   .5327376   .3250823     1.64   0.101     -.104412    1.169887 
Battle Deaths Annual  |  -2.63e-06   1.74e-06    -1.51   0.130    -6.04e-06    7.75e-07 
 Battle Deaths Monadic  |  -2.86e-06   1.04e-06    -2.75   0.006    -4.89e-06   -8.24e-07 
Polity Score   |   .1682712   .0786132     2.14   0.032     .0141921    .3223503 
 Durability  |   .0219003   .0103037     2.13   0.034     .0017054    .0420952 
 Auto Regime Change  |    .366389   .4607942     0.80   0.427     -.536751    1.269529 
Presidential  |   -1.97527   1.259384    -1.57   0.117    -4.443617    .4930763 
Parliamentary   |  -12.22827   7.322737    -1.67   0.095    -26.58057    2.124027 
Mixed Regime  |  -1.768362   1.008095    -1.75   0.079    -3.744192    .2074681 
 Royal Dictator  |   1.080395   .4571995     2.36   0.018      .184301     1.97649 
Military Dictator |  -.0966064   .4792705    -0.20   0.840    -1.035959    .8427466 
 Enemy Access   |   .8802396    .309786     2.84   0.004     .2730702    1.487409 
 Capability Symmetry |   1.672635   .6830165     2.45   0.014     .3339468    3.011322 
Polity-Parl Interact |   1.123978   .7754071     1.45   0.147    -.3957924    2.643747 
Polity-B. Deaths Interact| -3.29e-07   2.34e-07    -1.40   0.160    -7.88e-07    1.30e-07 






B. Including Lagged Version of Enemy Access Variable and Lagged Version of Dependent Variable 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Generalized Ordered Logit Estimates               Number of obs   =        216 
                                                  Wald chi2(22)   =    5348.75 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log pseudolikelihood =  -141.3181                 Pseudo R2       =     0.3787 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       |               Robust 
  Access Measure  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
mleq1                  | 
Lagged Access Measure |   -.273614    .2501431    -1.09  0.274    -.7638854    .2166574 
Battle Deaths Annual |  -1.37e-06    1.63e-06    -0.84   0.402    -4.57e-06    1.83e-06 
Battle Deaths Monadic  |  -1.14e-06    6.14e-07    -1.86   0.063    -2.35e-06    6.17e-08 
Polity Score   |   .1699481**   .0603792     2.81 0.005      .051607    .2882891 
Durability   |   .0138643    .0081487     1.70  0.089    -.0021068    .0298355 
Auto Regime Change |  -11.50961*** 1.350737    -8.52 0.000      -14.157   -8.862212 
Presidential  |   15.81665***  1.049536    15.07 0.000     13.75959     17.8737 
Parliamentary   |  -304.2721*** 12.14231   -25.06 0.000    -328.0705   -280.4736 
Mixed Regime  |   17.03346*** .7494734    22.73 0.000     15.56452     18.5024 
Royal Dictator   |   -.000329  .517522    -0.00   0.999    -1.014653    1.013995 
Military Dictator |   .3149802 .4780529     0.66  0.510    -.6219862    1.251947 




Capability Symmetry |   1.807388**  .6912685     2.61  0.009      .452527     3.16225 
Polity-Parl Interact  |   35.40804***  1.42471    24.85  0.000     32.61566    38.20042 
Polity-B.Deaths Interact |   1.93e-07    2.17e-07     0.89   0.373    -2.32e-07    6.19e-07 
 Constant  |  -.3686782    .4172576    -0.88  0.377    -1.186488    .4491316 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
mleq2                  | 
Lagged Access Measure |   .4050956    .2967202     1.37  0.172    -.1764653    .9866564 
Battle Deaths Annual  |  -.0000233*    9.74e-06    -2.39   0.017    -.0000424   -4.18e-06 
Battle Deaths Monadic  |  -1.14e-06  6.14e-07    -1.86  0.063    -2.35e-06    6.17e-08 
Polity Score   |   .1699481**   .0603792     2.81  0.005      .051607    .2882891 
Durability   |   .0138643    .0081487     1.70  0.089    -.0021068    .0298355 
Auto Regime Change  |   .2817902    .2138494     1.32  0.188     -.137347    .7009274 
Presidential  |   .7606486    1.004921     0.76  0.449     -1.20896    2.730257 
Parliamentary   |  -23.01044*   10.67365    -2.16  0.031    -43.93042    -2.09046 
 Mixed Regime  |  -1.712619*    .7604744    -2.25 0.024    -3.203122   -.2221166 
 Royal Dictator   |   -.000329     .517522    -0.00   0.999    -1.014653    1.013995 
 Military Dictator  |   .3149802    .4780529     0.66   0.510    -.6219862    1.251947 
 Lagged Enemy Access  |   1.885378***  .5082376     3.71  0.000     .8892503    2.881505 
 Capability Symmetry |   1.807388***  .6912685     2.61 0.009      .452527     3.16225 
 Polity-Parl Interact |   2.247839    1.171906     1.92   0.055    -.0490553    4.544733 
Polity-B.Deaths Interact |   1.93e-07    2.17e-07     0.89   0.373    -2.32e-07    6.19e-07 






C. Ordinary Least Squares Results 
Linear regression                                     Number of obs =     251 
                                                         F( 14,    51) =   26.54 
                                                         Prob > F      =  0.0000 
                                                         R-squared     =  0.3540 
                                                         Root MSE      =  .61216 
 
                                         (Std. Err. adjusted for 52 clusters in ccode) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       |               Robust 
  Access Measure  |      Coef.    Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Battle Deaths Annual |  -7.67e-07**    2.09e-07    -3.67   0.001    -1.19e-06   -3.48e-07 
Battle Deaths Monadic  |  -8.10e-07**    3.00e-07    -2.70   0.009    -1.41e-06   -2.07e-07 
Polity Score   |   .0539821*** .0135843     3.97   0.000     .0267105    .0812537 
Durability   |   .0055956*    .0020768     2.69   0.010     .0014262     .009765 
Auto Regime Change  |   -.014394    .0084467    -1.70   0.094    -.0313514    .0025634 
 Presidential   |  -.5218151*     .217439    -2.40   0.020     -.958342   -.0852881 
 Parliamentary  |  -.5275377    .8298577    -0.64   0.528    -2.193546    1.138471 
 Mixed Regime  |   -.198394    .1535836    -1.29   0.202     -.506726     .109938 
 Royal Dictator  |   .5878249*** .1112493     5.28   0.000     .3644826    .8111673 
 Military Dictator  |   .0629442    .1210295     0.52   0.605    -.1800327     .305921 
Enemy Access  |   .2693471*** .0592917     4.54   0.000     .1503141    .3883801 
Capability Symmetry |   .5251584**   .1935456     2.71   0.009     .1365994    .9137174 




Polity-B. Deaths Interact|  -5.51e-08    3.11e-08    -1.77   0.082    -1.18e-07    7.35e-09 
 Constant  |  .6590054***  .1330211     4.95   0.000     .3919543    .9260564 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
D. Random Effects Ordered Probit Results  
 
Random Effects Ordered Probit                      Number of obs   =        256 
                                                     LR chi2(8)      =      95.30 
Log likelihood = -211.05399                         Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  Access Measure  |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
eq1                    | 
Battle Deaths Annual  |  -2.20e-06*    1.12e-06    -1.97   0.049    -4.38e-06   -1.07e-08 
Polity Score   |   .0846217**   .0298045     2.84   0.005     .0262059    .1430375 
Durability   |   .0010548     .003708     0.28   0.776    -.0062128    .0083225 
Auto Regime Change  |  -.0175487    .0798545    -0.22   0.826    -.1740607    .1389634 
Lagged Enemy Access  |   1.008546*** .1192662     8.46   0.000     .7747885    1.242303 
Capability Symmetry  |   .7816918*  .3434337     2.28   0.023     .1085741    1.454809 
Polity-Parl Interact  |  -.0829645    .0528508    -1.57   0.116    -.1865502    .0206213 
Polity-B.Deaths Interact |   5.47e-08    1.21e-07     0.45   0.650    -1.82e-07    2.91e-07 
---------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
_cut1                  | 
_cons    |  -.0275755    .2712436    -0.10   0.919    -.5592031    .5040521 
